

An abstract 3D graphic of a keyboard. The keys are rendered in three colors: blue, yellow, and grey. The keys are arranged in a grid pattern, with some keys missing or shifted, creating a sense of depth and perspective. The background is a dark blue gradient.

2017 / 2

LATVIJAS INTERESES EIROPAS SAVIENĪBĀ

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Ārlietu ministrija



LATVIJAS
POLITOLOGU BIEDRĪBA

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Zinātniskā redaktore **Žaneta Ozoliņa**

Projekta vadības grupa **Iveta Reinholde, Nora Vanaga**

Literārā redaktore **Inga Kanasta-Zabarovska**

Maketētāja **Inese Siliniece**

Māksliniece **Kristīne Plūksna**

Redakcijas kolēģijas adrese:

Latvijas Politologu biedrība
Lomonosova iela 1A, Rīga, LV-1019

Tālrunis: 67140533

e-pasts: info@politologubiedriba.lv

www.politologubiedriba.lv

ISSN 2243-6049

Iespiests SIA Dardedze hologrāfija
Ķengaraga iela 10a, Rīga

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Tukša lapa

Editor's Note

In recent years such key words as hybrid threats, information warfare, propaganda, fake news and many others constitute substantial part of discussions related to a new generation of warfare. A collection of different tools which are applied by government sponsored and supported groups in order to influence minds and behaviour of individuals is expanding in those countries which rely on deception, delusion and disinformation. There are less and less people in the western world who would be surprised about such practices. Interference in the election process in the United States of America and France, manipulation with information, bribing journalists and politicians – what in the end serves the purpose of Russia's foreign and security policy ambitions. Edward Lucas wrote that “Americans are worried about Russia's trademark cocktail of money, propaganda, spookery and violence”¹

We cannot complain about impressive growth of studies which are revealing the most sophisticated (and sometimes not sophisticated at all) manipulative instruments of Russia's propaganda. At the same time there is no wide range of scholarly attempts to analyse the policies and policy tools that the Western countries are applying to minimize potential impact of Russian policies on the core values of democratic societies. Therefore, the journal “*Latvijas intereses Eiropas Savienībā*” (*Latvian Interests in the European Union*) attempts to bridge the gap and to reveal a few aspects of the Western response to propaganda.

The editorial board of the journal invited scholars from different countries to present their cases on how respective governments and societies are dealing with the new reality. Sarma Gintere in her article compares three actors that have been direct targets of Russia's hybrid threats – Georgia, Ukraine and the Baltic states. She follows five widely used criteria in the

¹ *The Sunday Times*, 24 September, 2017.

identification of the presence of hybrid threats and arrives at the conclusions that so far only the Baltic States have not faced paramilitary actions but other elements of hybrid threats are present. Bojana Zorić introduces Montenegrin experience in dealing with Russia's propaganda which substantially increased before integrative attempts to join NATO were intensified. She argues that despite massive campaigns from outsided society demonstrated what resilience is about and support to the alliance remains strong. Katrine Pedersen introduces the Danish case. Denmark was not considering itself as the main target of Russia's propaganda. However, after the introduction of EU's limited sanctions against Russia, flows of mastered fake news increased in the country. Pedersen argues that there are no grounds for the spread of mastered fake news. At the same time several decisions taken by the government prove its commitment to protect values that Danish society is respecting. Sigita Strubergera presents the Latvian case. Latvia is considered as one of the most exposed countries to Russia's propaganda. Looking at those measures that the government and the society at large has undertaken in recent years, there is no surprise that Latvian society is demonstrating a high level of resilience. Starting from 2013-2014 different institutions, such as NATO Strategic Communication Centre of excellence, the EU East StratCom Task Force, European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, were established in order to reveal the essence of Russia's hybrid threats and to inform societies about their effects. Numerous think tanks are also contributing to the debate. Therefore, the question often asked is what those institutions have achieved and whether their performance is efficient in countering flows of propaganda. Heinrihs Rozēns studies the so called Liza's case and looks at reactions of respective institutions. He concludes that even there are no direct synchronization or collaborative efforts, the conclusions at what those institutions arrived are similar and concrete measures within their competences were introduced. Similar question related to the need of systemic approach to countering hybrid threats are discussed in two interviews – Kurt Engelen who is the Vice-President of the Euro-Atlantic Association of Belgium is more critical, while Jānis Sārts, Director of NATO Strategic Communication Centre of excellence is more optimistic, claiming that coordination of newly established institutions is on the rise. However, individual needs and specific circumstances of countries should not be forgotten.

As always, we include in the journal information related to the most current events. In October Latvian politicians, experts, professionals and journalists participated in a discussion devoted to the Future of Europe. After the publication of the *White Paper on the Future of Europe* by the European Commission in March 2017 member states launched discussions on the proposed five scenarios. The discussion in Biriņi hopefully will serve as background information for finalizing Latvia's position on the future of Europe.

Žaneta Ozoliņa, Editor in Chief

Tukša lapa

I

THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO HYBRID THREATS

Russia's Hybrid Warfare in Georgia, Ukraine and the Baltic States

Sarma Gintere,

MA International Relations, New York University

The article analyzes five aspects of Russia's hybrid warfare in three case studies. The five aspects used to analyze Russia's hybrid warfare are: (1) political influence, (2) community and ethnicity, (3) intelligence, (4) provocations, (5) paramilitary action; meanwhile the use of propaganda accompanies all five. Analysis of the five aspects is done within the case studies of the Five Day War in Georgia, the conflict in Ukraine post-2014, and currently within the Baltic States. The article finds that Russia used hybrid warfare in all three cases and developed it over time by using all five aspects in its aggression towards Georgia and Ukraine, while four, with the exception of paramilitary actions, have been used against the Baltic States.

Keywords: Baltic States, Georgia, hybrid warfare, NATO, Russia, Ukraine.

Rakstā analizētas piecu Krievijas hibrīdkara elementu izpausmes trīs gadījumu izpētē – Gruzijas karā 2008. gadā, Ukrainā no 2014. gada un pašlaik Baltijā. Apskatīti šādi hibrīdkara elementi: 1) politiskā ietekme, 2) etniskā piederība un kopienas, 3) izlūkošana, 4) provokācijas, 5) paramilitāras darbības, savukārt propaganda papildina visus piecus elementus.

Autors secina, ka Krievija vērsusi hibrīdkaru pret visām analizē iekļautajām valstīm. Visi pieci hibrīdkara elementi izmantoti pret Gruziju un Ukrainu, savukārt pret Baltijas valstīm izmantoti četri, izņemot paramilitāras darbības.

Atslēgvārdi: Baltijas valstis, Gruzija, hibrīdkarš, Krievija, NATO, Ukraina.

Introduction

Following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, analysis of Russia's tactics and strategies has been brought to the forefront of Western politics and academia. However, this time with a modern narrative in which traditional confrontation takes a back seat in favor of a more covert approach. This article introduces conclusions about Russia's use of hybrid warfare derived from a Master's thesis written at the New York University in 2017. In my research, I analyzed Russia's use of hybrid warfare in Georgia (2008), Ukraine (from 2014) and the Baltic States (currently). I analyzed hybrid warfare using five aspects: (1) political influence, (2) community and ethnicity, (3) intelligence, (4) provocations, (5) paramilitary action. Meanwhile the use of strategic and highly developed propaganda is an aspect that accompanies all five. In this first part of the article I introduce the concept of hybrid warfare and the five aspects. The following three sections will analyze the use of hybrid warfare in the three case studies, followed by a conclusion based on these three comparisons.

Defining the hybrid warfare

The use of the term 'hybrid warfare' is controversial, especially among academics. Over the past decade or so the term has been used to refer to various forms of warfare, many of which share very little with Russia's actions. However, the term became widely used once NATO adopted it to refer to Russia's actions in Ukraine post-2014. Despite criticism the term has stuck on and despite various attempts to present an alternative¹ the wide use of 'hybrid warfare' continues in society, the military and academia. I define hybrid warfare as:

¹ For example: Jonsson, O., Seely, R. (2015). Russian Full-Spectrum Conflict: An Appraisal After Ukraine. *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (March 2015).

“A strategic form of warfare that aims to limit hard military power while using information and psychological warfare, along with political, technological, social and economic means, to gain an advantage over the target state and exploit any weakness. The use of force is employed through covert and paramilitary means while the support of espionage and propaganda allow the adversary to spin the conflict in a favorable narrative.”²

The case studies of Georgia, Ukraine and the Baltic States were chosen because they illustrate how Russia has used and developed hybrid warfare over a period of time, and how it is used outside and within NATO territory.

The five aspects of my analysis provide evidence of whether hybrid warfare has been used and to what extent. First, **political influence** analyzes Russia's role in infiltrating and/or influencing politics and political leaders in the target state. Second, **community and ethnicity** focuses on Russia's use of minorities or Russian speakers in a target state to exploit and create division, often exaggerating the actual situation to present its aggression in a favorable light. Third, analysis of Russia's use of **intelligence** illustrates the covert way it aims to weaken the target state using espionage. Fourth, **provocations** are used by Russia to intimidate and provoke an action from the target state that Russia is then able to use as a pretext to enhance its aggression. Finally, **paramilitary actions** are used to confront the target state via force, all the while allowing Russia to deny military involvement.

Undeniably, all the aspects are closely interconnected. Likewise, analysis cannot always present the full picture, especially in relation to the aspects of intelligence and political influence because a large part of the evidence is known only to intelligence institutions. Hence it is important to emphasize that research of these aspects presents only the ‘tip of the iceberg’ of the true extent of Russia's hybrid warfare. This, however, does not diminish the ability to conclude if these aspects are present in Russia's actions; it simply means that indications of the aspects reflect the minimum of their true extent.

² Authors definition using the concepts established by: Galeotti, M. *Hybrid War or Gibridnaya Voyna?: Getting Russia's Non-Linear Military Challenge Right*. Mayak Intelligence, 2016. & Bērziņš, J. (2016). *The New Generation of Russian Warfare*. The Potomac Foundation. Retrieved (11.10.2016.) from: <http://www.thepotomacfoundation.org/the-new-generation-of-russian-warfare/>

Georgia 2008 – Five Day War

In 2008, following Georgia's decision to send troops into the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia launched a military intervention in Georgia. While the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are officially a part of Georgia, in the 1990s their unrecognized governments declared independence making them separatist regions. Following early clashes a ceasefire was signed in 1994 with Russia deploying 'peacekeepers' to the regions. In 2008, separatist forces began to shell over the regional border into the rest of Georgia's territory provoking Georgian president Saakashvili to send troops into the regions. Russia responded by also sending in troops and further invading Georgian territory by advancing towards the city of Gori. After Russia halted the conflict which lasted five days, it recognized both regions as independent.

Analysis of Russia's use of **political influence** shows that before the military conflict began it tried to use Georgian politicians, especially those of the opposition, to influence Georgian politics and infiltrate the government.³ Furthermore, Russia helped create, fund and use non-governmental organizations (NGO's) to further the Kremlin's influence in the country.⁴ Despite Georgia not having a notable ethnic Russian minority, Russia used the aspect of **community and ethnicity** to exploit the linguistic and ethnic ties present among residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Already in 2001 Russia imposed visa requirements on the rest of Georgia, except in regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in what the EU deemed a "de facto annexation of these indisputably Georgian territories."⁵ In the years leading up to the conflict Russia enhanced its use of *passportization* – a tactic employed by the Kremlin which involves granting Russian passports to masses of people (in this case residents of the two regions) irrespective of their ethnic ties and

³ Lefebvre, S., McDermott, R.N. (2009). Intelligence Aspects of the 2008 Conflict Between Russia and Georgia. *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 8.

⁴ Cecire, M. (2015). The Kremlin Pulls on Georgia. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved (09.03.2015.) from: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/09/the-kremlin-pulls-on-georgia/>. & Kartte, F. (2015). Russia Beams Message into Georgia: 'You Belong to Us'. *Politico*. Retrieved (05.04.2016.) from: <http://www.politico.eu/article/russia-message-to-georgia-you-belong-to-us-eu-allure-waning-tbilisi/>

⁵ European Parliament. (2001). *Visa requirements between Russia and Georgia*. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/euro/pcc/aag/pcc_meeting/resolutions/2001_01_18.pdf

judicial status.⁶ This tactic allows Russia to claim it is intervening to protect Russian citizens.

Intelligence was also used by Russia towards Georgia. Shortly before the conflict Georgia uncovered a group of individuals conducting espionage on behalf of the Kremlin with the aim of gaining information on Georgia, including its relations with NATO.⁷ Additionally, a few weeks before the Five Day War broke out Russia's cyber intelligence units infiltrated Georgia's military and government networks.⁸ During the war Russia's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) worked in Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, as the army moved past the regional border. Meanwhile Russia used its cyber capabilities to illustrate its power while refraining from attacking the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipe's infrastructure, possibly holding the target in reserve to pressure Georgia to accept defeat.⁹

The use of **provocations** is particularly notable in the war due to Russia's success in provoking Saakashvili. The shelling of Georgian territory from the separatist regions was a Russian provocation and conducted by forces that were "egged on and armed by Moscow."¹⁰ By responding to the provocations Georgia gave Russia pretext to begin its intervention while having the ability to claim it was doing so to protect its citizens within the regions. Meanwhile **paramilitary actions** remain closely intertwined with the provocations. Russia not only armed and supported separatists in the regions before the war broke out, it also moved paramilitary forces into South Ossetia in preparation for the conflict.¹¹ However, once Georgia responded to the provocations

⁶ Roudik, P. Russian Federation: Legal Aspects of War in Georgia. Library of Congress. Retrieved (19.04.2017.) from: <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/russian-georgia-war.php>

⁷ Lefebvre, S., McDermott, R.N. (2009). Intelligence Aspects of the 2008 Conflict Between Russia and Georgia. *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 8.

⁸ Hollis, D. (2011). Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008. *Small War Journal*, January 2011. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/cyberwar-case-study-georgia-2008>

⁹ Haddick, R. (28.01.2011.). This Week at War: Lessons from Cyberwar I. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved (28.01.2011.) from: <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/28/this-week-at-war-lessons-from-cyberwar-i/>

¹⁰ Galeotti, M. (2017). 2008: The Georgian Turning Point. In: *The Modern Russian Army 1992-2016*. New York: Osprey Publishing, 2017, p. 22.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 25 & Traynor, I. (2009). Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili Blamed for Starting Russian War. *The Guardian*. Retrieved (30.09.2009.) from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/30/georgia-attacks-unjustifiable-eu>

Russia moved on to using traditional force and deployed its military troops. Using paramilitary forces for just the beginning and moving on to traditional military force marks the biggest difference between Russia's approach in Georgia and what it went on to do in Ukraine six years later.

Ukraine 2014

Ukraine's president, Viktor Yanukovych's, decision to halt an agreement on closer ties with the EU in favor of boosting relations with Russia sparked protests in Kiev. Attempts to quash them by Yanukovych's government seemed to only add fuel and clashes between protestors and police turned deadly. When Yanukovych fled the country the opposition formed a government and announced plans to hold elections. A few days later armed forces in masks and unmarked uniforms took over airports and regional government buildings around Crimea. Soon enough Crimea's regional parliament was surrounded and, along with electing a new government, Crimean politicians decided to call for a referendum about joining the Russian Federation. In March 2014 the referendum (deemed illegal by the US and EU) passed and Russian president, Vladimir Putin, signed a bill to add Crimea to Russian territory. Shortly thereafter violence broke out in eastern Ukraine, especially the cities of Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv, where separatists occupied buildings and called for independence referendums. Ukrainian forces became involved and tried to liberate the regions, clashes in eastern Ukraine continue to this day with talks in Geneva not being enough to halt the violence.

Russia's use of **political influence** in Ukraine was immense. Russia had influence over Ukraine's leaders and top advisors. Leading up to the annexation of Crimea, Crimean regional politicians were regularly traveling to Moscow for meetings.¹² Russia also had close ties to Yanukovych, it donated around \$300 million to his unsuccessful presidential bid in 2004.¹³ Furthermore, Russia also had close ties to various civil society organizations

¹² Boghani, P. (21.12.2016.). How Russia Looks To Gain Through Political Interference. PBS. Retrieved (23.12.2016.) from: <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/how-russia-looks-to-gain-through-political-interference/>

¹³ Peleschuk, D. Uncertainty Remains Over Black Sea Fleet. ETH Zürich. Retrieved (20.04.2017.) from: <http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/121118>

that promoted a pro-Kremlin agenda in the country.¹⁴ **Community and ethnicity** was important in Russia's hybrid warfare as it was used to defend the annexation of Crimea. Additionally, the alleged abuse of minorities was accentuated to support the work of Russia's paramilitary forces in the eastern Ukraine. Ethnic tensions in Ukraine were not large enough to create a civil uprising against the government and few citizens actually fought against the government.¹⁵ However, Russia worked to create and exploit the narrative of abused minorities rioting against their oppressive government.

Russia used the aspect of **intelligence** within the conflict by firstly using its agencies to mislead the West and Ukraine about its intentions and actions in Crimea.¹⁶ Secondly, Russia's infiltration of Ukraine's intelligence agencies was immense. In the beginning of the conflict Ukrainian institutions provided Moscow with intelligence leaks, with the Ukrainian Security Service taking orders from Russia at one point.¹⁷ Intelligence has been used by Russia throughout the conflict and Russian infiltration continued to cause various issues, such as the event when a Ukrainian commander betrayed his own forces to separatists.¹⁸

Meanwhile **provocations** were present in Ukraine, but to a lesser degree than in Georgia. Perhaps learning from the war in Georgia, Ukraine has practiced restraint in its reaction to Russia's provocations, this restraint often handicaps Ukraine's actions. For example, Ukraine did not militarily defend Crimea and was warned by Western diplomats to not react to avoid

¹⁴ *Ibid.* & Luhn, A. (20.09.2015.). Russia Funds Moscow Conference for US, EU and Ukraine Separatists. *The Guardian*. Retrieved (20.09.2015.) from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/20/russia-funds-moscow-conference-us-eu-ukraine-separatists>

¹⁵ For information on support for Russia among separatist regions see: Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. (2014). How Relations Between Ukraine and Russia Should Look Like? Public Opinion Polls. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=236> & Rácz, A. (2015). *Russia's Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemies Will to Resist*. Finnish Institute of International Affairs, p. 79.

¹⁶ Rácz, A. (2015). *Russia's Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemies Will to Resist*. Finnish Institute of International Affairs, p. 68 & Zaitsev, A. Партизанскими методами. VPK News. Retrieved (20.04.2017.) Accessed April 20, 2017. <http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/21649>

¹⁷ Sherr, J. Ukraine's Fightback. *World Today*, Vol. 70, No. 4 (August/September 2014), p. 35. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/twt/ukraines-fightback-has-surprised-kremlin>

¹⁸ Shuster, S. (2014). Ukraine Policemen Stand by as Pro-Russian Separatists Seize Control. *TIME*. Retrieved (10.10.2014.) from: <http://time.com/81475/ukrainian-policemen-stand-by-as-pro-russian-%20separatists-seize-control/>

provoking Russia.¹⁹ Paramilitary forces have also been used in provocations with violent demonstration held while Russian troops remain visibly close to the border – blocking Ukraine from responding out of fear of giving Russia a pretext to deploy its military.²⁰ Hence Russia used provocations while limiting the use of traditional forces and handicapping Ukraine in the process, creating a “win-win” situation for Russia.

Paramilitary actions were central to Russia’s hybrid warfare in Ukraine. The first wave of “green men” as they went on to be known, entered Ukraine claiming to be part of a local Crimean defense group. They took over government buildings and were obviously better trained and equipped than a recently formed militia could be.²¹ Paramilitary actions were accompanied by an active propaganda campaign with Russia denying its presence. Russia’s policy of denial continued despite notable evidence such as Russian trucks transporting forces, Russian helicopters flying over Crimea and even the forces themselves telling reporters and residents that they are part of Russia’s military.²² Following a campaign of denial about Russia’s involvement in Crimea, denial and use of paramilitary forces in eastern Ukraine began and continues. Proof of Russia’s paramilitary involvement in eastern Ukraine can be found in various reports, as well as NATO satellite images, reports from Western intelligence agencies, military equipment retrieved from separatists that is traceable to Russia, as well as dead or captive Russian soldiers.²³

Baltic States

The Baltic States share a border with Russia and due to a history that includes decades spent under Soviet Union occupation, the three countries

¹⁹ Rácz, A. (2015). *Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemies Will to Resist*. Finnish Institute of International Affairs, p. 62.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Dayspring, S. M. (2015). Toward a theory of hybrid warfare: the Russian conduct of war during peace. Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/47931/15Dec_Dayspring_Stephen.pdf.

²² Chappell, B., Memmott, M. (04.03.2014.). Putin Says Those Aren’t Russian Forces In Crimea. NPR. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/03/04/285653335/putin-says-those-arent-russian-forces-in-crimea>

²³ Czuperski, M., *et.al.* (2015). *Hiding in Plain Sight: Putin’s War in Ukraine*. Atlantic Council. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Hiding_in_Plain_Sight/HPS_English.pdf

also share some ethnic and cultural ties with Russia. Unlike Georgia and Ukraine, all three countries are EU and NATO members and thus protected under NATO's collective defense clause as well as being closely integrated within the EU politically, socially and economically. While providing relative protection to the Baltic's, NATO and EU membership also make it a viable target for Russia if it wishes to weaken Western international organizations and institutions.

Political influence is exerted by Russia as it tries to influence political parties and leaders, as well as funding and supporting civil society organizations that promote a pro-Kremlin agenda. Both the Latvian opposition party *Harmony* and the Estonian *Center Party* had signed cooperation agreements with Putin's *United Russia*. However, *Harmony* announced the dismantling of the cooperation agreement in 2017 after it was in force for about eight years, while the agreement between the *Center Party* has remained for nearly 13 years. Policies of these parties provide hints of Russia's influence. For example, *Harmony* has openly criticized EU sanctions on Russia that were adopted after the annexation of Crimea.²⁴ The party also passed out fliers that compared certain Latvian regions with Crimea.²⁵ Furthermore, e-mail leaks in 2011 indicated that the mayor of Riga and leading figure within *Harmony*, Nils Ušakovs, had strong links to Moscow that were fostered through Russia's embassy in Riga.²⁶ Meanwhile a prominent politician within Estonia's *Center Party* was found to have accepted over 1 million EUR from a Kremlin-funded organization.²⁷

²⁴ Lastovskis, F. (2017). Saskaņa par sankcijām pret Krieviju: zāģējam zaru, uz kura sēžam. DELFI. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <http://www.delfi.lv/news/national/politics/saskana-par-sankcijam-pret-krieviju-zagejam-zaru-uz-kura-sezam.d?id=48449363>

²⁵ Birnbaum, M. (2014). In Latvia, Fresh Fears of Aggression As Kremlin Warns About Russian Minorities. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/in-latvia-fresh-fears-of-aggression-as-kremlin-warns-about-russian-minorities/2014/09/26/b723b1af-2aed-44d1-a791-38cebbbadbd0_story.html?utm_term=.e336f899791c

²⁶ Diena. (17.02.2013.). Izmeklējot Ušakova e-pasta noplūdi, žurnālists Jākobsons mēnesi turēts psihiatriskajā slimnīcā. Retrieved (22.04.2017.) from: <https://www.diena.lv/raksts/latvija/zinas/izmeklejojot-usakova-e-pasta-nopludi-zurnalisti-jakobsons-menesi-turets-psihiatriskaja-slimnica-13993997>

²⁷ Stratfor Worldview. (27.12.2010.). A Political Scandal in Estonia and Russian Influence in the Baltics. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/political-scandal-estonia-and-russian-influence-baltics>

Russia also actively funds and supports pro-Kremlin civil society organizations within the Baltics. For example, the *Russki Mir Foundation* annually receives over \$20 million from the Russian government.²⁸ Some NGO's are accused of being Russian agents by Baltic intelligence services.²⁹ Perhaps the most visible form of NGO use by the Russian government is illustrated with the 2012 referendum to make Russian the second language in Latvia. The referendum failed by a large margin, but it was a Russian funded NGO that organized, lobbied and collected enough signatures for the initiative to go to a referendum.³⁰

In relation to **community and ethnicity** Russia has used the aspect in the Baltic States as well, mostly by emphasizing the “plight” of Russian speakers and non-citizens who, in Estonia and Latvia, make up nearly one third of the population. Furthermore, evidence indicates that Russia has employed the tactic of *passportization* in the Baltic's.³¹ Then defence minister and current president of Latvia warned: “Russia is trying to use the Russian-speaking minority as a tool to aggressively promote its objectives.”³² Through propaganda and funding civil society organizations, Russia exaggerates and falsifies the minority situation in the Baltic's trying to create an image of countries on the brink of ethnic strife.³³

²⁸ Park, I. (2014). Russian Soft Power in the Baltics: In the Framework of Neoliberalism. *Pursuit – The Journal of Undergraduate Research at the University of Tennessee*, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 160; Saari, S. (2014). Russia's Post-Orange Revolution strategies to increase its influence in Former Soviet Republics: Public diplomacy po russkii. *Finnish Institute of International Affairs*, Vol. 66, No.1.

²⁹ ERR. (07.09.2015.). Over 40 Russian-funded NGOs Operate in Baltic States. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <http://news.err.ee/116670/over-40-russian-funded-ngos-operate-in-baltic-states>

³⁰ Kudors, A. (2014). Russian soft power and non-military influence: The view from Latvia. In: *Tools of Destabilization: Russian Soft Power and Non-Military Influence in the Baltic States*. NATO STRATCOM.

³¹ Grigas, A. (22.02.2016.). How Soft Power Works: Russian Passportization and Compatriot Policies Paved Way for Crimean Annexation and War in Donbas. Atlantic Council.

³² Birnbaum, M. (2014). In Latvia, Fresh Fears of Aggression As Kremlin Warns About Russian Minorities. *The Washington Post*. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/in-latvia-fresh-fears-of-aggression-as-kremlin-warns-about-russian-minorities/2014/09/26/b723b1af-2aed-44d1-a791-38cebbbadbd0_story.html?utm_term=.e336f899791c

³³ *Ibid.*

In terms of **intelligence** Russian agencies work in the Baltics and aim to recruit politicians, businessmen and former communist members.³⁴ In 2016 counterespionage agencies from the Baltic countries reported an increase in the amount and aggressiveness of Russian espionage attempts, particularly in areas close to the border and often in coordination with Belarussian intelligence.³⁵ All three countries concluded that espionage attempts increased following the breakout of the conflict in Ukraine.³⁶

Two main actions can be considered as **provocations** by Russia. First, regularly flying very close to and at times even violating NATO airspace above Baltic territories.³⁷ Second, the 2007 cyber-attack on Estonia which cyber security agencies concluded was carried out by Russia, warning that Russia remains the greatest threat to NATO in cyber space.³⁸ Meanwhile **paramilitary actions** have not been used in the Baltic States.

Conclusion

Analysis of the five aspects shows that hybrid warfare has been used by Russia in all three cases but in different forms. Available information indicates that political influence and intelligence are used by Russia; however, due to the covert nature of these aspects it is very likely that the true extent of their use is greater than reflected in research. The use of provocations differs among the three case studies as Russia has not used physical force in its provocations towards the Baltic States. Furthermore, provocations served as a pretext for military action in Georgia, while they served to handicap and intimidate in

³⁴ Blank, S. (01.12.2016.). Counting Down to a Russian Invasion of the Baltics. *Newsweek*. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <http://www.newsweek.com/counting-down-russian-invasion-baltics-414877>

³⁵ Piotrowski, M. A., Raś (Dudzińska), K. (2016). Baltic States' Intelligence Services Report Increased Threat from Russia. Polish Institute of International Affairs. Retrieved (15.07.2016.) from: <https://www.pism.pl/publications/bulletin/no-42-892>

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Sharkov, D. (04.04.2017.). NATO: Russian Aircraft Intercepted 110 Times Above Baltic in 2016. *Newsweek*. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <http://www.newsweek.com/nato-intercepted-110-russian-aircraft-around-baltic-2016-538444>

³⁸ Maldre, P. (18.05.2016.). The Russian Cyber Threat: Views from Estonia. Center for European Policy Analysis. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <http://cepa.org/The-Russian-Cyber-Threat-Views-from-Estonia>

Ukraine. The 2007 cyber-attack in Estonia is the closest Russia has come to attacking the Baltic's and illustrates how modern warfare has developed.

Russia's use of community and ethnicity is perhaps the most worrisome aspect that Russia exploits. As my research showed, a country does not need to be on the brink of ethnic strife for Russia to use community and ethnicity in its hybrid warfare. In fact, even if there is no ethnic strife, using other aspects, especially paramilitary actions, Russia uses minorities as pretext for aggression. Furthermore, Russia's highly developed propaganda works to defend the narrative of Russia as the protector of abused minorities. Hence, confusing a part of the public into believing that the conflict is home-grown.

Paramilitary actions particularly relate to the aspect of community and ethnicity. In both Georgia and Ukraine paramilitary troops were presented as part of the local minority, despite credible evidence that they are Russian forces. Notably, in Georgia paramilitary troops were only used in the beginning, while they are used throughout the conflict in Ukraine. This shows how Russia developed its hybrid warfare strategy from 2008. The involvement of Russia's military in Georgia resulted in major international backlash, especially in media where pictures of Russian troops and actions were headlining. By only using paramilitary troops in Ukraine Russia seeks to avoid the media criticism it encountered in Georgia, while using state-sponsored media to create an "alternative" media environment that counters the West and spreads its propaganda. Despite the most credible evidence that the forces are Russian, Russia can claim it is a Western conspiracy and influence masses of people with that notion.

While paramilitary actions have not been used in the Baltic States, the use of the other four aspects is nonetheless alarming. As scholars have noted, hybrid warfare can happen in levels and the success of non-violent actions serves to encourage Russia to step up the warfare and involve force.³⁹ Thus, it is vital for the Baltic States to not underestimate the threat. In the potential use of paramilitary actions in the Baltic's, Russia would aim to portray it as a civil conflict and thus one that does not fall under NATO's collective defence obligation.

³⁹ Bērziņš, J. (2015). Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defence Policy. *CSSR Policy paper*, No.2, April 2014, p. 7.

NATO must continue in maintaining its presence by the border. It is also vital that NATO, especially the leaders of the most powerful NATO states, emphasize the commitment to protecting the territorial integrity of Baltic allies and readiness to react to any breach. Meanwhile Baltic States must fulfil their financial obligations under NATO, as well as focus on societal integration, such as weighing different options of granting automatic citizenships to non-citizens and fostering unity. Nevertheless, continued NATO and Baltic readiness to react in the case of paramilitary actions, which will likely be planned and developed in a way that presents the situation as a home-grown conflict, is paramount.

This research shows that Russia has developed hybrid warfare from its use in Georgia, to how it was implemented in Ukraine and will likely continue to develop it in its further use towards the Baltic States. This research would be further enhanced by analysis of Russia's use of economy and energy within hybrid warfare to present an even more encompassing picture of Russia's actions. Overall, it is important to recognize that in its use of hybrid warfare towards NATO member states, Russia has refrained only from using physical force and violence, but has targeted it through all other aspects. Hence Russia's hybrid warfare is a major threat for NATO – the worst reaction of NATO and other actors would be to underestimate it.

Propaganda as a Tool of Obstructing Montenegro's Engagement with the West

Bojana Zorič,

Junior researcher at ALDE group in the European Committee of the Regions

Despite the nurturing of warm ties for decades, Montenegro's NATO membership appeared to be an impediment for the continuation of positive relations with Russia. By examining economic repercussions, political connections with Montenegrin opposition and deceptive media campaigns led by Russia, this article demonstrates the variety of Russian reciprocal measures taken prior to and after Montenegro's acceptance to NATO in June 2017. The article argues that, unlike in post-Soviet countries where Russian influence is still strong, Russia is gradually losing its position in Montenegro, as the polarisation of the Montenegrin political scene goes in favour of the ruling coalition, whose foreign policy aspirations match those of NATO and the EU. The Kremlin's incapacity to alter Montenegro's direction toward NATO caused a setback in political relations between Moscow and Podgorica and brought upon the country a series of actions that were backed by an anti-Montenegro media campaign.

Keywords: EU, information warfare, Montenegro, NATO membership, political opposition, propaganda.

Neskatoties uz desmitiem gadu koptām attiecībām, Melnkalnes dalība NATO ir izrādījusies šķērslis pozitīvām attiecībām ar Krieviju. Analizējot Krievijas ietekmi uz ekonomiku, politiskās saiknes ar Melnkalnes opozīciju un maldinošās kampaņas masu plašsaziņas līdzekļos, autors atklāj dažādus Krievijas īstenotus pasākumus, kas tika īstenoti pirms un pēc Melnkalnes uzņemšanas NATO. Rakstā tiek apgalvots, ka atšķirībā no bijušajām Padomju Savienības republikām, kur Krievijas ietekme ir

joprojām spēcīga, Krievija pakāpeniski sāk zaudēt savu ietekmi Melnkalnē. Tās centieni politiski šķelt Melnkalni kalpo par labu valdošajai koalīcijai, kuras ārpolitikas virziens ir dalība NATO un ES. Kremļa nespēja kavēt Melnkalnes virzību uz NATO būtiski pasliktināja attiecības starp Maskavu un Podgoricu. Tā rezultātā Melnkalne pieredzēja spēcīgu pretdarbību, ko pastiprināja pret Melnkalni vērsta nomelnojoša kampaņa plašsaziņas līdzekļos.

Atslēgvārdi: ES, informācijas karadarbība, Melnkalne, NATO dalība, politiskā opozīcija, propaganda.

Introduction

“Weakening the EU and obstruction of NATO is taking place in the Western Balkans and in order to create new political divisions it is necessary to prevent Montenegro from becoming a member of the Alliance,” noted the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro, Srdjan Darmanovic, when asked about his country’s EU and NATO aspirations¹. Although the EU stays fully committed to the European perspective for the whole of the Western Balkans region and continues intense engagements in this respect, the influence of other foreign actors, especially Russia are visible across the region.² Russia has made systematic attempts to destabilize the countries seeking closer integration with the EU and NATO and has increasingly used coercion to safeguard its influence in the post-Soviet space.³ The Kremlin seeks to exploit divisions in the Western Balkans and engineer ethnic

¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro. (22.05.2017.). Interview of Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Srdjan Darmanovic to agency MINA: Traditional friendship with Russia is a historical myth. Retrieved (20.08.2017.) from: <http://www.gov.me/vijesti/172595/Intervju-ministra-vanjskih-poslova-prof-dr-Srdjana-Darmanovica-agenciji-MINA-Tradicionalno-prijateljstvo-sa-Rusijom-mit-iz-prosl.html>

² On EU’s commitment have a look at: European Union External Action (03.07.2017.). Mogherini reaffirms EU commitment to European perspective of Western Balkans. Retrieved (05.06.2017.) from https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/29172/Mogherini%20reaffirms%20EU%20commitment%20to%20European%20perspective%20of%20Western%20Balkans

³ Delcour, L., Kostanyan, H. (2014). Towards a Fragmented Neighbourhood: Policies of the EU and Russia and their consequences for the area that lies in between. *CEPS Essay*, No. 17/ 17. Retrieved (05.05.2017.) from <https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/CEPS%20Essay%20No%2017%20Fragmented%20Neighbourhood%20-%20H%20Kostanyan%20L%20Delcour.pdf>

and political tensions in order to undermine the Western-led system and diminish liberal order that the EU stands for. Covert actions, political backlashes, economic repercussions, financial incentives, and propaganda are some of the tactics that the Kremlin uses in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives abroad. The possibility of Russian state agencies to influence European political parties and its politicians as well as to distort public opinion made governments revise their institutional practices and forge various approaches to fighting it. This article analyses Montenegro as one of such cases where Russia by using its influence seeks to undermine opponents and weaken Western institutions.

Following independence referendum of 2006, Montenegro became the sixth post-Yugoslav independent state after having left the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro that existed since 1992. Shortly after gaining its independence, a political dialogue between the government of Montenegro and the EU institutions was established at ministerial level.⁴ In 2007, the Montenegrin Parliament adopted a new constitution where “dedication to the European and Euro-Atlantic integration” was set as one of the main foreign policy goals.⁵ The formal institutional framework for bilateral EU-Montenegro relations came in 2007 and in 2010 the EU granted Montenegro an official status of a candidate country. So far, the country has provisionally closed chapters 25, 26 and 30 on *Science and Research*, *Education and Culture*, and *External Relations*, respectively.⁶ Montenegro’s NATO aspirations were developing simultaneously with EU objectives. The country was invited to join the Membership Action Plan in 2009 after which the start of accession talks began in December 2015. According to the Montenegrin Deputy Prime Minister Dusko Markovic the “Euro-Atlantic agenda instantly became 'a top priority' for the Montenegrin

⁴ European External Action. (06.06.2017.). Montenegro and the EU. Retrieved (21.08.2017.) from: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/27529/Montenegro%20and%20the%20EU

⁵ Constitution of Montenegro. *Official Gazette of Montenegro*, 01/07, 25 October 2007. Retrieved (04.06.2017.) from: <http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/me/me004en.pdf>

⁶ European Commission. Montenegro. European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations. Retrieved (16.06.2017.) from: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/montenegro_en

government”.⁷After the Accession Protocol was signed in May 2016, the instrument was ratified by all parliaments in NATO member states and the country became a full member of the Alliance on 5 June, 2017.⁸

The Kremlin's ability to impact domestic politics and provoke general anti-Western sentiment in Montenegro's society took shape in light of the country's accession to NATO. Russia has openly advocated for a referendum on NATO membership by referring to the demands of the largest opposition groups and defending the rights of Montenegrin people to have a free choice about their future.⁹ The pro- and anti-NATO political spectrum division generated protests which resulted in *coup d'état* in October 2016 when Russia was accused of planning an assassination of Prime Minister, Milo Djukanovic, and an overthrow of the elected government. According to Special State Prosecutor, Milivoje Katnic, the plot to attack Montenegro's Parliament was directed by Russian intelligence officers with the support and blessing of Moscow. This was also backed by a senior “Whitehall official” who claimed to have evidence about the interference of Russian state organs.¹⁰

The case of a planned *coup d'état* is the most recent example of a blatant attempt to interfere in Montenegro's domestic affairs with the purpose of turning the outcome of the elections in Moscow's favour. It can serve not only as a testing ground for Russia but also as a reminder that the Kremlin is stepping up and seeking to go beyond “soft propaganda” in the Western Balkans. By looking at the most recent examples of Russian retaliatory measures in economic and media spheres with the particular emphasis on political connections with the Kremlin, the article examines to

⁷ Glasser, S. B. (12.06.2017.). Damon Wilson and Prime Minister Dusko Markovic: The Full Transcript. *The Global Politico*. Retrieved (05.08.2017.) from: <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/12/damon-wilson-and-prime-minister-dusko-markovic-the-full-transcript-215241>

⁸ NATO. (12.06.2017.). Relations with Montenegro. Retrieved (23.06.2017.) from: http://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_49736.htm

⁹ TASS News Agency (22.06.2016.). Duma called upon NATO and OSCE to start a dialogue about dangerous of launching anti-missile defence system. Retrieved (21.07.2017.) from: <http://tass.ru/politika/3390925>

¹⁰ Farmer, B. (19.02.2017.). Russia plotted to overthrow Montenegro's government by assassinating Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic last year, according to Whitehall sources. *Telegraph*. Retrieved 07.08.2017.) from: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/18/russias-deadly-plot-overthrow-montenegros-government-assassinating/>

what extent Moscow can distort Montenegro's process of horizontal institutionalization¹¹ within the Western institutions.

Russian Hybrid Warfare Tools

The European Parliament *Resolution on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties* highlights that hostile propaganda comes in different forms and uses various tools with the goal of distorting truths, provoking doubt, discrediting EU institutions and transatlantic partnerships and, by doing so undermining and eroding the European narrative based on democratic values, human rights and the rule of law.¹² Frank G. Hoffman (2007) defines hybrid war as a blend of the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular war. More specifically the concept is explained as the use of military and non-military tools in an integrated campaign designed to achieve surprise, seize the initiative and gain psychological as well as physical advantages utilising diplomatic means, sophisticated and rapid information, electronic and cyber operations; covert and occasionally overt military and intelligence action; and economic pressure.¹³ James J. Wirtz (2015) goes a step further and breaks the concept of information warfare down into several constituent parts: intelligence, counterintelligence, deceit, disinformation, electronic warfare, psychological pressures, degradation of information systems and propaganda.

Russia has been using social media, as the most convenient platform for disseminating information and anti-Western sentiment, since information control is vital to the Russian strategy to maintain control of its citizens and

¹¹ The most crucial level of horizontal institutionalisation is full membership since it concedes full rights to the new member state. Source: Mehlhausen, T. (2015). *European Union Enlargement: Material interests, community norms and anomie*. Routledge, pp. 14-15.

¹² European Parliament (14.10.2016.). Report on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties, (2016/2030(INI)). Retrieved (14.08.2017.) from: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A8-2016-0290&language=EN>

¹³ The International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2015). Complex crises call for adaptable and durable capabilities. *The Military Balance 2015*. Retrieved (20.07.2017.) from <https://www.iiss.org/-/media/silos/the%20military%20balance/the-military-balance-2015/mb2015-00b-foreword/mb2015%2000b%20foreword.pdf>

prevent any dissent.¹⁴ In this respect, hybrid warfare refers to Moscow's use of a broad range of subversive instruments, many of which are non-military, to further Russian national interests.¹⁵ Moscow seeks to use hybrid warfare to ensure compliance on a number of specific policy questions: (1) to divide and weaken NATO; (2) to subvert pro-Western governments; (3) to create pretexts for war; (4) to annex territory, and (5) to ensure access to European markets on its own terms.¹⁶ The approaches that Russia deploys are diverse and all-encompassing with the ability to adjust the toolkit to the country's specific context: i) economic influence; ii) cyber and information warfare; iii) financial incentives; iv) political connections; v) trolling factory (a new set of weaponry created to additionally backup existing strategies by paying loggers to run several accounts and to post pro-Kremlin comments on internet forums and social networks).¹⁷ The goal of the pro-Russian campaign is to shift public opinion against its own democratic institutions and foreshadow a world where every West-leaning politician is corrupt and all media outlets not of their persuasion are biased.¹⁸

Although the Western Balkan countries do not directly belong to the sphere of Russian influence, the strategic importance of the region as a transit route for Russian gas, along with ideational ties manifested through Slavic roots and Orthodox religion, laid a solid foundation for Russia to establish itself as an influential foreign policy actor in the Western Balkans. Russian foreign policy has been able to build upon traditional foreign policy

¹⁴ Hunter, E., Pernik, P. (2015). The Challenges of Hybrid Warfare. *ICDS Analysis*. Retrieved (03.08.2017.) from: https://www.icds.ee/fileadmin/media/icds.ee/failid/Eve_Hunter_Piret_Pernik_-_Challenges_of_Hybrid_Warfare.pdf

¹⁵ For threats and challenges of Russia's hybrid warfare, see: Eronen, 2016; Monaghan, 2016; Renz and Smith, 2016; Giles, 2015; Reisinger and Golts, 2014. For single-case studies, see: Lanoszka, 2016; Hunter and Pernik, 2015.

¹⁶ Chivvis, C.S. (22.03.2017.). Understanding Russian, Hybrid Warfare and What Can Be Done About it. *RAND Testimony*. Retrieved (31.08.2017.) from: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT468/RAND_CT468.pdf

¹⁷ Kovalev, A. (24.03.2017.) Russia's Infamous 'Troll Factory' Is Now Posing as a Media Empire. *The Moscow Times*. Retrieved (08.08.2017.) from: <https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russias-infamous-troll-factory-is-now-posing-as-a-media-empire-57534>

¹⁸ Smoleňová, I. (2015). The pro-Russian disinformation campaign in the Czech Republic and Slovakia: types of media pro-Russian propaganda, their characteristics and frequently used narratives. *Prague Security Studies Institute*. Retrieved (17.09.2017.) from: http://www.pssi.cz/download/docs/253_is-pro-russian-campaign.pdf

ties with former Yugoslav countries, religious and ethnocultural ties and on harsh criticism of Western conflict resolution policies in a war-torn region. Its business and political ambitions have concentrated mainly on three countries: Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (in particular the entity of Republika Srpska), and Montenegro.¹⁹ Only a limited number of work is dedicated to Russian propaganda in the Western Balkans as the subject became topical recently with the emergence EU aspirations for the Western Balkan countries. For instance, Jaroslaw Wisniewski (2017) shortly discusses Russian information warfare strategies in the Western Balkans and examples of each country deliberate on two key goals of such strategies: 1) undermining all of the Western-sponsored achievements in the region and 2) stopping any future NATO enlargement into the region. So far academic research in the field of the Western Balkan countries and Russia focus mainly on economic, energy and political cooperation with respect to the countries' EU and NATO commitment. However, a comprehensive approach that encompasses broader Russian propaganda strategy in the Western Balkans is still lacking.

Economic and Media Propaganda

In contrast to the media landscape in the West where Russian state-owned channels such as “Russia Today” and “Sputnik” operate, no official media representatives are present in Montenegro at this point in time. It does not, however, prevent the Kremlin from disseminating false information and distorting public opinion. At the end of March, TV channel “24” and the channel “Zvezda”, being under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, reported about “grenades being thrown at monuments in Montenegro, Russian citizens arrested on false charges, the opposition threatening to organize mass protests against the government”²⁰. In order to back up claims from the previous news story, another report

¹⁹ Rotaru, V., Troncot', M. (eds.) (2017). *Romania's Concentric Circles: The impact of Hybrid Actions and a Possible 'Ukrainian Scenario' in the Balkans*. National University of Political Studies and Public Administration. Retrieved (07.08.2017.) from: http://dri.snsps.ro/uploads/brosura_policy_paper-v8-LE-hi_res.pdf

²⁰ Zvezda TV channel. (25.03.2017.). Criminal, Mines and Catalepsy: Why is Montenegro dangerous for tourists. Retrieved (04.07.2017.) from: https://tvzvezda.ru/news/vstrane_i_mire/content/201703251100-mpeq.htm

from Montenegrin Littoral in April followed and depicted a photograph of a car riddled with bullets which was actually a film prop vehicle. After the efforts to find Russian citizens living in Montenegro to comment on the stories failed, state TV media interviewed the members of the opposition party Democratic Front (DF). Both news stories were planned to be broadcasted on June 5-7, during the country's official recognition as a new NATO member. Moreover, as of 24 April 2017, economic warfare took on new proportions following Russian embargo on the wine company "Plantaze" due to alleged pesticides and plasticizers found during the quality control. The decision to ban the most known import product to Russia was politically motivated and came amid the historic vote on ratification of NATO membership Treaty. Prior to that, in 2014, Russia banned imports of meat, fish, seafood, fruits, and vegetables after Montenegro joined the EU on sanctions against Russia. Economic sanctions imposed on Montenegro that were triggered due to a political decision in Podgorica remain Moscow's main weapon in the fight against Montenegro's rapprochement toward Western institutions.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro is not overly concerned with propaganda tools that the Kremlin uses in the interest of causing unrest in the country as "there has not been a single case where Russian businessmen or tourists were treated badly, neither has there been negative sentiment toward Russian people in our country".²¹ The fact that people dealing with spheres, other than politics, are not interested in how media portrays Montenegro is demonstrated on the number of Russian tourists on Montenegrin Littoral. According to the official data of National Touristic Organisation of Montenegro, only in May and July, there were around 30,000 Russian tourists on Montenegrin coast, which is 14% more in comparison with the same period last year.²² Apropos, the numbers which makes the year 2017 the most successful for Montenegrin tourism in a long time on which Russian propaganda had no notable effect.

²¹ Vesti Online. (02.05.2017.). How is Russia waging economic war against Montenegro. Retrieved (13.05.2017.) from: <http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Ex-YU/649260/Kako-Rusija-vodi-ekonomski-rat-protiv-Crne-Gore>

²² Montenegro Tourism Association. Neighbour's negative campaign is in vain: Russians are more than ever. Retrieved (24.07.2017.) from: <http://www.ctu-montenegro.org/en/news/dzabana-negativna-kampanja-susjeda-rusa-vise-nego-ikad-321>

The president of the Tourist Association of Montenegro, Zarko Radulovic, believes that the propaganda warfare “made a good promotion for the country because media around the world covered the story about Montenegro”²³. “Politicians cannot alienate us from Russian people and Russia as such”, adds Radulovic, convinced that people in business and cultural sectors are not interested in politics because the business is ongoing despite political setbacks.²⁴ The president of Russian linguist diaspora, Aleksandar Hrgijan, also agrees that using propaganda to discredit Montenegro in the heart and minds of Russian citizens in an effort to damage the country’s economy is “set to fail as the truth cannot be hidden in the age of social media”²⁵. Instead, his organisation strives to counter these actions by using the same social network tools in the furtherance of better communication between Russian and Montenegrin partners.

That being the case, on a high political level Russian propaganda brings about a setback in diplomatic and political relations between Moscow and Podgorica that is easily detected in the belligerent narrative that both governments deliver when addressing one another. The spokeswoman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Irina Zakharova, advised Russians to “think twice before traveling to Montenegro, due to the anti-Russian hysteria that continues to build up in Montenegro amid setback in mutual relations” with the intention of redirecting people to other destinations.²⁶ Montenegro, on the other hand, considers Russia to have interfered in domestic political developments and circumstances, which was then reflected in preparation of a terrorist act.²⁷ Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro Darmanovic refuses to believe that Montenegro is the prime Russian target due to the

²³ Koprivica, V. (01.05.2017.). Russian propagada-economic war against Montenegro. *Aljazeera Balkans*. Retrieved (25.05.2017.) from: <http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/ruski-propagandno-ekonomski-rat-protiv-crne-gore>

²⁴ SEEBIZ ALjazeera Balkans. (01.05.2017.). Radulovic: Russian propaganda will not harm Montenegrin tourism. Retrieved (27.05.2017.) from: <http://www.seebiz.eu/radulovic-ruska-propaganda-nece-nastetiti-crnogorskom-turizmu/ar-155206/>

²⁵ Weekend Newspapers. (03.06.2017.). Russians are preparing media blitzkrieg from June 5th to 7th. Retrieved (02.09.2017.) https://issuu.com/dnevne-novine/docs/783206_4_1496459475

²⁶ Vedomosti (29.05.2017.). Ministry of Internal Affairs: of Russian Federation warns Russians about traveling to Montenegro. Retrieved (04.06.2017.) from: <https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2017/05/29/691971-mid-predostereg>

²⁷ Glasser, S. B. (12.06.2017.). Damon Wilson and Prime Minister Dusko Markovic: Full Transcript, *Politico*. Retrieved (30.06.2017.) from: <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/12/damon-wilson-and-prime-minister-dusko-markovic-the-full-transcript-215241>

country's small size in the Balkans. He sees it as a political direction in which the Kremlin sets itself and Moscow's necessity to fill the geopolitical vacuum wherever possible.²⁸ Prime Minister Markovic seeks to reduce political tensions by stating that "Montenegro in NATO is not a threat to Russia, but rather a contributor to peace and stability, regional cooperation and good neighbouring relations"²⁹.

Political Opposition as a Game Changer?

The political scene in Montenegro cannot be mapped in a traditional sense against the single left-right/conservative-liberal axis. As the majority of the parties see themselves as socio-democratic, the real divide exists between the long-lasting ruling coalition consisting of Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (DPS) and Social Democratic Party of Montenegro (SDP) and the opposition encompassing several parties and movements (DF, Movement for Changes (PzP), New Serbian Democracy (Nova), Socialist People's Party (SNP), Citizens' Movement Under Reformist Action (URA), etc.).³⁰ Another layer of division emerged only recently with Montenegro's NATO aspiration, turning the political landscape into those who support NATO membership and those who do not. The majority of opposition parties that were working hard to undo NATO membership and in general to reduce Western influence in the country are also seen as pro-Russian. Although not being directly related to their emergence, Russia has embraced these parties and up to now continues to turn their anti-Western rhetoric and ideological inclinations towards Kremlin's advantage. In spite of no hard evidence about Kremlin donations to opposition parties found,

²⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro. (2017). Interview of Minister of Foreign Affairs dr. Srdjan Darmanovic to agency MINA: Traditional friendship with Russia is a historical myth. Retrieved (20.08.2017.) from: <http://www.gov.me/vijesti/172595/Intervju-ministra-vanjskih-poslova-prof-dr-Srdjana-Darmanovica-agenciji-MINA-Tradicionalno-prijateljstvo-sa-Rusijom-mit-iz-prosl.html>

²⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro (2017). President Markovic in an interview to Politico: Decision about NATO membership cannot be put into question. Retrieved (26.06.2017.) from: <http://www.mvp.gov.me/pretraga/173479/Predsjednik-Markovic-u-intervjuu-Magazinu-Politico-Odluka-o-clanstvu-CG-u-NATO-u-ne-moze-biti-dovedena-u-pitanje.html>

³⁰ BlogActiv eu. (09.04.2015.). Complete reshuffling of the opposition scene in Montenegro? Retrieved (23.08.2017.) from: <https://montenegro.blogactiv.eu/2015/04/09/complete-reshuffling-of-the-opposition-scene-in-montenegro/>

frequent visits of Montenegrin opposition parties' leaders to Moscow speak of close connection to the Kremlin and raise suspicions about continuous Russian support for parties' activities and political agenda back at home.

The major opposition party – Socialist Party of Montenegro (SNP) – is committed to maintaining good relations with the Russian government, which is proved by the number of official visits to Russia. In 2014, the party's former leader, Srdjan Milic, was the only politician representing Montenegro at the celebration of Victory Day in Moscow. The timing was symbolic as it coincided with Djukanovic's visit to Washington at a time when sanctions against Russia were widely discussed. Other visits followed in the next year and were justified as "the continuation of constructive cooperation of Socialist People's Party of Montenegro with the representatives of political parties and the government of the Russian Federation with the aim of improving bilateral relations between Montenegro and the Russian Federation".³¹ The party's leader, Nenad Popovic, condemned the government's decision not to hold a referendum on NATO membership, as it represents a harsh violation of human rights and the crackdown on democratic principles by the regime in Podgorica.³² The same line of thinking can be read in Russian media and among Russian officials who openly opposed the decision not to include the Montenegrin population in a decision over NATO membership.

Moreover, two pro-Russian leaders of DF party, Milan Knezevic and Andrija Mandic, sought to garner Russian support during the protests against Montenegro joining NATO in early 2017. They were among 14 suspects over an alleged coup attempt to overthrow the Montenegrin government and are facing investigations at the moment. They visited Moscow amid unrests in Montenegro due to a new constitutional setup of the Parliament that was boycotted by four opposition parties. Sergey Zelezhnyak, deputy speaker of Duma known for his extremist views, was one of their hosts during the visit. He was also the one to propose to Montenegrin opposition parties to come

³¹ CDM. (07.05.2017.). Milic in Moscow for four days: The continuation of cooperation with Russian Federation. Retrieved (16.07.2017.) from: <https://www.cdm.me/politika/milic-u-moskvi-cetiri-dana-nastavak-saradnje-sa-ruskom-federacijom/>

³² Blic online. (28.04.2017.). Popovic (SNP) condemned the decision on joining NATO. Retrieved (23.08.2017.) from: <http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/popovic-snp-osudio-odluku-ostupaju-crne-gore-u-nato/q8zz3rk>

up with a common presidential candidate for the elections in 2018. Although such intentions on behalf of the Kremlin failed, it shows the ongoing tendency to gather pro-Russian politicians, create political networks and influence the domestic affairs in the Western Balkans.

Apart from party identification with Kremlin ideological tenets, religious ties between the two Orthodox churches are also used by the Kremlin to foster closer cooperation with political leaders and to spread Russian influence domestically. "The church is being used as an instrument of the Russian state to extend and legitimize the interests of the Kremlin", noted Sergei Chapin, a former editor of the official journal of the Moscow Patriarchate.³³ In the Montenegrin case, the involvement of the clergy in politics became evident when a local priest openly campaigned against NATO referring to it as "a national fascist pact"³⁴. Nebojsa Juskovic, the leader of the Democratic Party of Unity (DSJ) met with Patriarch Kiril in 2016 in Moscow, and according to official party narrative, the meeting represented huge respect for the politics led by Juskovic.³⁵ Earlier in 2014, SNP delegation led by the party's president Srdjan Milic met in Moscow as well. The topics discussed were bilateral relations between Russia and Montenegro and "continuation of warm relations between two countries, as bound by historically and traditionally good relations and fight against fascism".³⁶ The cultural and Orthodox ties emphasized by pro-Russian lawmakers in Montenegro, therefore, serve not only for maintaining close relations with political and religious leaders in Moscow but also as a platform for the promotion of Russian interests.

³³ Higgins, A. (13.09.2016.). In Expanding Russian Influence, Faith Combines with Firepower. *New York Times*. Retrieved (15.07.2017.) from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/14/world/europe/russia-orthodox-church.html>

³⁴ CDM. (16.08.2015.). A Serbian priest in anti-NATO campaign: They want to have a Catholic priest, a hodja and a rabi among them. Retrieved (08.08.2017.) from: <https://www.cdm.me/english/a-serbian-priest-in-anti-nato-campaign-they-want-to-have-a-catholic-priest-a-hodja-and-a-rabbi-among-them/>

³⁵ Analitika. (26.02.2017.). Juskovic with Russian patriarch Kiril. Retrieved (05.09.2017.) from: <http://portalanalitika.me/clanak/220357/juskovic-sa-ruskim-patrijarhom-kirilom>

³⁶ Socialist People's Party of Montenegro. (12.05.2014.). Milic talked with Ecumenical Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia Mr. Kiril. Retrieved (16.08.2017.) from: <http://www.snp.co.me/vijesti.asp?kat=5&id=13671>

Conclusion

Hybrid warfare refers to the use of a broad range of subversive instruments – electronic and cyber operations, covert and intelligence actions, psychological and economic pressures, information warfare and propaganda – in order to ensure compliance on a number of policy issues. In certain parts of the Western Balkans where Russian influence is substantial, shaping political landscape via disinformation techniques became Kremlin's new 'modus operandi'. This article, therefore, demonstrated the variety of measures taken by Russia to retaliate for Montenegro's extensive engagement with Western institutions. Given Montenegro's new status within NATO, the article looked into the proportion of Russian propaganda in Montenegro and possible effects it may have on the country's foreign policy aspirations.

Without having set up any institutional approach to counter Russian propaganda on domestic soil, Montenegro has so far succeeded in staying on track when it comes to NATO membership and EU negotiations. Judging by reactions on behalf of the Montenegrin government, EU membership is undoubtedly high on the foreign policy agenda and the country continues to pursue that goal. As it was shown in the media campaign case, some of the Russian state propaganda channels – "Sputnik" and "Russia Today" – have no direct access to Montenegrin media sphere, which makes influence weak and unstable if compared to post-Soviet countries, where media strategy is substantially more active. Russian propaganda caused no major hindrance for business between Montenegrin and Russian partners. As indicated, the anti-Montenegrin campaign did not have any effect on tourism as the number of Russian tourists visiting Montenegro in 2017 increased by four times. Although the actions from October 2016 when Russia allegedly tried to orchestrate *coup d'état* and assassinate at that time PM Djukanovic have not garnered any institutionalised approach of Montenegrin government to fight Russian propaganda, the act as such has not been detrimental to country's progress toward the EU either.

Furthermore, though the pro-Kremlin aspirations among certain camps of Montenegrin opposition are still very much alive, the reason for it lies not in the long-term impact of any kind of historical catalysts, with which Russian side often boasts, but highly likely in disproportional sponsorship of incumbent President and ex-PM, Milo Djukanovic, by Brussels. In point

of fact, this trend was confirmed by Montenegrin Minister of Foreign Affairs Darmanovic who denied the existence of any traditional friendship between Russia and Montenegro: "The facts about historical friendship date back to 19th century or earlier, but have no ground in the contemporary generations".³⁷ Although the threat of anti-Atlantic and anti-EU rhetoric comes from the majority of opposition parties, the opposition is still divided on a number of issues and, hence, incapable of effectively undoing Montenegro's progress in EU negotiations.

³⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro. (2017). Interview of Minister of Foreign Affairs dr. Srdjan Darmanovic to agency MINA: Traditional friendship with Russia is a historical myth. Retrieved (20.08.2017.) from: <http://www.gov.me/vijesti/172595/Intervju-ministra-vanjskih-poslova-prof-dr-Srdjana-Darmanovica-agenciji-MINA-Tradicionalno-prijateljstvo-sa-Rusijom-mit-iz-prosl.html>

How is Denmark exposed to and coping with Russian Disinformation, Fake News and Propaganda?

Katrine Pedersen,

MSc. Political Science, University of Southern Denmark

Exposure to disinformation, fake news and Russian propaganda is becoming a reality. The freedom of speech, uncensored and rightful media and newspapers is a trademark of Denmark. A Danish core narrative about its society is therefore important for the government, ministries and companies. Examples on fake news and disinformation in Denmark recently focus on a low level of hygiene and legalizing sex with animals. Facing these challenges Denmark has to find a balance between, on the one hand, fighting the disinformation, fake news and propaganda and, on the other hand, not to create propaganda itself. This article claims that Denmark cannot cope with Russia on its own. Therefore, the establishment of bilateral and international cooperation and interdepartmental task forces are of great necessity to Denmark. Another option of great importance is the ability to act faster to counter the threats coming from Russia and its media.

Keywords: cooperation, Denmark, disinformation, fake news, propaganda, Russia.

Ievainojamība pret dezinformāciju, viltus ziņām un Krievijas propagandu ir kļuvusi par realitāti. Vārda brīvība, necenzēti plašsaziņas līdzekļi un laikraksti ir viena no Dānijas tirgus zīmēm. Tā kā tas ir dāņu sabiedrības vadošais vēstījums, valdībai, ministrijām un lielajiem uzņēmumiem šis jautājums ir īpaši svarīgs. Kā viltus ziņu un dezinformācijas piemēri Dānijā pēdējā laikā jāmin paziņojumi par zemo higiēnas līmeni un seksa ar dzīvniekiem legalizēšanu. Saskaroties ar šiem izaicinājumiem, Dānijai

ir jāatrod līdzsvars starp, no vienas puses, cīņu pret dezinformāciju, viltus ziņām un propagandu un, no otras puses, spēju neradīt pašai savu propagandu. Šajā rakstā tiek argumentēts, ka Dānija viena pati nevar stāties pretī Krievijai, tāpēc Dānijai ir ļoti svarīgi veidot divpusēju un starptautisku sadarbību un starpnozaru darba grupas. Vēl viena ļoti nozīmīga joma ir attīstīt spēju ātri stāties pretī Krievijas un tās plašsaziņas līdzekļu radītiem apdraudējumiem.

Atslēgvārdi: Dānija, dezinformācija, Krievija, propaganda, sadarbība, viltus ziņas.

Introduction

Fake news, disinformation and propaganda might become the new normal and a phenomenon that every country and society needs to take seriously. The article aims at an analysis of the Danish exposure to fake news, disinformation and Russian propaganda. The first section of the article will focus on the most recent exposure to Russian propaganda in Denmark. Along the analysis of reaction from society and political elite the response by media will become part of the investigation. Danish media demonstrated an uncritical attitude towards fake news. The second part of the article will focus on how Denmark copes with these new challenges. It further focuses on why strategic communication is becoming a keyword not only for big companies and for institutions, but also for governments, ministries and the parliament.

Disinformation, fake news and propaganda flows in Denmark

In August 2017, Denmark underwent a big attack of disinformation and fake news. The origin was the Russian internet media *kolokol-russia.ru*. This site published an article on how Denmark was about to legalize sex with animals e.g. in a brothel in Copenhagen.¹ The article further stated that sex with animals is legal in Denmark. Neither of the two statements in the story

¹ Kolokolrussia.ru. (03.08.2017.). Danii otrkvaetsya pervy publichny dom dlya zoofilov. Retrieved (30.09.2017.) from: <http://kolokolrussia.ru/novosti/v-danii-otkrvaetsya-pervy-publichny-dom-dlya-zoofilov>

was correct.² As a response, several Danish newspapers and media outlets focused on the challenges that fake news and disinformation created for governments and society at large. In addition, stories on low hygiene standards and food shortages have been spread in the Russian media to weaken the core narrative of Denmark.³

A trademark of Denmark is freedom of speech and an uncensored and rightful media. Many Danes are aware that tabloid media hunt sensational stories, and are able to navigate these media outlets critically. This is much more difficult when trustful newspapers and media publish stories from questionable sources. Some Danish newspapers and media did apologise for not researching their sources used in their news and articles. An example is the Danish newspaper *Ekstra Bladet* referring to the news agency RIA without mentioning its origin- the Russian Ministry of Defence. The specific story refers to Russia testing a new super weapon. *Ekstra Bladet* has also several times referred to the international media *Global Research*, which is known to be influenced by Russian governmental sources. In addition, the Danish newspaper *Jyllands Posten* used information directly from the Russian government without citing it as a source. In this case, the story concerned the launching of a new Russian nuclear missile.⁴ Internet trolls are also an element that Denmark needs to cope with, mostly those which are used for propaganda purposes. Hopefully the focus on trolls has already made people aware of the threat and, according to Max Arhippainen, might not be a big threat anymore. They will not disappear, but the full awareness of them makes them easier to handle. Internet trolls normally act on social media, and Denmark has already picked up a plan for handling the threat.⁵

Russia is not the first to spread disinformation about Denmark. In 2006 *Jyllands Posten* had its Muhammad cartoons controversy. The newspaper

² www.EUvsdisinfo.eu. (09.09.2017.). No, Denmark is not legalising sexual abuse of animals. Retrieved (30.09.2017.) from: <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/no-denmark-is-not-legalising-sexual-abuse-of-animals/>

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Kulager, F. (28.04.2017.). Informationskrig under lup: Sådan spreder Ruslands dagsorden sig i Danmark. *Zetland*. Retrieved (30.09.2017.) from: <https://www.zetland.dk/historie/sOXVEKv3-aOZj67pz-3bd93>

⁵ Hebsgaard, T. (23.03.2017.). Rusland inficerer os med misinformation. Her er modgiften. *Zetland*. Retrieved (30.09.2017.) from: <https://www.zetland.dk/historie/s8RVNypb-ae6XddK5-34b80>

posted several drawings of the Prophet Muhammad, which according to some demeaned him and his religion. The Danish embassies in the Middle East worked hard to correct fake information about Denmark and account for the Danish view on freedom of speech.⁶ After this incident, the exposure of fake news, disinformation, and propaganda has mainly come from Russia. The stories often have their origin from articles and TV-news clips from the Russian media such as *Sputnik* and *Russian Insider*, published in English and German. These languages are chosen to reach an audience outside Russia, for instance the Nordic countries including Denmark.⁷ The media outlet, *Sputnik* had offices in Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland in the period 2014 to 2016. Denmark is mentioned in more than 2450 articles on *Sputnik*, since 2012.⁸

RT, the news agency *RIA*, *Russian Insider* and *Sputnik News* are all media outlets controlled by the Kremlin. Articles and videos are shared on Danish right-wing news media but often without the original or direct sources or subtitles. They are often further shared on the news media *Facebook*-pages.⁹ New internet media are growing in Denmark, with a majority of them being national conservative right wing. The Russian media *RT* is often used by these sites in relation to Islamic and immigrant critical news. An example being *24NYT*, whose owner also established the right-wing internet media, *NewSpeek Networks*. *24NYT* also manages a *YouTube* video channel that shows unedited videos without original sources or often hidden under other sources. For instance *RT* mentioned as the source but originally was filmed by *FSB* (the Russian security agency). It is important to underline that it is not only right-wing news media that have been influenced by Russian propaganda. The Danish ultra-left internet media *KPnet* and *Arbejderen* also distributes stories and information from Russian government controlled

⁶ Fyns, S. (10.01.2006.). Ambassader skal rette op på misinformation. Retrieved (30.09.2017) from: <http://www.fyens.dk/indland/Ambassader-skal-rette-op-paa-misinformation/artikel/586773>

⁷ www.dr.dk. (17.07.2017.). Danske soldater skal beskyttes mod fake news fra Rusland. Retrieved (30.09.2017) from: <https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/politik/danske-soldater-skal-beskyttes-mod-fake-news-fra-rusland>

⁸ Hebsgaard, T. (23.03.2017.). Rusland inficerer os med misinformation. Her er modgiften. *Zetland*. Retrieved (30.09.2017) from: <https://www.zetland.dk/historie/s8RVNypb-ae6XddK5-34b80>

⁹ Kulager, F. (28.04.2017.). Informationskrig under lup: Sådan spreder Ruslands dagsorden sig i Danmark. *Zetland*. Retrieved (30.09.2017.) from: <https://www.zetland.dk/historie/sOXVEKv3-aOZj67pz-3bd93>

media. A study from University of Southern Denmark shows that the rightwing media often has a larger reach and interactions online than the more established media in Denmark.¹⁰

Several Danes have expressed interests during the last years in visiting Russia, the pro-Russian separatist lead part of Ukraine or spreading stories from Russia. One Dane has been interviewed live on the local TV-station *Novorossiya TV*. The starting point of the interview was his view on the situation in Donbass, a separatist controlled area in Ukraine. His views were, contrary to the Danish governments, positive on the Russian involvement in the conflict. The demonstrated interview was unusual in its content and context that cause a range of questions related to the rise of Russian propaganda and manipulation with Danish citizens. Another example is related to exposure of Marie Krarup who is a politician from the Danish National/Social conservative party Dansk Folkeparti's to pro-Russian media. Krarup is not only a member of parliament but also a member of the Foreign Policy Committee in the parliament. Her opinions are often translated and used in Russian media. Furthermore, her comments on the overestimated fear of Russian news used in Danish media were also used by *Sputnik*. Krarup has also presented a report to the Foreign Policy Committee in the Danish parliament conducted by a civilian Dane, who visited the aforementioned areas. This is a new tactic by Russian state media, as *RT* and *Sputnik* to cooperate more closely with local Danish political parties and media. A similar pattern has already been applied in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe for several years but for Denmark it was an unexpected tendency since it does not fall in the traditional category of Russian interests.

These developments mobilized Danish authorities.¹¹ A statement delivered by Anders Samuelsen, the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs on Russia's use of disinformation, fake news and propaganda stated that Russia systematically uses disinformation as examples of lies. Meaning- Russia's efforts are detectable and provably false and untrue. These fake stories have a clear

¹⁰ Kulager, F. (28.04.2017.). Informationskrig under lup: Sådan spreder Ruslands dagsorden sig i Danmark. *Zetland*. Retrieved (30.09.2017.) from: <https://www.zetland.dk/historie/sOXVEKv3-aOZj67pz-3bd93>

¹¹ *Ibid.*

aim of harming the core narrative of Danish society, as well as undermining credibility of Western countries.¹²

Apart from the disinformation, fake news and propaganda Denmark also needs to be aware of cyber-attacks from abroad. In the spring of 2017, Denmark was attacked by a hacker group with roots in Russia and connections to the Kremlin. The group gained access to email accounts at the Danish Ministry of Defence. Already in 2016, the Danish intelligence agency mentioned probable risks of cyber-attacks from Russia.¹³ The Danish company *Maersk* who operates worldwide were also attacked earlier this year. The company was stung for several days and the economic expenditures were enormous.¹⁴

What policy tools does Denmark put forward?

It is not the single story in itself that poses a threat to Denmark, which was the case for the Muhammed controversy. The danger lies in the continuing flow of stories with no source of origin. The flow of the stories positions itself in the awareness arena of citizens, both in Denmark and in neighbouring countries. If the introduced narratives and stories are not handled by the Danish media or authorities, then the Kremlin views on the world might influence the minds of the Danish society.

The first step to counteract the Russian disinformation and propaganda is to make decision makers, media and the broader public aware of the risks involved. Finland, to whom we could compare ourselves, has established a section within the Finnish Ministry of Defence to coordinate the efforts against disinformation.¹⁵ In September 2017 the Danish government

¹² Talking point from the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs. Samråd i Udenrigsudvalget den 1.12.2016. Retrieved (30.09.2017.) from: <http://www.ft.dk/samling/20161/almdel/uru/spm/25/svar/1368531/1701915.pdf>

¹³ FE – Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste (Danish Intelligence Agency). (01.12.2016.). Efterretningsmæssig Risikovurdering 2016. Retrieved (30.09.2017) from: <https://fe-ddis.dk/SiteCollectionDocuments/FE/EfterretningsmaessigeRisikovurderinger/Risikovurdering2016.pdf>

¹⁴ Gronholt-Pedersen, J. (27.06.2017.). Maersk says global IT breakdown caused by cyber-attack. Retrieved (15.10.2017.) from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-attack-maersk/maersk-says-global-it-breakdown-caused-by-cyber-attack-idUSKBN19I1NO>

¹⁵ Hebsgaard, T. (23.03.2017.). Rusland inficerer os med misinformation. Her er modgiften. *Zetland*. Retrieved (30.09.2017.) from: <https://www.zetland.dk/historie/s8RVNypb-ae6XddK5-34b80>

announced the establishment of a similar interdepartmental taskforce, to coordinate efforts against misinformation campaigns targeted at Denmark. This interdepartmental taskforce consists of the head of offices from the Danish Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, the Police Intelligence Agency and the Defence Intelligence Agency. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is asked to identify means to counteract disinformation. Initially the taskforce will support the Danish Embassy in Russia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen, but later the competence will be shared with other Danish Embassies around the world. The taskforce is also used to reduce coordination time, since it has shown that time is important in order to control and prevent disinformation from spreading.¹⁶

The core narrative of Denmark, according to strategic communication experts, is one of the most important tools to be able to cope with disinformation, fake news and propaganda. If it is not possible to compete with the narrative, an alternative can be to seek influence or try to destroy the core narrative of Denmark and its international partners.¹⁷ According to Max Arhippainen, the best way to avoid disinformation and fake news is to pre-empt them- strengthening the narrative and not fighting fake news and disinformation is the best method to counteract. Directly referring to fake stories only fuels them. This creates a difficult position for a country like Denmark, and favours the adversary. Exemplified by the fake news on animal sex, the Danish government decided to establish a unit with the purpose of revealing Russian disinformation and propaganda. The reason was, according to the government, to lower the risk of incorrect stories that can harm the Danish democracy. However, Danish experts fear that this initiative was seen as counter propaganda and therefore ineffective on the campaign against disinformation and propaganda. The challenge for Denmark and the rest of the Western world according to Jed Willard is

¹⁶ Mandag, M. (10.09.2017.). Danmark får ny kommandocentral mod misinformation. Retrieved (30.09.2017.) from: <https://www.mm.dk/artikel/danmark-faar-ny-kommandocentral-mod-misinformation>

¹⁷ Thomas, E.N. (25.01.2017.). Strategisk Kommunikation – et spørgsmål om legitimitet. Retrieved (30.09.2017.) from: http://www.fak.dk/publikationer/Pages/Strategiskkommunikation_etspoergsmaalomlegitimitet.aspx

the growing distrust in existing institutions and organisations.¹⁸ Therefore, creating new ones aimed at countering propaganda will be perceived with enthusiasm.

The Danish Defence forces have put strategic communications high on the agenda in the last couple of years. Not only because of the growing influence from Russian media, but also because Denmark in 2018 will be part of NATO forces deploying soldiers to Estonia. There is a risk of the soldiers being exposed to disinformation during their stay. Therefore, the Danish authorities prepare the soldiers to this risk by establishing a support group to protect the soldiers against disinformation, intimidation and fake news. This group is established in close cooperation with a NATO unit working with strategic communication.¹⁹ The risk is real as German, Spanish and Canadian soldiers are also participating in NATO deterrence forces and have been exposed to fake news.

The Danish Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen from the liberal party Venstre underlined in autumn 2017 that European cooperation is crucial in the fight against fake news and propaganda. The EU and the member states also need to be aware of the risks in areas like cyber defence and security. Both cyber security and fake news and disinformation are high on the agenda in autumn, when the Danish Parliament is to settle the coming years defence budget. One of the elements is to strengthen Denmark's position in bilateral and international cooperation. For instance, Denmark could work towards becoming the 20th member of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia.²⁰

The EU External Action Service has established the so-called East StratCom Task Force. This is given the task to monitor the Russian activity and react on Russian disinformation on EU and its member states. According to East StratCom, foreign actors are trying to create fear among selected people as well as in general. The actors are trying to create confusion on what

¹⁸ Hebsgaard, T. (23.03.2017.). Rusland inficerer os med misinformation. Her er modgiften. *Zetland*. Retrieved (30.09.2017.) from: <https://www.zetland.dk/historie/s8RVNypb-ae6XddK5-34b80>

¹⁹ www.dr.dk. (17.07.2017.). Danske soldater skal beskyttes mod fake news fra Rusland. Retrieved (30.09.2017) from: <https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/politik/danske-soldater-skal-beskyttes-mod-fake-news-fra-rusland>

²⁰ Berlingske. (29.09.2017.). Løkke reagerer på cyberangreb: "Det eneste gensvar er at bygge et ordentligt forsvarsværk op". Retrieved (30.09.2017.) from: <https://www.b.dk/politiko/loekke-reagerer-paa-cyberangreb-det-eneste-gensvar-er-at-bygge-et-ordentligt>

is real and what is fake news.²¹ Max Arhippainen formulates one of the main goals for Russian propaganda: “to weaken EU or even make EU fall apart”. This would include influencing Danish citizens to mistrust the purpose and the vision of the EU.²² Therefore, Denmark and the Danish government are cooperating closely with the East StratCom Unit to prevent disinformation in the Danish media. The work by the East StratCom Task Force has been criticised by some Danish experts and politicians for being a propaganda tool itself. The task force has also been criticised for being a unit under EU and not neutral. For this reason, the Danish Committee on Foreign Affairs has debated the cooperation with the East StratCom Task Force. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anders Samuelsen, defended the performance of the Task force underlining, that the purpose of the unit is the disclose Russian disinformation, promote knowledge about the EU and support independent media in eastern member states of the EU. He also stated that there had been misunderstandings in relation to the East StratCom, due to lack of information.^{23, 24}

Denmark is cooperating with Sweden in the fields of hybrid threats and disinformation in several areas, since society and media structures look the same and the core narratives are similar. Therefore, a partnership is very important for being able to stand up to the Russian threat.²⁵ Solutions could be similar to the ones implemented in Finland. Here the government reached out to opinion makers, experts, journalists and civil servants to defend public opinion from disinformation. This approach is a more traditional; avoid direct contact with the foreign opinion makers. Denmark is using

²¹ Kulager, F. (28.04.2017.). Informationskrig under lup: Sådan spreder Ruslands dagsorden sig i Danmark. *Zetland*. Retrieved (30.09.2017.) from: <https://www.zetland.dk/historie/sOXVEKv3-aOZj67pz-3bd93>

²² Hebsgaard, T. (23.03.2017.). Rusland inficerer os med misinformation. Her er modgiften. *Zetland*. Retrieved (30.09.2017.) from: <https://www.zetland.dk/historie/s8RVNypb-ae6XddK5-34b80>

²³ Kulager, F. (28.04.2017.). Informationskrig under lup: Sådan spreder Ruslands dagsorden sig i Danmark. *Zetland*. Retrieved (30.09.2017.) from: <https://www.zetland.dk/historie/sOXVEKv3-aOZj67pz-3bd93>

²⁴ Talking point from the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs. Samråd i Udenrigsudvalget den 1.12.2016. Retrieved (30.09.2017.) from: <http://www.ft.dk/samling/20161/almdel/uru/spm/25/svar/1368531/1701915.pdf>

²⁵ Euvdsinfo.eu. (01.09.2017.). Russian fake news is a danger to our countries. Retrieved (30.09.2017.) from: <https://euvdsinfo.eu/denmark-and-sweden-russian-fake-news-is-a-danger-to-our-countries/>

different approach or a mixed strategy. The government has established and hired online diplomats to counter argue and answer the disinformation and fake news in Denmark, focusing mostly on online media and social media. Finland and the Netherlands have already established similar diplomats to straighten out misunderstandings and disinformation.²⁶ The RAND Institute suggests that Denmark and alike need to prioritise correctional efforts or to have the upper hand against Russian propaganda, fake news and disinformation. RAND suggests that Denmark should dominate news on the internet and within social media. It is important to emphasize that this is not the same as controlling news on the internet and other written media.²⁷

Concluding remarks

Denmark has within the last 2-3 years experienced flows of propaganda, especially on social media, as well as cyber-attacks that targeted the core narrative of Danish society. The upcoming defence budget is therefore expected to be concerned with issues of cyber defence, disinformation, fake news and Russian propaganda. In addition to the defence budget, other initiatives have been developed to manage the ongoing challenges. It is important that the conflict related to the spread of fake news is handled on Denmark's own condition. The core narrative of the government, ministries and companies is essential for counteracting disinformation campaigns and fake news initiated in Russia. The Danish government has established an interdepartmental taskforce to help and cope with disinformation on Denmark. This taskforce is a mix of three ministries and intelligence agencies. Denmark needs to keep up with bilateral and international cooperation to be able to counter the cyber-attacks, disinformation, fake news and propaganda coming from Russia and Russian media. With these initiatives the Danish government is seeking to resist the Russian propaganda efforts of disinformation and fake news.

²⁶ Hebsgaard, T. (23.03.2017.). Rusland inficerer os med misinformation. Her er modgiften. *Zetland*. Retrieved (30.09.2017.) from: <https://www.zetland.dk/historie/s8RVNypb-ae6XddK5-34b80>

²⁷ Mchangama, J. (31.01.2017.). Lad os bekriige de falske nyheder. Første træk: Forstå, hvordan de virker. Retrieved (30.09.2017.) from: <https://www.zetland.dk/historie/sOKVXID6-aevmj36a-9698d>

Addressing Russian Propaganda. Experience of Latvia: From Fact Recognition to Proactive Actions

Sigita Struberga,

Consultant at the Advanced Social and Political Research Institute,
University of Latvia

The Russian propaganda influence on the European country societies and particularly in Latvia is one of the most discussable topics. When facing this multi-level and multi-way approach towards strategic communication, one of the greatest challenges for countries is not to just realize and ascertain various propaganda techniques, but to claim clear, measurable indications for its realized consequences, and to offer possible counter-reaction models. In this context, it is more complex to create a long-term vision for a proactive governmental actions, which would promote the people's resilience against foreign-offered hostile interpretations of reality. The aim of this article is not only to give a glimpse in Latvia's, until now, realized activities towards fighting propaganda, but also to try and complement discussions of possible further actions, which would promote the resistance of the Latvian society against foreign hostile attempts to create harm to the country, its society and stability.

Keywords: education, Latvia, legislature, media, propaganda.

Krievijas propagandas ietekme uz Eiropas sabiedrībām, tajā skaitā arī Latvijas, ir plaši apspriests jautājums šo valstu dienaskārtībā. Sastopoties ar šai propagandai raksturīgo daudzlīmeņu un diverso formu pieeju, viens no lielākajiem izaicinājumiem ir ne tik daudz identificēt un aptvert dažādās izmantotās tehnikas, cik atrast skaidrus, izmērāmus indikatorus tās seku apmēra noteikšanai un piedāvāt iespējamus pretreakcijas modeļus. Šajā kontekstā ir daudz sarežģītāk izstrādāt ilgtermiņa vīziju tādai pārvaldes

rīcībai, kas veicinātu iedzīvotāju izturēšpēju pret no ārpusē piedāvātām naidīgām realitātes interpretācijām. Raksta mērķis ir ne tikai sniegt ieskatu līdz šim realizētajās aktivitātēs, kas vērstas uz propagandas apkarošanu, bet arī mēģināt papildināt diskusiju par tālākām iespējamām rīcībām, kas varētu veicināt Latvijas sabiedrības izturēšpēju pret ārējiem naidīgiem mēģinājumiem negatīvi ietekmēt valsts un tās sabiedrības stabilitāti.

Atslēgvārdi: izglītība, Krievija, Latvija, likumdošana, mediji, propaganda.

The Russian propaganda influence on the European country societies is one of the most discussable topics not only among national administration and safety institutions, but also in public space and academic environment. Referring to its created informative threats is such an often occurrence that one can sometimes even sense an impression of a certain banality and overuse. Yet, contemporary safety issues, both at a local and international level, make men regard propaganda over and over again as one of the most serious modern forms of threat. However, trying to emphasize these threat sources, Russia will be one of the most mentioned countries. It is not surprising, taking in consideration that the political regime of this country has successfully modernized the messages and their manipulative forms meant for foreign societies by actively using various information and misinformation techniques. As the most actively used channels, one can mention television, internet and other social media, which let one to adapt the content and forms accordingly to the necessary place and situation.

The “Kremlin-made” informative system includes diverse media and other form of information broadcaster network, a most diverse message, more likely even an entirety of variously interpreted reality with a fuzzy structure. Accordingly, in praxis, it is much more complicated and broader than the activity listings that are covered by such complexes and western-based macro concepts as information war or propaganda. Moreover, one must remember that, basically, Russia is not only introduced information, in praxis, as a new form of warfare, but also has given the concept of “information warfare” a status of a full-fledged school of theory¹, thus clearly

¹ Darczewska, J. (2014). The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare. The Crimean Operation, A Case Study. *Point of View*, No.42, 05/2014, p. 7.

demonstrating such means of foreign activity significance in modern Russia's foreign policy and its will to develop its capacity for the realization of such form of communication.

When facing this multi-level and multi-way approach towards strategic communication, one of the greatest challenges for countries is not to just realize and ascertain various propaganda techniques, but to claim clear, measurable indications for its realized consequences, and to offer possible counter-reaction models. In this context, it is more complex to create a long-term vision for proactive governmental actions, which would promote people resilience against hostile interpretations of reality offered from abroad.

Since the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine, realizing the current international background, and pressure coming from the East, Latvia has made developing the resistance of hostile foreign information campaigns as one of its strategic goals. As a result, not only has it invested more in raising capacity for its physical defence capabilities, but also seriously resurveyed its attitude towards the media and digital space, as well as the place and role against the realization of propaganda towards the country. One must admit that considerable success has been reached. Its experience demonstrates several stories of success on several activities – starting with individual initiatives aimed at revealing false information, continued with the promotion of long-term strategy development for citizen media literacy and critical thinking. At the same time, these stories of success have marked the basic challenges which we are bound to face, the lessons to be learned, and future prospects. Consequently, the aim of this article is not only to give a glimpse into Latvian, until now, realized activities towards fighting propaganda, but also to try and complement discussions of possible further actions which would promote the resistance of the Latvian society against foreign hostile attempts to create harm to the country, its society and stability.

Initializing such discussions and keeping them relevant is significant due to several reasons. Firstly, it is connected with the necessity to maintain constant surveillance over the activities carried out by Russia especially considering the fact that an intensification of various propaganda messages can be seen. Secondly, it is important to realize the necessity to overview and develop the carried out media politics, which have been found to be incomplete. Thirdly, the strengthening of society resilience as a whole is fundamentally important for the sustainable provision of its welfare.

The structure of the article consists of several sub-chapters-fields of society life in which The Republic of Latvia has carried out a certain set of activities to abolish the consequences of the Russian-realized propaganda. These are: legislation and politically strategical decisions; media space; education; research; the national safety authorities; international collaboration; civic society initiatives, whereas the conclusion will consist of illustrations and conclusions about what has been achieved, as well as offer possible further action models in order to develop implemented strategies.

Legislature and key strategic political documents

The production and legislation of strategic documents are fundamental fields, which demonstrate the political will to change something, while simultaneously serving as a basis to almost every significant transformation in public administration, foreign politics and other government-controlled spheres. Accordingly, taking into consideration the above described circumstances, it is not surprising that in the past years, it was exactly here, where the carried out activities are pointed towards addressing the growing informative threats.

As one of the most significant initiatives that can be mentioned are the changes made in the criminal law in 2016. Their initiating was connected with addressing the potential hybrid threats. In fact, no changes were made in the law section “crimes against the country” since 1999, moreover, the regulation that existed was one of the weakest among the countries of the EU and NATO. That is why it was vital to make additions and improvements, which would define the regulation towards the above mentioned. The edited law foresees changes in the penalty section, which are connected with fines for an illegal claim of the state secret, as well as turning against the republic of Latvia, spying and helping a foreign country in such actions. Publicly, this initiative made broad discussions connected with boundaries over freedom of speech, and repressions that might occur against the media representatives. However, it is almost impossible to find evidence that these concerns could be valid. Meanwhile, as the director of The Constitution Protection Bureau of the Republic of Latvia, *Jānis Maizītis* has acknowledged, it is due to these changes that broader opportunities have come up

in legislation to turn against persons who have committed actions against the state.²

Another example is the Electronic Media Act³, in which several significant changes have been made. Firstly, according to the law additions which have come into force by this year's July 1st it is determined, what kind of television channels, and in which order they should be included in the popular TV channel packages, as well as which programmes will not be translated. Steps have also been taken to limit the broadcasting of the illegal television content. It is intended that these legislation initiatives will help to arrange the electronic media market in Latvia, including limiting the harmful message distribution among the citizens of Latvia, and against the country's and Europe's safety in general.

The described legislation initiatives are not the only activities carried out by the decision makers. Along those, one can also mention several strategic documents of political planning, which have been made by taking into consideration the informative type of threats. For example, the medium term policy planning document *Media policy guidelines 2016 – 2020*⁴, made by the Ministry of Culture, is a cornerstone for particular tasks and events for the development of media space. The ways, for which the improvements are meant are: diversity of media space; quality and responsibility of media space; education of the professionals of the media space, the competence and safety capacity of media space. These means are clearly subordinate to the governmental media policy goals, which include such media content provisions that would be qualitative, independent, trustworthy, and suitable for the greater good of Latvian society.⁵

The Ministry of Transport has developed the project of the *Electronic communication industry plan 2017 – 2020*⁶, which has been sent for further

² Raudseps, P. (2017). Interview with Jānis Maizītis. Valsts neatteiksies no slepenām metodēm. Magazine *Jr*, No.17/18 (366/367), 27.04. - 10.05. 2017., pp. 16-17.

³ See: Elektronisko plašsaziņas līdzekļu likums. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <https://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=214039>

⁴ See: Mediju politikas pamatnostādnes 2016. – 2020. gadam. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <https://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=286455>

⁵ Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Latvia. Mediju politika. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <https://www.km.gov.lv/lv/mediju-politika/mediju-politika>

⁶ See: Ministry of Transport of the Republic of Latvia. The project of plan "Elektronisko sakaru nozares politikas plāns 2017.-2020.gadam". Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <http://tap.mk.gov.lv/lv/mk/tap/?pid=40434028>

reconciliation in August. The plan has been developed due to the necessity for new and short-term planning challenges, updating it for the current issues and adjusting it for *Latvia's long-term development strategy till 2030*⁷. Adjusting is also necessary for the EU legislation and planning documents because the electronic communication industry is one of its subordinate sectors. This is especially relevant due to the initiative made by the European Commission to review the current regulation and to create a unified Europe's Electronic Communication Codex.

In the 1st quarter of this year, *The Minister of Foreign Affairs published the annual report of the achieved and intended for the country's foreign policy and EU questions*, which could be considered as a short-term policy planning document, as it also outlines the ministry's position regarding the current international environment challenges. Particular attention has been dedicated to the so called hybrid threats. They have gained an undivided state of readiness by the country, in both, a national way and with partners at the international level, in order to strengthen the means to counter the threats. Accordingly, cyber-safety and strategic communication have been named as top priorities. In order to achieve the planned, especially highlighted is the following work on the EU Audio-visual media service directive promotion report with the aim of achieving an effective and easy-to-overview regulation in the field.⁸

The examples of the approved legislation act and political planning documents are considered as a clear signal from the decision maker's side. They demonstrate the political will to achieve results not only in the fight with Russia's current political regime makers creating short-term and middle-term challenges in the informative space, but also to strengthen the Latvian society's overall resistance against possible issues of such kind.

⁷ See: Ministry of Invernonmental Protection and Regional Development of the Republic of Latvia. Sustainable Development Strategy of Latvia until 2030. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <http://www.varam.gov.lv/lat/pol/ppd/?doc=13857>

⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia. (2016). Ārlietu ministra ikgadējais ziņojums par paveikto un iecerēto darbību valsts ārpolitikā un Eiropas Savienības jautājumos. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <http://www.mfa.gov.lv/arpolitika>

Media Space

The mass media space is the zone, in which the propaganda broadcasting channels are being outlined. It is exactly because of this, that the particular space is considered as critically crucial. Reviewing Latvia's situation, it is possible to conclude that, overall, it has a liberal, a free-market based, functional media environment. Several actors operate in its setting – those who can be defined as government institutes, and those which are non-governmental, whose work is being controlled by other countries. One, here, can particularly mention the actively and broadly represented media, financed and supported by Russia. Accordingly, from one side can be considered as the strength and considerable support for the democratic society of this media space, simultaneously, also carries weaknesses. Moreover, those weaknesses are used by the opposite side, in order to carry out activities aimed towards undermining the stability in our state's security.

As an example of such a partly democratic and liberally based market characteristic used to carry out opposing interests, it is possible to mention the fact that the Latvian television audiences are being offered diversified television content, accordingly to the market demand. This offer, of course, includes Russian television channels. Some of them are so popular among the viewers that they clearly surpass the others. This also applies for the largest telecommunication company and the most popular TV programme supplier, whose co-owner is the country itself – *Lattelecom*. As a well-founded finding, pointed out by *Andis Kudors*, Latvia is fighting Russian propaganda from one side, and the partly government-owned company is transmitting several main Russian TV channels from the other.⁹ Furthermore, the matter is that the channels broadcasted are broadly recognized as the basic propaganda channels, used in Russia.

At the same time, it is necessary to point out that certain progress has been achieved even in this field. For example, in the spring of 2014, The National Electronic Mass Media council took a decision to ban the broadcast of the Russian television channel *RTR Rossija*, in Latvia, for 3 months. A conclusion served as the basis that in March, 2014 one could notice an international event interpretation, very tended and suitable for Russia;

⁹ Kudors, A. (2017). Latvia – Russia Relations: the Cool Stability. In: *Latvian Foreign and Security Policy. Yearbook*. Eds. A. Sprūds et.al. Riga: Latvian Institute of Foreign Affairs, p. 136.

it consisted of military aggression excuse and war propaganda towards a sovereign state – Ukraine, being in contradiction with the Electronic Mass Media Law. A step like this, in Latvia was taken again in 2016, which ended in a broadcast ban for 6 months. Argument – during 2015, several service directive violations were found based on the Mass Media law and EU audio-visual law, mostly connected with hatred incitement and calls to war.

In both cases, the mentioned decisions were ambiguously perceived at national and international scale. These steps, carried out by Latvia and Lithuania, have made broader discussions about, whether such restrictions are considered suitable instruments in fight against Russian propaganda. Based on these discussions, a question arises – whether, in such a way, precedents for media freedom restrictions are not being made, and because of that, could it not have been interpreted as a contradiction against European core values. It is also questioned, whether in such coming events, and despite the bans, viewers would not rather choose to watch the same channels using different methods and alternatives. The possibility of such actions is also proven by the fact that now, in Ukraine, particularly in its eastern territory, many people choose Russian television by using a satellite antenna, internet, or any other difficult-to-monitor connections. The result clearly shows that certain channel bans are more of a short-term step of despair, in order to demonstrate the red lines to the opposite side. Yet, when looking at long-term solutions, one must conclude that until now, a clear recipe on how to act in such situations has not been offered, taking into consideration that rule of law is considered as one of the cornerstones for European democracy.

A little less resistance was made with the decision to block the Latvian internet domain for the news portal *Sputnik*. However, the following news portal's re-registration in another country's jurisdiction has again outlined the challenges connected with the already mentioned audio-visual media directive's pointed restrictions for the responsible national institutions to carry out active actions for a full-fledged content restriction or fining according to the medium, which is situated in another countries jurisdiction. This basically means that the directive's changes, particularly described in the previous chapter, would be very important. Yet, until that moment, Latvia's possibilities in this field could be limited.

One of the aims pointed out for the provision of a qualitative and diverse medium in the Russian language, is connected with an alternative

to its offered content and the creation of media programmes. In this case, several alternatives have been discussed in Latvia, in the past few years. Yet, none of them have been fully carried out. The idea of a special national television channel for Russian-speakers can be mentioned as an example. Still, back in November 2016, the chairman of the National Electronic Mass Media council, *Dace Kezberē*, announced that in case if financing would be found, in 2018 it is planned to create a separate interactive channel for Latvia's Russian-speaking audience.¹⁰ However, an impression is rising that in addition to a lack of finances, several other reasons have delayed realization of this initiative, among them can be mentioned such reasons as, for example, disagreement, and a comparatively low interest among the decision makers, as well as expert views on that the development of such a channel would make a negative impact on the country's media space.¹¹ Yet, the surveyed journalists had expressed confidence that one or the other side's (Latvian and Russian-speaking) successful media transfer to the opposite audience is "mentally impossible".¹² Taking into consideration the above mentioned factors, for the moment, Latvia has temporarily refused making a special channel for the Russian-speaking audience. A similar fate has also crossed the idea about a regional television channel, which would be developed for the Baltic Russian-speaking audience.

Ignoring the described problematics, progress can be noticed in some aspects. For instance, several Latvian commercial television channels do not use Russian-made entertainment shows, but equivalent versions that are shown in Ukraine. A replacement policy of such kind is considered as more effective than restrictions or channel ban from the offered channel packs. Thus, by step-by-step diversifying and changing of the offered content it is possible to change the audience viewing habits and tastes if such an intention exists.

According to the government's stated positions, the diversity of journalistic, on a national scale, should be pointed out. For now, it exists in a

¹⁰ Latvijas Avīze (30.11.2016.). NEPLP televīzijas kanālu krievu valodā plāno 2018.gadā. *Latvijas Avīze*. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <http://www.la.lv/neplp-televizijas-kanalu-krievu-valoda-plano-2018-gada/>

¹¹ Putnis, R. (2016). *Latvian Media Policy. Responses to the Foreign Information Threat. Resisting Foreign State Propaganda in the New Information Environment: The Case of the EU, Russia, and the Eastern partnership Countries*. Rīga: Brīvības un Solidaritātes Fonds, p. 150.

¹² Veinberga, S. (2010). *Mediju misija. Preses attīstības tendences Latvijā pēc valsts neatkarības atjaunošanas (1990-2010)*. Rīga: Zvaigzne ABC, pp. 118-119.

certain way, however, the fundamental differences that make themselves noticeable, are found in the content, ideology, and the offered daily routines. Yet, these evaluations of differences, as discovered in a research conducted by the Latvian Institute of Foreign Affairs, often are the same as the journalist ethnicity/nationality and the organizations identity, which is closely connected with its owner or political belief. But those journalists, who believe that it is not necessary to dissociate one self, accordingly connecting one's profession with the battle over ethnic or linguistic interests, and becoming a non-critical supporter of one's own party. At the same time, it must be pointed out that the impression on that, which matches the society's interests, and what kind of news the representatives of this society await, is mostly based on several author subjective interpretations. For example, as the Latvian Institute of Foreign Affairs researchers state, "the presumption that the Russian-material reading audience should be offered more news from Russian sources and events, is based on the until-now praxis, but the analysis of internet user interests does not prove that".¹³ Overall, the Russian-speaking citizens, the same as Latvians, are more interested in local news and events.

The above mentioned problematics, connected with the previously mentioned lack of unified journalism serves as a base for the fact that there are constant difficulties for those, who work outside to gather an inner demand of clearly defined profession norms and values.¹⁴ As a result, for the moment, we are speaking of a situation when there is no quality and competence self-regulators in Latvian media space. The currently existing organizations – National Electronic Mass Media Council and a couple of profession associations do not provide this function. To solve this, several possible scenarios have been offered. This is affecting both: the development of a unified ethics and morale codex, and the establishment of a professional Ombudsmen Institute. According to the Ministry of Culture's realization plan of *Latvia's media politics guidelines 2016–2020*, the mentioned activities are meant to be carried out in the applied political planning span. The plan

¹³ Andžāns, M., Bruģe, I., Daugulis, M., Rožukalne, A. (2016). *Latvijas plašsaziņas līdzekļu noturība pret citu valstu vēstījumiem: Krievijas faktors NATO 2016. gada Varšavas samīta kontekstā*. Zin. Red. A. Sprūds. Rīga: Latvijas Ārpolitikas Institūts, pp. 10-11.

¹⁴ Šulmane, I. (2010). *Neatrastās identitātes? Latvijas dienas laikrakstu žurnālisti politikas, ekonomikas un kultūras lauku ietekmē*. Rīga: Latvijas universitātes Sociālo un politisko pētījumu institūts, p. 116.

foresees to make professionalism development events for journalists, and includes the association of representatives of higher education, as well as other events. Therefore, which leans towards collaboration with the specific field experts and among media sphere professionals in order to promote and strengthen the development of the according life-long education.

Although several experts have a rather critical stand against the professionalism of media space, some examples of a good praxis still exist. One can speak about both: qualitative analytical journalism and journalism that supports countering propaganda. For example, the National Television of Latvia offers a show called “Theory of Lies”, which unmasks the Russian propaganda tricks, fake news and other similar informative activities. Such activities are quite significant, taking into consideration that the Latvian society, overall, has a low level of media literacy¹⁵, and what is important here – people are waiting support for its development right from the media.¹⁶

That particular media environment field, in which no improvements currently have been made, and/or nobody has made an effort to develop one, is media ownership transparency. And although it is considered as seeming vulnerable, the current tendencies do not show signs that changes could be implemented in the nearest time. Both, this mentioned problem and several similar ones are quite often connected with the insufficient democratic experience of the media space and the financial and political interests of the true owners.

Education system, Think tanks and NGO's

Education is one of the key spheres not only in strengthening societal resistance in an informative threat context, but for developing overall resilience.

¹⁵ According to SKDS, 53 % of inhabitants of Latvia agree that the influence of fake news is big or rather big. And only 44 % think that they can recognize fake news. Source: LETA. (19.05.2017.). SKDS: Viltus ziņu ietekme uz Latvijas sabiedrību varētu būt diezgan liela. *Diena*. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <https://www.diena.lv/raksts/latvija/zinas/skds-viltus-zinu-ietekme-uz-latvijas-sabiedrību-varetu-but-diezgan-liela-14172463>

¹⁶ According to the *Latvijas Fakti* 35 % of inhabitants of Latvia would like to know more about media literacy and 85 % would prefer media as a source of educational information about it. Source: *Latvijas Fakti*. (2017). *Latvijas iedzīvotāju medijpratība*. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <https://www.km.gov.lv/lv/mediju-politika/prezentacijas-un-petijumi>

Critical thinking, media literacy and information literacy are considered as key spheres here, which are necessary to carry out when thinking in long-term spans. Unfortunately, currently no one offers a systematic media literacy education in Latvia.¹⁷ However, it is necessary to acknowledge that considerable progress has been made in a relatively short time span. The undergoing event set includes quite a broad spectrum of activities. Among them, one can mention broad reforms in the education sphere; teacher, librarian, youth case specialist and others included in the youth education training; a separate, special education funds development; support for lecturers in media literacy and its promoting projects.

Reviewing what is already achieved, it can be concluded that, overall, considerable progress has been achieved in the education system regarding the highest political and institutional level, as well as higher education establishment levels, especially regarding higher pedagogical education. Currently the state is undergoing a broad education reform, which oversees the possibility to gradually turn to a competence based education. According to the data of the State Education Content centre, some active work has been undergone regarding the mentioned education model development and approbations. Such an outline on the students to use the gained knowledge in praxis also includes critical thinking, and the ability to evaluate information sources and their offered news and messages. Along the above mentioned, national education is also emphasized.¹⁸ However, certain doubts arise due to teacher levels of competence and the practical level of skills in schools, raising questions about whether the desired changes will make an impact on the desired level and reach out to pupils and students.

State education and other public administration establishments are not the only ones that participate in educating and raising public awareness

¹⁷ Ločmele, K. (02.09.2016.). Medijpratība: skaidrojums un piemēri, kāpēc tā nepieciešama un kāpēc to apgūt. Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Latvia. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: http://jaunatne.gov.lv/sites/default/files/web/Lejupielades/2016/kmprez_medijpratiba_jauniesiem_2_sept_2016.pdf

¹⁸ Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia No. 480. Izglītojamo audzināšanas vadlīnijas un informācijas, mācību līdzekļu, materiālu un mācību un audzināšanas metožu izvērtēšanas kārtība. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <https://likumi.lv/ta/id/283735-izglitojamo-audzinasanas-vadlinijas-un-informacijas-macibu-lidzeklu-materialu-un-macibu-un-audzinasanas-metozu-izvertesanas>

in youth and society as a whole. A significant role is also played by think tanks and other institutes of the society. As one of the seemingly successful think tank principle examples is the carried out activities of the research journalism centre “Re: Baltica”. This think tank has not only been capable of offering quality research, which unmasks the influence and carried out propaganda of the Russian political regime and its actors in Latvia, but also effectively forwarded this information to broader society, thus making public discussions about it and making the problematics relevant. In addition, this centre has also participated in other publicly significant activities. For example, there currently is an exposition of a tool, capable of recognizing fake news.¹⁹ Along the already mentioned Research Journalism centre, one can also mention some regionally recognizable think tanks like the Latvian National Defence academy’s subordinated Safety and strategic research centre, the Centre for International studies, and the Centre for East European Policy Studies.

If the base for the think tank is pointed towards research, then the non-governmental sector actively participates in informing society and educational events via the realization of various projects. As a successful example, one can mention the Baltic Media Centre of Excellence, which positions itself as a platform for the development of smart journalism in the Baltics, Eastern partnership countries and other regions. Its ways of operation: the promotion of journalist professional growth, strengthening of critical thinking and promotion of the media consumer competences with the aim to achieve positive changes in the media space and in society as a whole.²⁰ Overall, looking at the existing organization web, which is raising public awareness about propaganda issues and working with media information literacy as well as critical thinking, is broad enough and capable of covering not only the pupil and youth audiences, but also other layers of society.

¹⁹ LSM. (15.08.2017.). «Re:Baltica» veidos riku viltus ziņu atpazīšanai. *LSM*. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <http://www.lsm.lv/raksts/zinas/latvija/rebaltica-veidos-riku-viltus-zinu-atpazisanai.a246691/>

²⁰ Baltic Centre for Media Excellence. (2017). Par mums. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <https://baltic.media/about>

Other activities to prevent and combat propaganda consequences

The above mentioned does not include all the activities and actors, who are actively participating in Russian information campaign, including the prevention and combat of the consequences of propaganda activities. In this subchapter, a discussion of more active actors and other separate success stories will take part. Accordingly, they represent different spheres of society and perform different functions.

First of all, it refers to the international cooperation implemented by the state. At the international level, Latvia has so far been actively involved in addressing Russian propaganda in several formats. *Ojārs Ēriks Kalniņš*, Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament of the Republic of Latvia, has pointed out that “Latvia has taken a leading role in strategic communications, both in NATO and European Union”.²¹ He talks about two initiatives realized by the Latvian government. The first one is The Centre of Excellence for Strategic Communications, which was established in Riga in 2014. Another – proposed idea of having similar institutions within EU network in 2015 during the presidency of Latvia. And since the Latvian idea was quite well received, the EU Eastern StratCom Task Force was established.²² Over the past few years, significant progress has been made in both of these institutions, but undoubtedly, Latvia plays one of the central roles in the first institution, not only by co-financing individual initiatives implemented by the Centre, but also by involving local researchers and offering expertise.

However, they are undoubtedly not the only formats in which the Latvian state acts to combat or, as a minimum, make the influence of Russian propaganda relevant on societies in Europe and the West as a whole. An example of this type of successful international cooperation is the annual “Riga Conference” organized by the Latvian Transatlantic Organization in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other governmental, non-governmental and international organizations are mentioned. Within it, annually,

²¹ Kalniņš, O. E. (2016). Latvia 2017: Seeking Security Through Principled Pragmatism. In: *Latvian Foreign and Security Policy. Yearbook*. Eds. A. Sprūds et.al. Riga: Latvian Institute of Foreign Affairs, p. 14.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15

high-level politicians, officials, academics, representatives of the non-governmental sector and business structures arrive in Riga with the aim of discussing major foreign policy issues and international challenges. In the last three years, Russia and its hybrid threats have appeared as one of the most urgent topics discussed.

Secondly, as an example of successful counterpropaganda, one can mention the strategic communication of the Ministry of Defence on topical, information related issues with Russia. During the past year, several events, related to national defence, have taken place and have received a special place in Russian propaganda, such as the deployment of additional NATO forces in the Baltics and Russia's the military training *Zapad 2017*. In both cases, the ministers responsible for communication, including The Minister of Defence *Raimonds Bergmanis*, chose a successful timely, proactive communication tactic with the public, which resulted in its support of the defence strategies chosen by the state and its allies. Another example of successful communication with the public implemented by the Ministry of Defence is information campaigns aimed at involving children and young people as well as adults in voluntary military draft organizations – the Young Guard and the National Guard. As a result, the number of people interested has grown in the recent years²³ and the range of functions of these organizations has been expanded accordingly. These include aspects of cyber security and information security.

Thirdly, the activities of state security institutions can be positively evaluated. Their activity and professionalism are one of the key elements in ensuring the security of the state and its society within the broadest sense of the term. This, to a certain extent, means that the function of these organizations also includes rising public awareness about the potential threats. One way, such as the Latvian Security Police is to engage in this function, is the Annual Report, published with the aim of highlighting the current security threats in the country. Accordingly, one of the most significant

²³ During 2016 the number of national guards has increased by 900, but the overall number of The National Guard in March 2017 was 7941. Source: *Diena* (21.03.2017.). Zemessargu skaits palielinās, bet nav sasniegts maksimālo iespējamo. *Diena*. Retrieved (10.10.2017.) from: <https://www.diena.lv/raksts/latvija/zinas/zemessargu-skaits-palielinas-bet-nav-sasniedzis-maksimalo-iespejamo-14168409>

elements of the report is the description of Russian propaganda as an important challenge each year. It also describes the actors involved and their directions of action. Without preventive activities, national security authorities undoubtedly also carry out a repressive function, including certain informative or hybrid threats as a whole. For example, on March 16, 2016, during a procession of the Latvian Legionnaires, a former blogger, Graham Phillips, working for the former propaganda channel *Russia Today*, was arrested and subsequently expelled from the country for not complying with the police.

Fourth, non-institutionalized civic initiatives are also mentioned alongside the active work of public administration and security institutions as well as organized non-governmental sector. For example, the so-called Internet elves, who deal with the illumination and repression of propaganda spread by the Russian Internet trolls, have gained international popularity and recognition. In addition to these, there are several initiatives of a different nature. Basically, they are all fragmented and do not form a unified system. It is precisely this lack of system that is sometimes considered to be vulnerable to the struggle against Russian propaganda.

Lessons to be learned

It is said that no one in the world has done so much for strengthening NATO as Vladimir Putin. Perhaps something similar can be said about Latvia. The list of activities mentioned above confirms that Latvia, in particular, has achieved remarkable results in the fight against Russian propaganda, and also building societal resilience in general. It has mastered a series of training in information campaigns that Russia has implemented against Latvia, the Baltic States and the West as a whole, as well as the Eastern Neighbourhood, especially Ukraine. This road has also highlighted the basic weaknesses and challenges that need to be overcome. The vulnerabilities that can be identified are: low quality of generated and broadcast messages; limited transparency on sources of media financing and ownership; the division of society according to the linguistic principle; citizens have a low level of trust in public administration institutions; underdeveloped media literacy and critical thinking; the current educational system inconsistency

with current trends. Another important lesson that has not yet been learned is the ability to distinguish between the “real hand of the Kremlin” and the apparent. And this is very important not only to find the most effective solution to the problem, but also because this failure is one of the advanced tactical objectives of the informative war.²⁴

Both the separation of appearances from reality and the maximum accumulation of knowledge about the tactics used by the propaganda apparatus will make it possible to understand the military system that Russia operates. Moreover, since the network of propaganda has become increasingly complex and fuzzy, and includes not only governmental institutions or institutions coordinated directly by the government, but also private companies and a great number of other non-state actors, which are engaged in creating, recreating and presenting information, the response should be equally wide and systematic in its character. Political decisions, laws, and planning documents must be completed with more comprehensive real practice. This applies not only to the need for a unified national system but also to more coordinated response at European Union level. In order to counter Russian aggression, including informational, strong leadership is needed, which can deliver a clear, direct strategic narrative. It must be a simple, clear message that can be understood by different audiences. Such a clear narrative is also needed at the national level. It has to be based on the basic values adopted by society, which can then also become the main motivating force in favour of the vision offered.

In addition to the creation of a strategic narrative and its successful delivery to the public, effective communication as such is equally important. As shown above, the communication campaigns carried out by the Ministry of Defence with various target audiences have yielded significant results. One of the keys to ensuring the efficiency of today’s changing environment is the timeliness of this communication and quick responses to the latest propaganda messages. It is exactly the quick reaction and timeliness in interpreting that sometimes allows the overcoming of potential consequences.

Often, a not effective and fast enough response to the challenges posed, is closely linked to the lack of knowledge and expertise among

²⁴ Maļukevičs, N. (2016). Interview with Egils Zirnis. Putins man dod darbu. *Sestdiena*, 11.–17. 03. 2016., p. 17.

public administration officials at different levels. Looking at the experience of other countries²⁵, one of the ways to build public administration awareness is to work on educational programs for civil servants in order to introduce them to the most popular and most dangerous forms of propaganda that they may face in their daily routines. No less important is the development of this type of competence and other competences for the development of information literacy and critical thinking are among the educational staff at all levels, given that these are the people, who work mainly with children and young people.

Awareness distribution among community members is another key component for successful resilience strengthening. To achieve this, it is necessary not only to provide the existing support for research, which must work to understand propaganda and its effects in targeted societies, and to offer possible solutions to mitigate them. No less of an important factor in educating the public about informative literacy is the media. Only high professional standards and stricter regulation of the media space (especially with regard to the internet environment), the development and enhancement of common values among professionals would achieve the desired effect both in the short term and also in terms of sustainable development of society.

Additionally, it must be remembered that propaganda is very adaptive. It takes contemporary, topical questions in the eyes of the inhabitants of a particular society and uses it in order to undermine the overall stability of the state. For this reason, promoting public confidence in public administration institutes, eliminating national and racial hatred, raising people well-being and other similar domestic-policy tasks simultaneously become the guarantors of state security. For this reason, promoting public confidence in public administration institutes, eliminating national and racial hatred, raising pupils well-being and other similar domestic-policy tasks simultaneously become the guarantors of state security. It is precisely for this reason that the construction of resilience of society begins with homework rather than fighting with external, hostile, state and non-state actor messages.

²⁵ For example, in Sweden special educational programs for the members of government are conducted about the possible propaganda manifestations they might face.

Rietumvalstu institūciju pretdarbība Krievijas dezinformācijai. *Ļizas gadījuma analīze*¹

Heinrihs Rozēns,

Mg. sc. pol., Latvijas Politologu biedrības pētnieks

Kopš 2014. gadā īstenotās Krimas okupācijas un vardarbīgā konflikta sākuma Austrumukrainā daudz tiek diskutēts par hibrīddraudu ietekmi un to izraisītajām sekām. Rakstā uzmanība tiek pievērsta dezinformācijas jēdzienam un tā lomai Rietumvalstu un to stratēģisko pretinieku savstarpējās attiecībās. Demokrātiskajās valstīs ir ierobežotas iespējas pretdarboties dezinformācijai vārda brīvības principa dēļ. Tomēr pieaugošās Krievijas dezinformācijas izplatības dēļ rodas nepieciešamība veikt darbības, lai pielāgotos jaunām dezinformācijas vēstījuma pasniegšanas metodēm. Pēdējos gados ir izveidotas tādas institūcijas kā NATO Stratēģiskās komunikācijas izcilības centrs, Eiropas Savienības Ārējās darbības dienesta Austrumu stratēģiskās komunikācijas vienība, kā arī būtisku pienesumu sniedz Prāgā bāzētā nevalstiskā organizācija – domnīca *European Values* – un Kijevā izvietotā sabiedriski aktīvā organizācija *StopFake.org*. Rakstā aplūkots viens no spilgtākajiem Krievijas dezinformācijas piemēriem – *Ļizas gadījums* – un minēto organizāciju reakciju uz to.

Atslēgvārdi: dezinformācija, Eiropas Ārējās darbības dienests, *European Values*, Krievija, NATO Stratēģiskās komunikācijas izcilības centrs, propaganda, *StopFake.org*.

Since the illegal occupation of Crimean peninsula in 2014 and the emergence of violent conflict in the Eastern parts of Ukraine, hybrid threats and the consequences they cause have been highly discussed. The

¹ Raksts tapis uz maģistra darba “Rietumvalstu pretdarbība dezinformācijai” pamata.

main focus of this publication is dedicated to the term *disinformation* and its role in relations and interactions between the West and their strategic opponents. The freedom of speech, being one of the base principles of democracy, is a phenomena that paradoxically limits the tools for countering disinformation. As the intensity of disinformation campaigns carried out by Russia have grown significantly during the recent period of time, there is a growing necessity to provide adequate counter measures suited to address the new disinformation methods. During the recent years the West have established several institutions, like the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, and the EU External Actions Service's East StratCom Task Force. Contribution of non-governmental organisations, like *European Values* think-tank based in Prague, and socio-political organisation *StopFake.org* based in Kyiv, have also been of great significance for analyzing this matter. This publication covers one of the best-known Russian disinformation cases – the Lisa case, focusing on the reaction of the Western institutions to it.

Keywords: disinformation, European External Action Service, *European Values*, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, propaganda, Russia, *StopFake.org*.

Ievads

Pēdējo trīs gadu laikā Krievijas īstenotās dezinformācijas kampaņas, vēstījumi un metodes vairs nav pārsteigums, bet gan daļa no pieaugošās spriedzes starp Rietumvalstīm un austrumu kaimiņu. Taču nav pietiekami apskatīts, vai un kādā veidā notiek pret darbība Krievijas rīcībai. Lai noskaidrotu, vai ir vērojams, ka Rietumvalstu institūcijas (ar Rietumvalstīm šī raksta kontekstā tiek saprastas Rietumu informācijas telpai piederīgās valstis un to institūcijas), kuru kompetences jomā ietilpst dezinformācijas identificēšana, atspēkošana un pret darbību veikšana, lai ierobežotu dezinformācijas izplatību, veic uz vienotu izpratni balstītas darbības, rakstā aplūkosim šādas institūcijas: 1) Rīgā, Latvijā bāzētās Ziemeļatlantijas līguma organizācijas (NATO) Stratēģiskās komunikācijas izcilības centru; 2) Briselē, Beļģijā izvietotā Eiropas Savienības (ES) Ārējās darbības dienesta Austrumu stratēģiskās komunikācijas vienību; 3) Prāgā, Čehijā bāzēto nevalstisko organizāciju – domnīcu *European Values*; 4) Kijevā, Ukrainā izvietoto sabiedrisko organizāciju *StopFake.org*. Par pamatu šo organizāciju darbības salīdzinājumam

esam izvēlējušies tā saucamo *Ļizas gadījumu*. Pirmajā sadaļā definēsim dezinformācijas jēdzienu, uz kura interpretāciju balstīsies gadījuma izpēte un tās analīze. Otrajā nodaļā īsumā ieskicēsim paša *Ļizas gadījuma* būtību un tā izraisītās sekas dažādās valstīs. Turpmākajās nodaļās apskatīsim minēto četru organizāciju reakciju uz šo gadījumu.

Dezinformācijas jēdziens

Lai arī latviešu valodā ar terminu ‘dezinformācija’ tiek saprasta jebkura veida informācija, kas *a priori* vai pēc analīzes veikšanas nav uzskatāma par izsmelošu, angļu valodā vārdam ‘dezinformācija’ ir iespējami divi formulējumi – *misinformation* un *disinformation*. Ar terminu *misinformation* tiek saprasta nepatiesa vai nepareiza informācija, atsevišķi neizceļot to, vai tā tiek izplatīta apzināti vai neapzināti, un neprecizējot, vai tās nepatiesums ir šīs informācijas autoram, apkopotājam vai izplatītājam zināms.² Savukārt termins *disinformation* tiek saprasts kā nepatiesas vai nepareizas informācijas izplatīšana ar mērķi maldināt auditoriju, tātad šīs darbības tiek veiktas apzināti, informācijas autoram vai apkopotājam mērķtiecīgi izplatot maldinošu informāciju.³ Šī raksta ietvaros vārda ‘dezinformācija’ tulkojumi *misinformation* un *disinformation* netiek atsevišķi izdalīti, aplūkojot dezinformāciju kā nepatiesu vai nepareizu informāciju neatkarīgi no tā, vai tā tiek izplatīta apzināti vai neapzināti, jo mērķis nav identificēt konkrētas dezinformācijas piederību vienai vai otrai grupai, bet gan noskaidrot Rietumvalstu pret darbību nepatiesai informācijai.

Dezinformācija, nesaskaroties ar pretēju informācijas plūsmu, kas sniedz objektīvu un pārbaudāmu informāciju, var izraisīt maldīgu sabiedrības realitātes uztveri. Lai arī tradicionāli pretdarbība dezinformācijas izplatīšanai ir tikusi saistīta ar objektīvas informācijas vēstījuma sniegšanu apmērā, kas nomāktu dezinformācijas plūsmu, jo izmantojamo informācijas nesēju spektrs ir bijis ierobežots un apzināms (piemēram, laikraksti, radio un televīzija, skrejlapas), 21. gadsimta sākumā informācijas plūsma no dažādiem grūti izsekojamiem avotiem ir palielinājusies vairākkārtīgi, turklāt dažādās

² Cambridge Online Dictionary. Izgūts (02.10.2017.) no: <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/misinformation>

³ Cambridge Online Dictionary. Izgūts (02.10.2017.) no: <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/disinformation?q=disinformation+>

izmantotās platformas un informācijas sniegšanas metodes apgrūtina visaptverošu pretdarbību dezinformācijas izplatībai un eventuālai sabiedrības izpratnes par realitāti izkropļošanai.

Dezinformācijas izplatīšana ir manipulatīvas darbības, kuru rezultātā caur vairāku pakāpju informācijas plūsmas līmeņiem maldīga informācija tiek pasniegta mērķauditorijai, izmantojot gan autoritatīvus, gan dezinformācijas izplatītāja radītus šķietami autoritatīvus sakaru kanālus, piemēram, medijus. Šādu darbību mērķis ir radīt sabiedrībā maldīgu priekšstatu par notiekošajiem procesiem, kā arī veidot sev labvēlīgu un pretiniekam nelabvēlīgu sabiedrisko domu.

Lai spētu efektīvi pretdarboties dezinformācijai, ir nepieciešams izprast šī fenomena būtību, tā nozīmi vispārējā propagandas izplatīšanas sistēmā, izmantotās metodes, sniegtās informācijas elementu savstarpējo korelāciju, kā arī dezinformācijas kodolu, no kura tā izriet un kas lielākoties ir leģitīms fakts, kas mērķtiecīgi tiek papildināts ar maldinošu un manipulētu vēstījumu. Pretdarbība dezinformācijai ir nepieciešama un ir sevišķi nozīmīga informācijas laikmetā, kad katram indivīdam ir specifiska un unikālas uzbūves informācijas plūsma un informācijas telpa, kurā tas atrodas. Pretdarbību veikšana attiecībā uz dezinformāciju ir īpaši aktuāla pastāvošajā ģeopolitiskajā situācijā, kur Rietumu informācijas sabiedrība ir pakļauta būtiskam stratēģisko pretinieku dezinformācijas spiedienam.

Dezinformācijas apkarošanas sākuma posms ir rodams valstu vai valstu bloku politiskās elites līmenī, kurā politiskajai elitei ir nepieciešams identificēt realitāti izkropļojošās un neobjektīvās dezinformācijas plūsmas, to izcelsmi un mērķus. Pieņemot politisku lēmumu par norobežošanas no šādas informācijas pieņemšanas par patiesu un par tās izplatības ierobežošanu, ir iespējams izvērst tālākās darbības, kas reāli vērstas pret dezinformācijas izplatīšanas kanāliem un to izcelsmes avotiem.

Dezinformācijas izplatīšana tradicionāli ir notikusi ar ārvalstīs bāzētu mediju un plašsaziņas līdzekļu uzņēmumu starpniecību, izmantojot iefiltrētus avota valsts pārstāvjus, apmaksātu publicitāti un argumentāciju, kas pārliecina medija pārstāvjus par sniedzamās informācijas šķietamo patiesumu, kā arī tieši vai ar starpnieku pakalpojumiem fiziski kontrolējot konkrēto mediju.⁴

⁴ Cambridge Online Dictionary. Izgūts (02.10.2017.) no: <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/disinformation?q=disinformation+>

Mūsdienās, informācijas plūsmām diversificējoties un attīstoties jauniem informācijas pārvadišanas kanāliem, arvien lielāku nozīmi dezinformācijas (un propagandas kopumā) izplatīšanā ieņem gan audiovizuālie mediji (televīzijas kanāli, vietnes *YouTube* kanāli u.tml.), gan uz sociālajiem tīkliem balstīti informācijas nesēji. Būtisks ir fakts, ka kanāli, kas ir iesaistīti dezinformācijas pavairošanā un izplatīšanā kāda spēles dalībnieka propagandas kampaņas ietvaros, neatkarīgi no informācijas veida, satura un formas paralēli izplata arī informāciju, kas nav uzskatāma par sagrozītu, jo neietilpst tēmu lokā, kas ietverts propagandas īstenošanas stratēģijā, tādējādi palielinot šī kanāla leģitimitāti un ticamību un neļaujot šī kanāla patērētājam identificēt publiskoto dezinformāciju visā informācijas plūsmā.

Propagandas kampaņas ietvaros dezinformācija tiek izmantota kā papildinošs elements gadījumos, kad citi izmantotie informēšanas un pārliecināšanas elementi nav devuši sagaidāmo rezultātu, tāpēc ar informācijas manipulācijas metodēm notiek centieni maksimizēt propagandas vēstījuma radīto ietekmi.⁵ Līdz ar to, ja vēstījumā piedāvātie fakti patstāvīgi nerada vēlamo efektu, tiek radīta propagandas kampaņas ziņa, kas šos faktus interpretē un piedāvā auditorijai jau iepriekš formulētus secinājumus; savukārt, ja piedāvātie fakti ne tikai nerada vēlamo efektu, bet arī nav loģiski interpretējami par labu konkrētajam spēlētājam, ar dezinformācijas metožu palīdzību šie fakti tiek manipulēti vai radīta informācija, to viltojot vai izmantojot iestudētas darbības (piemēram, iestudētas intervijas).⁶ Jāuzsver, ka dezinformācijas izmantošana propagandas nolūkiem ir minimāla, ja esošie fakti un notikumi ir labvēlīgi propagandas avotam.⁷ Tātad, ja publiskajā telpā ir pieejami fakti, kas negatīvi atspoguļo ieinteresētā spēlētāja pretinieku, konkrētajā brīdī nav loģiska pamatojuma izmantot dezinformācijas līdzekļus, jo vēlamais pretinieka diskreditācijas efekts tiek panākts jau ar patiesu faktu palīdzību. No tā arī secināms, ka politiskais spēlētājs neizmantos dezinformāciju, ja notikumi un fakti viņu pašu atspoguļo pozitīvi.

Nozīmīgs faktors, kas jāņem vērā gan iespējamajam dezinformācijas avotam, gan tam dalībniekam (auditorijai), kurš ar to saskaras, identificē un

⁵ Martin, J. L. (1982). Disinformation: An instrumentality in the propaganda arsenal. *Political Communication*, Vol.2, No.1, p. 59.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

pretdarbojas, ir dezinformācijas efektivitāte un iespāids uz auditorijas realitātes uztveri un uz to balstītajiem pieņēmumiem vai lēmumiem. Ir iespējams izdalīt trīs gadījumus, kuros propagandas un dezinformācijas kampaņa, visticamāk, spētu sniegt augstu efektivitāti: 1) situācija, kad mērķauditorija jau atbalsta propagandista izplatīto viedokli; 2) situācija, kad mērķauditorijai ir nepieciešams pieņemt ātru un īstermiņa lēmumu, piemēram, saistībā ar tās attieksmi pret kādu konkrētu jautājumu, gadījumos, kad auditorija uzticas komunikatoram; 3) situācija, kad mērķauditorijai ir jāpieņem lēmums par tās attieksmi nekavējoties, turklāt nepastāv iespēja pārbaudīt piedāvātos faktus, kuri ir šķietami ticami un *iespaidīgi*.⁸

Ļizas gadījums

Rakstā kā dezinformācijas piemēru apskatīsim t.s. *Ļizas gadījumu*, kas raksturo kampaņu, kurā 2016. gada janvārī Rietumvalstu un Krievijas medijos un citos informācijas nesējos tika izplatīts nepatiess vēstījums par Vācijā dzīvojošu Krievijas izcelsmes meiteni Ļizu, kuru esot nolaupījuši un izvarojuši Vācijā atrodošies arābu izcelsmes patvēruma meklētāji.⁹ Veicot izmeklēšanu ierosinātās krimināllietas ietvaros, Vācijas tiesībsargājošās iestādes secināja, ka Ļiza nav tikusi ne nolaupīta, ne izvarota, un pati iesaistītā persona to vēlāk arī atzina.

Ļizas gadījums sākotnēji tika atspoguļots krievu valodā rakstošā lokālajā medijā, kura mērķauditorija ir Vācijā dzīvojošie krievvalodīgie, bet vēlāk to atspoguļoja Krievijas televīzijas kanāls *Pervij Kanal*. Televīzijas kanālā *Pervij Kanal* minētais notikums tika pasniegts kā viena no būtiskākajām un aktuālākajām ziņām. Sākotnējā publikācijā tika pausts, ka Ļiza, 13 gadus veca krieviski runājošā ģimenē Vācijā pastāvīgi dzīvojoša meitene, esot pazudusi bez vēsts 2016. gada 11. janvārī pa ceļam no izglītības iestādes uz savu vecāku mājām, kad vairāki arābu izcelsmes vīrieši esot piedāvājuši Ļizai aizvest viņu mājās ar viņu rīcībā esošu transportlīdzekli;

⁸ Martin, J. L. (1982). Disinformation: An instrumentality in the propaganda arsenal. *Political Communication*, Vol.2, No.1, p. 59.

⁹ Ancītis, T. (09.02.2016.). Vācijas krievi – mediju, propagandas un identitātes spēlēs. *Latvijas Sabiedriskie Mediji*. Izgūts (02.10.2017.) no: <http://www.lsm.lv/raksts/arzemes/zinas/vacijas-krievi-mediju-propagandas-un-identitates-spiles.a168116/>

tomēr tā vietā Ļiza esot nolaupīta, aizvesta nezināmā virzienā, kā arī tikusi izvarota.¹⁰ Pēc tam, kad Ļiza neesot pārradusies mājās, viņas vecāki ir iesaistījuši Vācijas federālo policiju, kas to izsludinājusi meklēšanā kā bez vēsts pazudušu.

Pēc 30 stundu atrašanās bezvēsts prombūtnē Ļiza, atgriezusies vecāku mājās, sniegusi Vācijas federālajai policijai liecību par to, ka esot tikusi nolaupīta un izvarota. Policija uzsākusi izmeklēšanu un ierosināts kriminālprocess notikušā apstākļu noskaidrošanai un procesa virzībai nepieciešamo darbību veikšanai. Notikumam iegūstot plašāku skanējumu, tas tika pārpublicēts sākotnēji Krievijas elites kontrolētos Krievijas medijos, pēc tam arī Krievijas kontrolētos vai ietekmētos medijos Rietumvalstīs, kā arī Rietumvalstu sabiedriskajos un privātajos medijos un citās informācijas nesēju platformās, piemēram, sociālajos tīklos.¹¹ Izmeklēšanas sākotnējā posmā Vācijas federālā policija nesniedza plašāku informāciju par notikušā apstākļiem, tādējādi izraisot dažādu spekulāciju izplatīšanos publiskajā telpā, kā arī Krievijas oficiālo amatpersonu iesaistīšanos – Krievijas ārlietu ministrs S. Lavrovs publiski izteica neapmierinātību ar Vācijas federālās policijas darbu, komunikācijas trūkumu un šķietamiem centieniem slēpt patiesību, un vienlaikus, ņemot vērā Ļizas etnisko izcelsmi, nodēvēja gadījumu par *mūsu Ļizas gadījumu*.¹²

Pēc sākotnējo izmeklēšanas darbību veikšanas Vācijas federālā policija 2016. gada 18. janvārī nāca klajā ar paziņojumu, ka par cietušo sākotnēji atzīta Ļiza nav tikusi ne nolaupīta, ne izvarota, bet gan savā dzīvesvietā un izglītības iestādē pastāvošo sadzīves apstākļu dēļ 2016. gada 11. janvārī, laika periodā, kad atradusies bezvēsts prombūtnē, esot atradusies kāda sava paziņas dzīvesvietā, ar kuru seksuāla kontakta viņai neesot bijis.^{13,14} Neskatoties uz iepriekš

¹⁰ Janda, J. (2016). The Lisa case. STRATCOM lessons for European states. *Security Policy Working Paper*, No. 11/2016, p. 2. Izgūts (02.10.2017.) no: https://www.baks.bund.de/sites/baks010/files/working_paper_2016_11.pdf

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² McGuinness, D. (27.01.2016.). Russia steps into Berlin “rape” storm claiming German cover-up. *BBC*. Izgūts (02.10.2017.) no: <http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-eu-35413134>

¹³ Dearden, L. (20.01.2016.). Police say 13-year-old girl was not “kidnapped and raped by asylum seekers” in Berlin. *Independent*. Izgūts (02.10.2017.) no: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/police-say-13-year-old-girl-was-not-kidnapped-and-raped-by-asylum-seekers-in-berlin-a6823836.html>

¹⁴ Ancītis, T. (09.02.2016.). Vācijas krievi – mediju, propagandas un identitātes spilēs. *Latvijas Sabiedriskie Mediji*. Izgūts (02.10.2017.) no: <http://www.lsm.lv/raksts/arzemes/zinas/vacijas-krievi-mediju-propagandas-un-identitates-spiles.a168116/>

minēto, Krievijas elites kontrolētie vai to ietekmei pakļautie mediji neatsauca iepriekš paustās nepatiesās ziņas, un tas izraisīja Vācijā dzīvojošās etniskās krievu kopienas protesta akcijas, kas vērsās pret Vācijas federālās policijas šķietamo bezdarbību lietas izmeklēšanā, savukārt Krievijas ārlietu ministrs S. Lavrovs izteicās, ka “ir skaidrs, ka meitene brīvprātīgi nepazuda uz 30 stundām”, un izteica cerību, ka “šīs problēmas netiek *paslaucītas zem paklāja* un nākotnē neatgadsies līdzīgi gadījumi, kādi notikuši ar *mūsu Ļizu*”, neņemot vērā iepriekš Vācijas federālās policijas izplatīto paziņojumu.¹⁵

Neņemot vērā to, ka Vācijas federālā policija oficiālā paziņojumā norādīja, ka krimināllietā iesaistītā persona nav tikusi ne nolaupīta, ne izvarota, sociālajos tīklos, piemēram, *Facebook* un *Twitter*, tika izplatīti jauni ziņojumi, kuros personas, kas uzdevušās par Ļizas māti un tanti, turpināja apgalvot iepriekš pausto, ka nolaupīšanas un izvarošanas gadījums tomēr esot noticis, neņemot vērā, ka Vācijas policijas veikto ekspertīžu rezultāti neliecina par iesaistītās personas pakļaušanu fiziskai vardarbībai, to nolaupot, vai piespiedu seksuālam kontaktam.¹⁶ Tas, savukārt, izraisīja aktīvāku Vācijā dzīvojošās etnisko krievu kopienas pretreakciju – publiskas demonstrācijas, kas vērstas pret Vācijas migrācijas politiku, piesaistot šīm demonstrācijām arī neonacistiskas ievirzes aktīvistus un citas radikāli labēji noskaņotas personu grupas.¹⁷ Krievijas ārlietu ministrs S. Lavrovs atkārtoti izteicās par “Vācijas policijas un tieslietu sistēmas nespēju šādas lietas uztvert nopietni pārlieku liela politikorektuma dēļ”.¹⁸

Lai arī izmeklēšana nav atklājusi tiešu Krievijas varas elites mērķtiecīgu iesaisti *Ļizas gadījumā*, tomēr fakts, ka šo dezinformācijas kampaņu sākotnējā fāzē visaktīvāk realizēja tādi mediji kā *Sputnik*, *RIA Novosti*, *Voice of Russia*, *RT* un *RT Deutsch*, kuri starptautiski ir atzīti par Krievijas varas elites kontrolētiem medijiem, kas izpilda tās vadīto propagandas kampaņu,

¹⁵ New York Times. (27.01.2016.). Russia claims Germany tried to cover up the rape of 13-year old girl. IZGŪTS (02.10.2017.) no: <http://nytlive.nytimes.com/womenintheworld/2016/01/27/russia-claims-germany-tried-to-cover-up-the-rape-of-13-year-old-girl/>

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Janda, J. (2016). The Lisa case. STRATCOM lessons for European states. *Security Policy Working Paper*, No. 11/2016, p. 2. IZGŪTS (02.10.2017.) no: https://www.baks.bund.de/sites/baks010/files/working_paper_2016_11.pdf

¹⁸ NATO. (2016). The “Lisa case”: Germany as a target of Russian disinformation. IZGŪTS (02.10.2017.) no: <http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2016/Also-in-2016/lisa-case-germany-target-russian-disinformation/EN/index.htm>

ir secināms, ka, neskatoties uz to, ka gadījuma centrālā persona Ļiza maldinājusi sabiedrību sadzīvisku apstākļu dēļ, Krievijas kontrolētie mediji šo gadījumu ir izmantojuši Krievijas propagandas kampaņas ietvaros, sniedzot dezinformāciju, kas saskan ar Krievijas stratēģiskajiem mērķiem, un Krievijas elite ir bijusi informēta par šī gadījuma nepatieso atspoguļošanu un notikumu eskalāciju.¹⁹ Izvēlētajā gadījumā ir vērojams, ka Krievijas propagandas kampaņas komunikācijas kanāli ar dezinformācijas palīdzību centās ietekmēt Vācijas sabiedrisko domu, primāri ietekmējot etnisko krievu kopienu Vācijā, bet sekundāri ietekmējot arī pārējās Vācijas sabiedrības daļas, kā arī citas Rietumvalstu sabiedrības, ekspluatējot pastāvošo ģeopolitisko situāciju un liela skaita migrantu iepļūšanu ES Krievijas ģeopolitisko mērķu sasniegšanai, pozicionējot Krieviju un krievus kā *cietējus* no ES nespējas kontrolēt radušos situāciju.

Rietumos bāzēto organizāciju pretdarbība Krievijas dezinformācijai

NATO Stratēģiskās komunikācijas izcilības centrs

Lai arī NATO Stratēģiskās komunikācijas izcilības centrs (*StratCom*) savās publikācijās norāda uz nepieciešamību aktīvi pretdarboties Krievijas izplatītajai dezinformācijai, centrs nav atsevišķi pievērsies *Ļizas gadījuma* analīzei, kas tieši vērsts pret NATO dalībvalsti Vāciju. Vienlaikus centra akadēmiskā žurnāla "Aizsardzības stratēģiskās komunikācijas" otrajā izdevumā (2017. gada pavaris) *Ļizas gadījums* tiek pieminēts, apgalvojot, ka, pēc autoru domām, tas ir ticis tieši vērsts pret Vācijas kancleri A. Merkeli un viņas vadīto Vācijas valdību ar mērķi atspoguļot to kā nespējīgu pārvaldīt situāciju, ko ir izraisījusi Vācijas pieņemtā migrācijas politika, kā dezinformācijas paudēju apskatot Kremli jeb Krievijas oficiālo varu.²⁰ Publikācijā tiek uzsvērts, ka *Ļizas gadījums* ir bijis Krievijas pusei veiksmīga dezinformācijas kampaņa, jo tās rezultātā A. Merkeles valdības popularitāte ir nokritusi līdz

¹⁹ NATO. (2016). The "Lisa case": Germany as a target of Russian disinformation. Izgūts (02.10.2017.) no: <http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2016/Also-in-2016/lisa-case-germany-target-russian-disinformation/EN/index.htm>

²⁰ Rogers, J., Tyushka, A. (2017). "Hacking" into the West: Russia's "anti-hegemonic" drive and the strategic narrative offensive. *Defence strategic communications*, Vol. 2, p. 36.

zemākajam rādītājam piecu gadu periodā, un izcelts arguments, ka Krievijas veiktās dezinformācijas aktivitātes vairs nav slēptas, bet tiek paustas atklātā veidā ar augstu intensitāti, atbildot uz augošo Rietumvalstu pretdarbību Krievijas aktivitātēm.²¹

Krievijas dezinformācijas izplatīšanos Vācijā, t.sk. *Ļizas gadījumā*, pēc Stratēģiskās komunikācijas izcilības centra domām, ir veicinājušas t.s. ekspertu kopienas, kas Vācijas gadījumā tiek apzīmētas kā 'Krievijas sapratēji' (vācu val. – *Russlandversteher*; angļu val. – *Russia understanders*), kuri darbojas kā starpnieki, lai Krievijas varas atbalstīto dezinformāciju izplatītu mērķauditorijas vidē, proti, Vācijas un pārējo Rietumvalstu informācijas telpā.²² Šo ekspertu kopienu mērķis ir aktualizēt Krievijai vēlamo naratīvu Rietumvalstīs, akcentējot Krievijai piedēvējamo vērtību un identitātes šķietamo pārkūmu, nepieļaujot identisku situāciju attīstīšanos Krievijā.

Šajā publikācijā attiecībā uz *Ļizas gadījumu* par morālo vērtējumu, kas asociējams ar šo dezinformācijas kampaņu, ir uzskatāmi publikācijas autoru izteikumi par to, ka *Ļizas gadījums* ir kļuvis bēdīgi slavens kā Krievijas īstenota dezinformācijas un sabotāžas operācija.²³ Savukārt attiecībā uz šo gadījumu netiek izceltas nepieciešamās darbības, kuras būtu veicamas, lai novērstu šī gadījuma ietekmi un līdzīgas stratēģijas izmantošanu nākotnē.

Krievijas stratēģiskie mērķi apskatāmajā gadījumā tiek definēti kā realitātes uztveres izmaiņu veicināšana un Rietumvalstu lēmumu pieņēmēju uzmanības novēršana no citām aktivitātēm, tādējādi radot apjukumu.²⁴ Vienlaikus Rietumvalstu pretdarbība dezinformācijai tiek aprakstīta kā neefektīva, jo Rietumvalstis pievēršas katram individuālam dezinformācijas gadījumam, neveidojot vienotu un stratēģisku pieeju, tādējādi brīdī, kad Rietumvalstis ir pievērkušās viena nozīmīga dezinformācijas gadījuma ierobežošanai, tiek radīts jauns vēstījums, kurš sākotnējā fāzē ir veiksmīgs, jo tam netiek pievērsta ievērojama lēmumu pieņēmēju uzmanība, tādējādi negatīvi vērtējot Rietumvalstu veiktās darbības.²⁵

²¹ Rogers, J., Tyushka, A. (2017). "Hacking" into the West: Russia's "anti-hegemonic" drive and the strategic narrative offensive. *Defence strategic communications*, Vol. 2, p. 36.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 49.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

Eiropas Ārējās darbības dienests

Ļizas gadījums pirmo reizi EĀDD dezinformācijas apskatā tika publicēts 2016. gada 19. janvārī, izceļot to starp citiem apmēram 25 konkrētajā nedēļā identificētajiem dezinformācijas gadījumiem kā nedēļas tendenci, ar to saprotot, ka šis vēstījums tiek publicēts lielā skaitā informācijas nesēju, tāpēc strauji izplatās. Minētajā dezinformācijas apskatā tika sacīts, ka par konkrēto gadījumu EĀDD ir ziņojusi Čehijā bāzētā domnīca *European Values*, apgalvojot, ka minētais vēstījums tiek izplatīts Čehijas medijos, kuru mērķauditorija ir čehu valodā runājošie, tāpēc, vērtējot ziņas izcelsmi, ir uzskatāms, ka šo dezinformāciju pauda Krievijas naratīvu atbalstoši Čehijas mediji.²⁶

Vēstījumā minēts, ka Vācijas varas iestādes ir izveidojušas sadarbības mehānismus ar interneta informācijas nesējiem *Facebook*, *Google* un *Twitter*, paredzot to, ka šo tīmekļa vietņu uzturētāji veiks naida runu saturošu ierakstu identificēšanu un dzēšanu, tādējādi Vācijai īstenojot jau iepriekš plānotu vēršanos pret vārda brīvību, kam attaisnojumu ir radījusi pastāvošā migrācijas krīze, līdz ar to paredzot iespēju ar cietumsodu sodīt individuus, kas vēršas pret migrantiem un Vācijas piekopto migrācijas politiku.²⁷ Tāpat apskatītajā ziņā minēts, ka “cilvēki nebūs spējīgi aizstāvēt savas meitas pret imigrantu veiktu izvarošanu, neriskējot par to nonākt cietumā”, tādējādi demonstrējot EĀDD negatīvu morālo vērtējumu attiecībā uz dezinformācijas paušanu ar emocionālās pārliecināšanas metodēm, vienlaikus atsevišķi neizdalot vainīgās vai cietušās puses pozitīvas vai negatīvas darbības.²⁸ EĀDD šo dezinformācijas gadījumu atspēko, pamatojot ar faktu, ka naida runas aizliegums jau pastāvošajā demokrātiskajā iekārtā nav pretrunā ar vārda brīvības pamatprincipiem, paredzot sodu par naida runas izplatīšanu naudas soda vai cietumsoda veidā atkarībā no potenciāli vai reāli nodarītā kaitējuma sabiedrībai, kas vērtējams kā piedāvātais risinājums un tā īstenošana.²⁹

2016. gada 26. janvāra dezinformācijas apskatā žurnālists P. Spirins (*P. Spirin*) ziņoja EĀDD par jaunu dezinformāciju attiecībā uz *Ļizas gadījumu*, Krievijas televīzijas kanālā *Pervij kanal* demonstrētajā raidījumā *Voskresnoje*

²⁶ EU East StratCom Task Force. (19.01.2016.). Disinformation Review, p. 5. Izgūts (02.10.2017.) no: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/euvsdisinfo/docs/disinformation_review_19-01-2016.pdf

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*

Vremja translējot interviju ar Ļizas tanti un tēvoci, runājot par izvarošanas gadījumu, neskatoties uz faktu, ka līdz intervijas demonstrēšanas brīdim izvarošanas faktu Vācijas policija jau bija noliegusi pēc sākotnējo izmeklēšanas darbību veikšanas.³⁰ Fakts, ka konkrētais sižets ir ne tikai pārraidīts televīzijas ēterā, bet arī ievietots vietnē *YouTube*, ļauj secināt, ka dezinformācijas mērķis ir bijusi ne tikai Krievijas sabiedrība, bet arī ārpus Krievijas dzīvojošie krievvalodīgie.

EĀDD 2016. gada 9. februāra dezinformācijas apskatā kā pagājušās nedēļas tendence (jauni notikumi, kas pēc formas nav evolucionējuši) tiek norādīts, ka Krievijas televīzijas kanālā *Rossija 24* raidījumā *Vesti nedeli s Dmitriem Kisilevim* tiek turpināts paust jau iepriekš izskanējušu un atspēkotu dezinformāciju, nepiedāvājot jaunu traktējumu, bet arī neatkāpjoties no iepriekš paustā vēstījuma, par pamata auditoriju uzskatot Krievijas iedzīvotājus un cenšoties tos pārliecināt par labu Krievijas izplatītajai dezinformācijai.³¹

EĀDD dezinformācijas analīzē (publikācija, kas analīzē konkrētu gadījumu, nošķirot to no vispārīgā dezinformācijas apskata), kas publicēta 2017. gada 12. janvārī, pievēršas Krievijas īstenotai dezinformācijai, kas vēsta tieši pret Vāciju un A. Merkeles vadītās valdības piekopto politiku. Vācija tiek identificēta kā viena no tām Rietumvalstīm, kas pakļautas biežākajiem un lielākā apmēra dezinformācijas gadījumiem, kuri galvenokārt koncentrēti uz migrācijas jautājumiem un arābu izcelsmes imigrantu veiktiem noziegumiem, tos safabricējot vai reālus notikumus papildinot ar maldinošu un vienpusīgu informāciju.³²

2017. gada 12. janvāra EĀDD dezinformācijas analīzē *Ļizas gadījums* tiek definēts kā testa gadījums, paužot, ka šis gadījums nākotnē ir uzskatāms par piemēru tam, kā Krievija Vācijā un citās Rietumvalstīs turpmāk īsteno dezinformācijas kampaņas.³³ Tiek vēstīts, ka *Ļizas gadījumā* vainīgā puse ir prokremliskie mediji, kuru mērķis ir radīt Vācijas un citu Rietumvalstu sabiedrībā negatīvu un naidīgu attieksmi pret migrantiem,

³⁰ EU East StratCom Task Force. (19.01.2016.). Disinformation Review, p. 3. Izgūts (02.10.2017.) no: http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/euvsdisinfo/docs/disinformation_review_19-01-2016.pdf

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² EU East StratCom Task Force. (12.01.2017.). Disinformation Review. Izgūts (02.10.2017.) no: <http://us11.campaign-archive2.com/?u=cd23226ada1699a77000eb60b&id=8a3e5d1155>

³³ *Ibid.*

kas vērtējama kā “Kremla iecienītākā dezinformācijas paušanas stratēģija pēdējā gada laikā”.³⁴

Arī 2016. gada 16. maija EĀDD dezinformācijas analizē *Ļizas gadījums* tiek aprakstīts kā “mācību grāmatas piemērs” tam, kā prokremliskais naratīvs koncentrējas uz migrantiem, un atklāj spēcīgu dezinformācijas kampaņas koordināciju, kuru pamatā īsteno Krievijas valsts varas kontrolētie mediji, *interneta troļļi* un politiķi.³⁵ Īpaši minētajā analizē tiek izcelts fakts, ka šajā dezinformācijas kampaņā nozīmīgu lomu spēlēja ne tikai Krievijas varas kontrolētie mediji, bet arī Krievijas ārlietu ministrs S. Lavrovs, kurš dezinformāciju turpinājis paust apzināti, ignorējot faktus, kas pierāda sākotnējās ziņas nepatiesumu.³⁶

Domnīca *European Values*

Ļizas gadījums domnīcas *European Values* ieskatā ir vērtējams kā Kremļa uzturēts naratīvs par Eiropas valstu nespēju rīkoties un pieņemt lēmumus migrācijas krīzes kontekstā, vienlaikus nostādot Krieviju kā pozitīvu alternatīvu, kur šādas migrantu izraisītas problēmas nepastāv.³⁷ Kā būtiskākā cietusī puse *Ļizas gadījumā* tiek definēta Vācijas valdība, kuras nespēja strukturāli un koordinēti veikt atbildes pasākumus dezinformācijai piešķīra šim gadījumam neproporcionālu nacionālu un starptautisku uzmanību, tādējādi negatīvi ietekmējot to, kā tiek vērtēts Vācijas valdības darbs.³⁸

Kā iemesls, kāpēc šāda plaša mēroga dezinformācijas kampaņa varēja izcelties, tiek minēts fakts, ka Vācijā šī notikuma laikā nebija funkcionējošas stratēģiskās komunikācijas institūcijas, kura šī gadījuma sākuma posmā to būtu identificējusi kā potenciāli bīstamu, līdz ar to tā sekotu līdzīgai gadījuma attīstībai, paustajām dezinformācijas ziņām tās kontekstā, kā arī sniegtu koordinētu un sistemātisku atbildes reakciju gan ar Vācijas sabiedrību (vācu,

³⁴ EU East StratCom Task Force. (12.01.2017.). Disinformation Review. Izgūts (02.10.2017.) no: <http://us11.campaign-archive2.com/?u=cd23226ada1699a77000eb60b&id=8a3e5d1155>

³⁵ EU East StratCom Task Force. (16.05.2017.). *The pro-Kremlin narrative about migrants*. Izgūts (02.10.2017.) no: <https://euvsdisinfo.eu/the-pro-kremlin-narrative-about-migrants/>

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Janda, J. (2016). The Lisa case. STRATCOM lessons for European states. *Security Policy Working Paper*, No. 11/2016, p. 2. Izgūts (02.10.2017.) no: https://www.baks.bund.de/sites/baks010/files/working_paper_2016_11.pdf

³⁸ *Ibid.*

krievu un citās valodās runājošajām sabiedrības daļām), gan ar citu valstu sabiedrībām, paužot, ka Vācijas varas iestādes situāciju kontrolē.³⁹ Vienlaikus, lai arī Vācijas federālā policija šīs lietas izmeklēšanā rīkojās atbilstoši tās darbību regulējošiem normatīvajiem aktiem, funkcionējoša stratēģiskās komunikācijas institūcija to klasificētu kā augstas prioritātes gadījumu, tādējādi neiejaucoties izmeklēšanas gaitā, bet nodrošinot tiesībsargājošajām iestādēm papildu resursus gan lietas izmeklēšanā, gan sabiedriskās kārtības uzturēšanā, vērojot situācijas attīstību un masu nekārtību izcelšanās draudus.⁴⁰

Nemot vērā to, ka *Ļizas gadījums* tika vērsti tieši pret Vācijas iekšpolitisko dimensiju, iespējamās darbības nākotnē, kas veicamas, lai novērstu līdzīgu gadījumu atkārtošanos, ir stratēģiskās komunikācijas vienības institucionālā pakļautība Iekšlietu ministrijai.⁴¹ Pakļautība Iekšlietu ministrijai tiek skaidrota ar to, ka dezinformācijas gadījumi lielākoties ir saistīti vispirms ar iekšējo nacionālās drošības dimensiju un tikai pastarpināti ar citām nozarēm, tāpēc arī šādos gadījumos komunikācijai, kas notiek gan valsts iekšienē, gan pa diplomātiskajiem un, iespējams, militārajiem kanāliem arī valsts ārienes, ir jābūt pakļautai institūcijai, kuras kompetences jomai piekritīga ir nacionālā drošība valsts iekšienē un sabiedrības drošība.⁴² Šādai stratēģiskās komunikācijas vienībai būtu deleģējami četri pamata uzdevumi: 1) reaģēšanas pasākumu veikšana reālā laikā, identificējot nacionālajai drošībai un starptautiskajam diskursam nozīmīgus dezinformācijas gadījumus, veicot starpinstitutionālu veicamo darbību koordināciju; 2) masu mediju un citu informācijas nesēju pastāvīgs monitorings un regulāra informācijas apmaiņa; 3) regulāra dezinformācijas tendenču apkopošana un analīze, kas publicējama gan valsts sabiedrībai, gan ārējiem partneriem; 4) koordinācija un kopīgas izpētes veikšana sadarbībā ar citu valstu un starptautisko organizāciju stratēģiskās komunikācijas vienībām.⁴³

³⁹ Janda, J. (2016). The Lisa case. STRATCOM lessons for European states. *Security Policy Working Paper*, No. 11/2016, p. 2. Izgūts (02.10.2017.) no: https://www.baks.bund.de/sites/baks010/files/working_paper_2016_11.pdf

⁴⁰ *Ibid*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid*

Organizācija *StopFake.org*

StopFake.org ir Ukrainā bāzēta nevalstiskā organizācija, kurā līdzdarbojas pārstāvji no Kijevas Mohila žurnālistikas skolas un projekta “Žurnālistikas digitālā nākotne”, kuras pamata mērķis ir identificēt un atspēkot propagandas kampaņas un dezinformāciju, kas saistīta ar Krievijas īstenoto Krimas pussalas aneksiju un agresīvajām darbībām Ukrainas austrumu reģionos.⁴⁴ Vienlaikus šī organizācija pievēršas arī Krievijas dezinformācijas gadījumiem, kas skar ne tikai Ukrainu, bet arī Rietumvalstis. Pēc *Ļizas gadījuma* rašanās pirmā organizācijas *StopFake.org* publikācija, kas veltīta šai tēmai, tika publicēta 2016. gada 17. janvārī. Šajā publikācijā pausts, ka dezinformāciju izplata Krievijas masu mediji, galvenokārt televīzija, kā būtiskāko dezinformācijas paudžu minot Krievijas televīzijas kanālu *Pervij Kanal*, bet kā atbalstošo ziņojuma paudžu minot Vācijas krievu valodā runājošajiem paredzēto mediju *Genosse.su*, kas ir tīmekļa vietne Vācijas krievu konvencijai.⁴⁵ Publikācijā netiek pausta organizācijas *StopFake.org* interpretācija par to, kas ir bijusi dezinformācijas mērķauditorija, vienlaikus, ņemot vērā šai ziņai pievienotos tēmturus *Germany* un *Russian Channel One*, iespējams secināt, ka pamata auditorija šīs organizācijas izpratnē šajā gadījumā ir Vācijā dzīvojošie krievu valodā runājošie, kā arī Krievijas sabiedrība.⁴⁶ Vērtējot organizācijas morālo attieksmi pret dezinformācijas gadījumu, publikācijā šādu attieksmi iespējams identificēt, apgalvojot, ka Krievijas televīzijas kanāla *Pervij Kanal* raidījumā ticis translēts iestudēts sižets, kurā sieviete, kas uzdodas par *Ļizas* tanti, “izplūstot asarās, “apstiprina” izvarošanas gadījumu”, tādējādi skaidri ilustrējot organizācijas viedokli gan par šo demonstrēto sižetu, gan par dezinformācijas gadījumu kopumā.⁴⁷ Kā pozitīvas darbības *Ļizas gadījuma* kontekstā tiek izceltas Vācijas interneta integritātes monitoringa vietnes *Mimikama* veiktās darbības, lai izmeklētu un analizētu šo dezinformācijas gadījumu, kā arī Vācijas federālās policijas veiktā komunikācija, vietnē *Facebook* paužot apstiprinājumu tam, ka izmeklēšanas gaitā ir konstatēta

⁴⁴ StopFake.org. Izgūts (02.10.2017.) no: <http://www.stopfake.org/en/about-us/>

⁴⁵ StopFake.org. (17.01.2016.). Fake: Russian Girl Kidnapped and Raped by “Refugees” in Germany. Izgūts (02.10.2017.) no: <http://www.stopfake.org/en/fake-russian-girl-kidnapped-and-raped-by-refugees-in-germany/>

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

nepatiesas informācijas sniegšana no cietušo puses, savukārt kā negatīva darbība tiek akcentēts fakts, ka televīzijas kanāls *Pervij Kanal* šī gadījuma kontekstā ir demonstrējis video materiālu, kurā vairāku vīriešu grupa runā par viņu veiktu izvarošanu, kaut arī šis video vietnē *YouTube* ticis augšupielādēts jau 2009. gadā ar citu nosaukumu.⁴⁸

Organizācijas *StopFake.org* 2016. gada 26. februārī publicētajā ziņā par Krievijas un Vācijas attiecību saasinājumam pēc dezinformācijas gadījumiem, kas skar Vācijas migrācijas politiku un ar to saistītos jautājumus, pausts, ka nozīmīgākā loma dezinformācijas izplatīšanā un aprītē ir bijusi Krievijas medijiem, vienlaikus norādot, ka šādai ziņai ir maz ticams efekts uz lielāko daļu Vācijas sabiedrības, bet ir ticama ietekme uz Vācijā dzīvojošajiem krievvalodīgajiem.⁴⁹ Šajā publikācijā iespējams identificēt autora pausto morālo vērtējumu attiecībā uz *Ļizas gadījumu*, nodēvējot to par vispārsteidzošāko dezinformācijas gadījumu, vienlaikus nesniedzot iespējamās darbības scenārijus gan šīs, gan līdzīgu dezinformācijas kampaņu risināšanā.⁵⁰

Secinājumi

Lai arī Rietumvalstu institūcijas spēj veiksmīgi identificēt savus stratēģiskos pretiniekus, konkrētas dezinformācijas kampaņas sasaistot ar konkrētiem dezinformācijas avotiem, vienota Rietumvalstu izpratne gan par patiesajiem kampaņas mērķiem, gan nepieciešamajām darbībām, kas veicamas, lai pretdarbotos šādām kampaņām, ir daļēja un ir uzskatāma par vienu no būtiskākajām problēmām, kas saistītas ar nevēlamo dezinformācijas kampaņu augsto efektivitāti, ietekmējot Rietumvalstu politisko dienaskārtību atbilstoši pretinieka interesēm.

Dezinformācija, ar kuru saskaras Rietumvalstis, tiek pausta ne tikai kā atsevišķas dezinformācijas ziņas, bet tiek iekļauta arī kā propagandas kampaņu sastāvdaļa ar mērķi paust agresorvalsts naratīvu un iegūt mērķa

⁴⁸ StopFake.org. (17.01.2016.). Fake: Russian Girl Kidnapped and Raped by “Refugees” in Germany. Izgūts (02.10.2017.) no: <http://www.stopfake.org/en/fake-russian-girl-kidnapped-and-raped-by-refugees-in-germany/>

⁴⁹ StopFake.org. (26.02.2016.). Germany probes Russian media’s role in fuelling migrant fracas. Izgūts (02.10.2017.) no: <http://www.stopfake.org/en/germany-probes-russian-media-s-role-in-fuelling-migrant-fracas/>

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

auditorijas atbalstu tam, tā tiek izmantota arī agresorvalsts informācijas operāciju ietvaros ar mērķi iegūt operacionālu un taktisku pārsvaru, īstenojot to kā sagatavošanās fāzi sekojošām militārām un nemilitārām operācijām kompleksā karadarbības un konfliktu vidē. Dezinformācija tiek pausta ar mērķi panākt kādu konkrētu gala rezultātu, lai gan ne vienmēr šis mērķis ir identificējams no pašas dezinformācijas ziņas analīzes; tā vietā šo ziņu ir nepieciešams skatīt plašākā kontekstā, ņemot vērā gan identificētās agresorvalsts iepriekš veikto darbību tendences, gan citus konkrētās situācijas apstākļus, kas, iespējams, atklāj dezinformācijas paušanas stratēģiskos nodomus.

Neskatoties uz to, ka dezinformāciju ir iespējams identificēt, to pārbaudot ar reāliem faktiem, demokrātisku valstu rīcībā nav neierobežots instrumentu klāsts, ar kuriem iespējams pretdarboties dezinformācijai, jo pastāv liels ierobežojošo apstākļu kopums, kas liedz bez papildu izvērtējuma un samērīguma izanalizēšanas nekavējoties un pilnībā aizliegt dezinformāciju izplatošā informācijas nesēja darbību. Pretstatā tam nedemokrātiskas valstis ir pakļautas mazākai ievainojamībai no dezinformācijas kampaņām, jo šādās valstīs nereti tiek īstenota prakse, ka valsts vara ne tikai lielā apmērā vai pilnībā kontrolē medijus un to darbību, bet arī veic citu informācijas nesēju, piemēram, interneta resursu, cenzūru un piekļuves ierobežošanu. Šādas darbības ir pretrunā ar Rietumvalstu demokrātijas pamatprincipiem, lai gan pastāv tiesiskie instrumenti, kas sniedz iespēju atklāti naidīgu mediju darbību ierobežot, piemēram, piemērojot tiem naudas sodu vai islaicīgi pilnībā vai daļēji pārtraucot to darbību gadījumos, ja tiek konstatēts būtisks ar dezinformācijas izplatīšanas palīdzību nodarītais kaitējums sabiedrībai. Tomēr nepastāv viennozīmīga demokrātisko valstu izpratne par to, kā identificēt un mērīt radīto kaitējumu sabiedrībai un attiecīgi veikt samērīgu pret darbību.

Rietumvalstu institūciju izpratne par to, kas ir dezinformācijas paudējs apskatītā izpētes gadījuma kontekstā, ir vienota – kā būtiskākā akcentēta Krievijas, tās elites un mediju loma, papildus atzīmējot tos politiskos spēlētājus, kuru mērķi saskan ar pašreizējo Krievijas naratīvu. Apskatīto institūciju izpratne ir vienota arī attiecībā uz to, ka Krievijas dezinformācijas kampaņas būtiskākais mērķis šajā gadījumā ir bijusi Vācijas sabiedrība un politiskā elite ar nodomu ietekmēt Vācijas politisko dienaskārtību, dažas organizācijas par mērķauditoriju uzskata arī Krievijas sabiedrību un krievvalodīgos ar nolūku gūt Krievijas sabiedrības un krievvalodīgo atbalstu Maskavas uzturētajam pretrietumnieciski noskaņotajam naratīvam.

Nākotnē nepieciešams stiprināt Rietumvalstu noturīgumu un spēju pielāgoties un pretoties dezinformācijai un tās paušanas metodēm, ņemot vērā to, ka īsā un vidējā laika periodā nav vērojama pastāvošās konfliktsituācijas būtiska deeskalācija. Cīņā pret dezinformāciju arī nākotnē būs nozīmīgas vienotas un koordinētas Rietumvalstu darbības, lai spētu sniegt efektīvus un koncentrētus prettriecienus, kas tiek veikti, Rietumvalstīm vienoti izprotot pastāvošo situāciju un tās radīto apdraudējumu.

Tukša lapa

II

INTERVIEWS

The players on the other side

Interview with Kurt Engelen, Vice-President of the Euro-Atlantic Association of Belgium

Ina Strazdiņa,

Brussels Correspondent

Radio Latvia

At the beginning of October Finland officially opened European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki. This is the very first centre in history where EU and NATO are joining forces. Currently, the 12 participating countries to the Centre are Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. EU and NATO countries have the possibility of joining as participant countries.

I am meeting Kurt Engelen, Vice-President of the Euro-Atlantic Association of Belgium and lecturer on international politics in Brussels and Riga to talk about what hybrid threats are today and how to counter them.

When we talk about hybrid threats today, what do we mean by that?

That gives me the first opportunity to say something about the word “hybrid”. I know that it is widely used of course – EU, NATO use it and it is even the official title of the new Centre of Excellence in Finland. The reason

why I don't like the word hybrid is that it suggests a mixture of components from different things, but actually, when you look at the threats that we are facing today – mainly those from countries like Russia and China – this is not what they are. We should speak about comprehensive threats because they use every single component to their full extent. They are not at the intersection of things, they are full extent of everything. For instance, when we speak about the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, we say that the EU has a comprehensive approach to crisis management, because it uses not only military, but also police forces, legal and diplomatic means, or financial support for society reconstruction. This is why we speak about comprehensive, because it uses it all. Countries like Russia and China conduct their foreign policy and, maybe, we should use the word “war doctrine” instead, exactly in the same way. Of course, in the light of what happens today, when we speak about hybrid, we immediately think about Ukraine, the Russian meddling with elections in countries. We think about Russia using the supply of energy and pretended dependence of energy as a tool of influence. This systematic hybrid approach to International Relations in Russia has emerged rather recently and interestingly they call it themselves “the new generation warfare”. They don't use the word “hybrid”, they don't use the word “comprehensive”. Whatever we call it, this “hybrid”, “comprehensive” or “unrestricted” warfare doctrine is in fact something that originates in China and it dates back to the nineties. Two Chinese colonels of the People's Liberation Army developed a war doctrine called “unrestricted warfare”. It explains “how technologically inferior countries can defeat great powers by using non-military means.” You can find the book. You can google it. It has become China's war doctrine.

China seeks to gain influence?

It is a big country. Their economy has been blooming over the past decades, it has slowed down, but they still have a lot of money. They invest it in Africa, in Central Asia, they invest in places like Afghanistan, and what they do, is they buy influence. When in Africa, the EU wants to invest or to launch a programme, it will ask the country where it invests to comply with a number of criteria – human rights, respect of rule of law, and then, China comes there with what appears to be only economic interest. They are much

less regarding when it comes to things like human rights. They will accept to do the investment, they will build roads, buildings, without asking too much in return, but knowing that in the end, being there and holding the reins of the economy, they can exert their influence.

Can we say, that the EU and the Western world so far was too naive towards this threat? Although we have now the EU East StratCom Task Force set up to address Russia's ongoing disinformation campaigns and European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Helsinki.

There are different levels. What can a Centre of Excellence do? It can do research, it can make recommendations, it can analyse lessons learned of problems we had and it can help countries with the best practices and with knowledge. However, it has absolutely no decision power. It is not like, tomorrow, a task force from the Centre of Excellence can go into a country and say how it should behave in the wake of the threat that it is facing. Neither the centre of excellence, nor even the institutions themselves, because dealing within external threats means that we are speaking about Foreign Policy, and although the EU has a tool called Common Foreign and Security Policy, this policy is everything except common. It's not a common policy like the Common Agricultural policy or the Energy Policy of the EU. It is intergovernmental. That means that the EU can only do what the Council of Ministers agrees that it can do. So it can take actually no action autonomously. This means that it is for the Member States to address the threats. And there you're facing diverging interests. Again – political interest or the horizon of political interest are generally limited to four years. That is the time till the next election. And very often you will have very strong lobbying against the measures that you would impose against a country, because actually you are dealing with business, with people who would lose a market, people who would lose the source to suppliers, to resources. It is very unpopular in our systems to have a negative or hard approach towards a country or to impose sanctions, even though, objectively, you do realise that you are being threatened. It's very difficult to find a consensus among different countries. Spain could say: "I have no problem banning sales of cars to Russia." Germany would say: "Wait a second! Russia is one of the big markets for my "BMW" and my "Mercedes". Or we could say: "Let's diversify our energy

supply from Russia. But then Germany would say: “Yes, but we have “Nord Stream 1” and “Nord Stream 2” and there is money there; we have invested money and we need to write off investments, so it is very difficult to find consensus around the table.

And then there is a second aspect – our western democratic societies are all roughly built on a liberal model. A liberal system to be successful needs to generate its value from exchanges, from seeking win-win deals, from trying to find common denominators rather than from seeking its power in confrontations with its neighbours. We live in societies that profoundly dislike confrontation. Even the EU, when it can make a choice to obtain something by giving an advantage to a third country rather than to threaten it with sanctions, it will always go for the first option, because it doesn't like the idea of sanctions.

But the players that we have on the other side?

They think quite differently. For them, the use of confrontation is a natural tool. They are used to playing with that and to use that. For them, it would even be a mistake not to use an advantage that you have, even if it damages the other side. If something can give you an advantage, then you must take it. This is how countries that pursue a realist foreign policy function and that places western democracies in a very fragile position. Another aspect of liberalism is that you have a moral obligation to share your knowledge or your good recipes with others so they could also become wealthy and benefit from the same advantages that you have. You can very strongly feel it in the foreign policy of the EU. Every action that it undertakes is to try to help other regions of the world to structure themselves in the same way as the EU, to cooperate with them and to give them trade advantages.

We still believe today that there is value in trying to convince realist countries that there is another way and that we can actually build a liberal kind of relation with them. And in that sense, yes, we are naive.

How about information?

This is another aspect of “hybrid”, because freedom of expression and freedom of media are sacrosanct principles for us. We are very keen to let almost anyone use that freedom of expression and information for whatever

reason. And they understand it well – “RT”, “Sputnik”, and also control over social media – they extensively use these means and because we are not used to living in a world where the information is, by nature, used for subversive reasons, we have a tendency to believe what we hear. If the argumentation is well brought and if there is a certain logic in the message, if we recognize the validity of the logic in the frame of that argumentation, then we almost conclude automatically that what they say must be right. And that is very dangerous, because they are very skilled, they are very good at building argumentations, and if you listen to the premises that they pose in their argumentation, if you start from there and if you follow their reasoning, you very often have the impression that they are right.

Now we have a part, I would even say a significant part of our own public opinion that believes that Vladimir Putin is not that wrong. We have the right to criticize our governments, our politicians and we even find a certain pleasure in doing so. One way to show disdain for our own political class is to show sympathy for someone like Vladimir Putin. People behaving like this often simply show their opposition to their own politicians and want to place themselves outside the mainstream of their own political system. Moreover, some people think that it is “cool” to defend something or someone that the majority of others opposes. If the mainstream thinks that the Russian foreign policy is wrong, then they will defend it. They will claim that they can understand what others cannot, and they hope that this will make them more “interesting” in the eyes of others.

So this is why information, when it is used in a subversive way is dangerous and in a word – yes probably we are too naive.

For the hybrid threats – can we say that some parts of Europe are more interesting to use them against?

It depends whether you consider the end state or the means to reach the end state.

If you look at Russia you can put their desired end state at different levels. In the first place they want to be taken seriously and that’s almost a matter of ego. The second level – because they are political realists, they consider that everybody is a potential enemy, that they are surrounded and that everybody is going to attack them. They are paranoid about that and I am pretty sure that they are sincere. What do you do if you feel threatened? You will try

to keep your enemy as far as possible from your own borders. This is why, during the Cold War, it was very convenient to have a buffer zone, which was not the Soviet Union, but which was Poland, which was East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, which were there as buffers between them and NATO. So they are in the first place interested in what happens in their immediate neighbourhood. When Ukraine threatened to move to the west and ultimately to become a NATO member, they created a frozen conflict in Ukraine because they knew that it would cause a number of NATO countries not to move forward with membership for Ukraine in NATO. The same happened in Georgia in 2008 with South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the same happens in Moldova with Transnistria. If we look at the map the only place where they still have a bit of a buffer is Belarus and by the way, Belarus is not very happy with that. So their immediate vicinity is of direct interest to Russia and therefore hybrid threats are quite high in these regions. They try for instance to take advantage of Russian speaking minorities in these countries. The interesting thing is that Russia is more vocal about the interests of these minorities than these minorities are themselves. When I am in Latvia, when I am lecturing International Politics there, some 30 percent of my students are Russian speakers, and I can tell you – Mr Putin's rhetoric does not really resonate with them.

“Ceļā uz lielāku sadarbību”

Intervija ar NATO Stratēģiskās komunikācijas izcilības centra vadītāju Jāni Sārtu

Intervēja Jēkabs Ščipčinskis,

Latvijas Politologu biedrības pētnieks

Krievijas īstenotie hibrīddraudi tādās valstīs kā Gruzija, Ukraina, Sīrija un arī Baltijas valstīs ir pamodinājuši daudzas demokrātiskas valstis, kuras pēc aukstā kara beigām pieņēma, ka attiecības ar Krieviju varēs veidot uz savstarpējas uzticības pamatiem. Diemžēl realitāte ir izrādījusies citāda. Tādēļ aicinājām uz sarunu NATO Stratēģiskās komunikācijas izcilības centra vadītāju Jāni Sārtu, lai noskaidrotu, vai ir vairojusies Rietumvalstu izpratne par hibrīdo apdraudējumu ietekmi un vai daudzās institūcijas, kuru uzdevums būtu identificēt šos draudus, savā starpā sadarbojas.

Vai Jūs uzskatāt, ka Eiropas valstis ir apzinājušās Krievijas propagandas un dezinformācijas radīto seku bīstamību Eiropas valstu sabiedrībām un vai reakcija ir bijusi pietiekama?

Ļoti grūti izdarīt vispārīgus secinājumus par visām Eiropas valstīm, jo to ir daudz un reakcijas ir dažādas. Vienas ir apzinājušās, citas nav, dažās ir diezgan lieli politiskie strīdi ar pārstāvētajiem politiskajiem spēkiem, notiek viedokļu sadursmes. Līdz ar to nevaram apgalvot, ka pastāv viengabalaina aina.

Es domāju, ka lielākajās valstīs – Vācijā, Francijā, Lielbritānijā – jautājums par Krievijas īstenotajām propagandas aktivitātēm ir skaidrs. Domāju, ka mūsu reģionā skaidrība pastāv jau ilgāku laiku. Pēdējos gados strauji pieaug arī Ziemeļvalstu izpratne par Krievijas patiesajiem ārpolitiskajiem mērķiem. Savukārt Eiropas dienvidos, es teiktu, situācijas ir ļoti atšķirīgas. Ir dažas valstis, kurās, manuprāt, šīs izpratnes noteikti nav, bet dažām

tā parādās fragmentāri, tādēļ netiek uztverta pietiekami nopietni, jo tās uzskata, ka šis jautājums neattiecas uz viņiem. Ko valstis dara, lai novērstu hibrīdo draudu ietekmi un mazinātu propagandas izplatību? Pirmkārt – tiek radītas sistēmas, struktūras un situācijas, kas ļautu valsts izlūkdienestiem un valsts iestādēm atbildēt uz radītajiem apdraudējumiem. Otrkārt, pret darbībā iesaistās mediji. Šeit es varu atzīmēt, ka Eiropas mediju loma ir konstruktīvāka, nekā esam to redzējuši Amerikas Savienotajās Valstīs. Visbeidzot, protams, NATO un Eiropas Savienības ietvaros ir virkne iniciatīvu, kas principā ir vērstas uz to, lai šīs informācijas un ietekmes operācijas nebūtu tik efektīvas.

Vai uzskatāt, ka vidusmēra cilvēks Eiropā, teiksim, taksometra šoferis Spānijā, ir vismaz dzirdējis par informācijas karu?

Nupat varbūt jau jā. (Smejas.) Bet par to, vai Itālijas, es nebūtu drošs, un par Grieķiju – noteikti nē. (Smejas.)

Tikko Helsinkos ir atklāts Eiropas Hibrīddraudu apkaršanas izcilības centrs. Ko Latvija sagaida no dalības tajā?

Par Latvijas pozīciju īsti nevarēšu Jums atbildēt. Eiropas Hibrīddraudu apkaršanas izcilības centram šobrīd ir ļoti nozīmīgs tieši politiskais konteksts. Taču praktiskie rezultāti vēl jāgaida. Cik varu spriest no sarunām ar šī centra pārstāvjiem, kuri jau uzsākuši darbu, tajā skaitā ar direktoru, tā galvenais mērķis ir savienot dažādas grupas, cilvēkus un strāvojumus Eiropā un ārpus tās, kas strādā ar šiem jautājumiem, lai radītu tādu tiklojumu, kas rezultātā varētu radīt koordinētāku rīcību apdraudējuma novēršanai.

Vai starp Eiropā funkcionējošām draudu analīzes institūcijām pastāv kāda sadarbība?

Protams, pastāv, to jau nemaz tik daudz nav. Eiropā hibrīddraudus analizē drošības iestādes: NATO, Eiropas Savienības krīžu vadības un izlūkdienestu vienības (*fusion cell*). Katrā no šiem slāņiem notiek sadarbība. Tas, kas varbūt pietrūkst, ir savstarpēja papildināšana un sinerģija starp šīm institūcijām un to rīcību. Varbūt vismazāk spēlētāju ir jomā, kas veic informācijas jeb ietekmes caur informāciju operācijas. Taču mēs zinām visus spēlētājus.

Krievija regulāri pilnveido savu hibrīddraudu arsenālu. Kādi ir jaunākie paņēmieni, kurus esat novērojis?

Cik nu viņi pilnveido... Nē, nu, protams, ka viņi pilnveido. Piemēram, mēs redzam, ka tipiskajā "riku kastē" nav nekā īpaši jauna. Palasot padomju teorētiķu darbus no 70.–80. gadiem, redzēsim, ka lielāko daļu no tā, kas tajos aprakstīts, izmanto arī šodien. Jauni elementi redzami saistībā ar digitālās jomas izmantošanu. Par to daudz ir rakstīts – kaut vai tas, ka Krievija pērk rietumu tehnoloģiju firmu pakalpojumus, kuri tiek izmantoti ietekmes palielināšanai un sev vēlamu rezultātu sasniegšanai. Savukārt tie, kas pārdod šos pakalpojumus, pat neapzinās, kādam nolūkam un ar kādu mērķi pircējs tos liks lietā.

Kuri no NATO Stratēģiskās komunikācijas izcilības centra pētījumiem tiek izmantoti starptautiski? Ja nespēcijālistam būtu iespēja izlasīt vienu pētījumu, kuru Jūs ieteiktu?

Nespēcijālisti nav mūsu mērķauditorija. Mēs strādājam valdībām un speciālistiem NATO struktūrās. Tomēr es teiktu, ka pētījumi par sociālajiem medijiem un sociālo mediju kļūšanu par ieroci būtu jāzina ikvienam to lietotājam. Tuvākajā laikā tiks publicēts jauns pētījums par digitālo vidi, tā nosaukums ir "Digitālā hidra". Manuprāt, ikvienam, kurš darbojas sociālajos medijos, un tādi nu jau ir teju 70% no valsts iedzīvotāju skaita, būtu vēlams izlasīt, lai saprastu, kā tās lietas strādā.

Kurts Engelens, Beļģijas Eiroatlantiskās asociācijas viceprezidents, nesēn intervijā izteicās, ka NATO Stratēģiskās komunikācijas izcilības centram nav īstas ietekmes. Jūs izstrādājat pētījumus, rekomendācijas, bet tieša ietekme uz valstu rīcībpolitiku nav novērojama. Kāds ir Jūsu viedoklis par to?

Kā kurā valstī. Beļģijā noteikti nē, piekrišu. Attiecībā uz valstīm, kas piedalās NATO Stratēģiskās komunikācijas izcilības centra darbībā, situācija ir atšķirīga. Dažās valstīs mums noteikti ir ietekme uz procesu norisi. NATO iekšienē mums noteikti ir ietekme. Šajā ziņā pat varētu teikt, ka mums ir zināma ietekme arī uz procesiem ASV. Bet tas nenozīmē, ka mums ir ietekme visās valstīs. Kā jau teicu, mūsu uzdevums nav realizēt ietekmi visur un uz visiem. Mūsu mērķauditorija ir valdību un NATO struktūru eksperti.

Pēdējā Rīgas konferencē daudzi cilvēki izteicās, ka NATO būtu laiks veidot sistēmisku pretreakciju Krievijas propagandai. Mēs analizējam, bet pretreakcija, kādas konkrētas darbības, īsti nav novērojamas.

Kādu atbildi Jūs sagaidāt?

Nu, piemēram, Krievijai ir RT (*Russia Today*), “brīnišķīgs” propagandas līdzeklis. Es saprotu, ka Rietumu demokrātijas apstākļos nav pieņemami veidot propagandas rīkus, tādus kā aukstā kara laikā bija radio “Brīvā Eiropa”. Vai nebūtu laiks domāt par iedarbīgākiem līdzekļiem?

Pirmkārt, tas nav NATO uzdevums, tas ir dalībvalstu uzdevums. Ja mēs skatāmies uz dalībvalstīm, jau šobrīd ir valsts atbalstīti kanāli – *Deutsche Welle*, *BBC*. Atšķirība ir tāda, ka šajās programmās nenotiek valsts diktāts attiecībā uz saturu. Demokrātijās atskaites punkts ir mediju brīvība. Tādēļ es iepriekš uzdevu jautājumu – ko cilvēki sagaida? Vai jūs sagaidāt, ka NATO un tās dalībvalstis sāks darīt to pašu, ko Krievija? Tie, kas bļautās par ātras pretdarbības nepieciešamību, droši vien nav nopietni padomājuši par šo tēmu. Es uzskatu, ka nedrīkst atbildēt ar tiem pašiem līdzekļiem. Mums jāapzinās, ka tie ir līdzekļi, kas mūsu vērtību kontekstā nebūs taktiskā līmenī uzreiz realizējami. Otra lieta, ko daudzi mēģina darīt, tiklīdz Krievija apgalvo kādu nepatiesu faktu, ir mesties virsū un censties to atspēkot. Bet kāds ir rezultāts? Tas ir nosacīts. Pareizāk sakot, ļoti minimāls. Atspēkojums uzrunā tos, kas tam jau tic, un tērē resursus, cenšoties atspēkot to, ko otra puse jau ir pieņēmusi kā savu. Es piekristu apgalvojumam, ka pietrūkst pašu NATO dalībvalstu veidotu stāstu tai otram pusei. Bet, ja kāds domā – re, ko Krievija dara, kāpēc mēs nedarām to pašu? – es teiktu, ka, tā rīkojoties, mēs palīdzētu Krievijai.

Kāds ir Jūsu viedoklis par *Wikileaks*, kas sākumā bija vienkārši trauksmes cēlāji, bet šobrīd, saskaņā ar mediju ziņām, Krievija viņus ir izmantojusi, piemēram, ASV vēlēšanu kampaņas laikā?

Nu, mums ir pat vesela kategorija, kuru saucam par izdevīgiem idiotiem (“useful idiots”). Šajā gadījumā, protams, redzam, ka trauksmes cēlāju grupām, kuras kopumā dara labu darbu, demokrātiskā sabiedrībā jābūt no dažādām pusēm pārbaudītām, uzraudzītām. *Wikileaks* gadījumā mani šokē, ka viņi nekad nerunā par tām valdībām, kuras ir patiesi ļoti

autoritāras un attiecībā uz kurām tiešām būtu vērts pacensties un atklāt to patiesos mērķus un rīcību attiecībā uz saviem iedzīvotājiem. Man šķiet, ka tas diezgan labi visu izskaidro. Nav jau slikti, ka viņi atklāj kaut ko attiecībā uz Rietumvalstu valdībām. Bet tas, ka šie atklājumi vērsti tikai vienā virzienā, liek aizdomāties.

Tukša lapa

III

CURRENT ISSUES

Diskusija “Eiropas Savienības nākotne”

Kopsavilkums (Seminārs notika 2017. gada 6. oktobrī Bīriņos.)

Sigita Struberga,

Latvijas Universitātes Sociālo un
politisko pētījumu institūta konsultante

Diskusijas par ES nākotni un iespējamajiem tās attīstības virzieniem ir notikušas kopš tās dibināšanas brīža. Tomēr 2016. gads, kas nāca ar virkni būtisku izaicinājumu starptautiskajā vidē, īpaši aktualizēja to nozīmīgumu un ienesa tajās iekļautā diskursa maiņu. No tīri tehnokrātiska rakstura plānošanas esam atgriezušies pie fundamentāliem jautājumiem – par savienības nākotnes jēgpilnumu un saturu. To apliecina gan ES valstu līderu 2016. gada 16. septembrī diskusijas laikā Bratislavā lemtais, gan Eiropas Komisijas aktīvais darbs, kas rezultējies “Baltajā grāmatā” piedāvātajos piecos Eiropas attīstības scenārijos¹ un tam sekojošajos piecos pārdomu dokumentos². Ne mazāk nozīmīgi ir Eiropas Parlamenta ziņojumi par to, kā būtu reformējama ES, lai palielinātu tās spēju rīkoties, atjaunotu cilvēku uzticību un padarītu ekonomiku izturētspējīgāku.³

¹ European Commission. (01.03.2017.). White Paper on the Future of Europe. Izgūts (10.10.2017.) no: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/white-paper-future-europe_en

² European Commission. (2017). Reflection Papers on social dimension; harnessing globalization; deepening of the economic and monetary union; future of the European defence; EU finances. Izgūts (10.10.2017.) no: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/white-paper-future-europe/white-paper-future-europe-way-ahead_en

³ European Parliament. (24.02.2017.). Future of Europe: Debate on Reforming the EU. Izgūts (10.10.2017.) no: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/eu-affairs/20170219STO63247/future-of-europe-debate-on-reforming-the-eu>

Savukārt ES vadošo politisko amatpersonu runas liecina par dažādu iesaistīto pušu atšķirīgo skatījumu uz *status quo* un attiecīgi arī nākotnes attīstības trajektorijām. Piemēram, Eiropas Komisijas prezidents Žans Klods Junkers savā ikgadējā uzrunā par ES stāvokli 2017. gada 13. septembrī pauda nostāju, ka jāattīsta tālāk Bratislavā uzņemtais kurss un jāturpina ES kā mūsu kopējās mājas remontdarbi, lai uzbūvētu vienotāku, spēcīgāku un demokrātiskāku Eiropu līdz 2025. gadam.⁴ Savukārt Francijas prezidentam Emanuēlam Makronam ir atšķirīgs viedoklis. Viņš uzskata, ka ES ir nepieciešama fundamentāla pārbūve, nevis tikai neliels remonts.⁵

Šīs atšķirības viedokļos, kā arī daudzās balsis un toņkārtas, kas šodien izskan, norāda, ka diskusijas par ES nākotni ir sākušās visos tās līmeņos. Latvija nav izņēmums. Turklāt jāņem vērā, ka Latvijas nacionālās intereses vai tās pozīcijas netiek formulētas tikai Ārlietu ministrijā. Un, lai arī tai ir viena no vadošajām un koordinējošajām lomām šajā procesā, vienlīdz nozīmīgs ir arī citus valsts sektorus pārstāvošo institūtu un sabiedrības pārstāvju viedoklis un gatavība sadarboties ne tikai politisko nostāju izstrādē, bet arī politiku īstenošanā, tajā skaitā eiropisko ideju izskaidrošanā plašākām iedzīvotāju aprindām. Ņemot vērā iepriekš minēto, Ārlietu ministrija spējusi iesaistītās puses apvienot kopējās diskusijās un tādējādi ārpolitiska rakstura lēmumu pieņemšanu padarījusi efektīvāku, viedokļiem bagātāku un atvērtāku.

Līdz šī gada beigām Ārlietu ministrija ir iecerējusi izveidot detalizētu Latvijas valsts nostāju par Eiropas nākotnes perspektīvām un attīstības virzieniem. Attiecīgi viens no soļiem, kas tika sperts šīs nostājas izstrādē, bija diskusiju aizsākšana ar plašāku sabiedrību un nozares speciālistiem. Lai to realizētu, šī gada 6. oktobrī Biriņos notika seminārs par Eiropas nākotni, kas pulcēja vairāk nekā 50 politisko aprindu, ierēdniecības, zinātnes un pilsoniskās sabiedrības pārstāvju.

Semināra dalībniekiem tika piedāvāts pievērsties trīs lieliem jautājumiem – kādā ES Latvija nākotnē vēlas dzīvot, kam jākļūst par ES pilsoņu

⁴ European Commission President Jean – Claude Juncker State of the Union Address 2017. (13.09.2017.). Izgūts (10.10.2017.) no: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm

⁵ Francijas prezidents savā uzrunā par savu vīziju Post-Brexit Eiropas attīstībai šī gada 26. septembrī Sorbonā, Francijā paziņoja, ka šobrīd Eiropas projekts ir trauslāks nekā jebkad agrāk un ka ir nepieciešams piedāvāt jaunu vīziju, jaunu attīstības ceļu ES. Avots: Emmanuel Macron's full speech presenting his vision of post-Brexit Europe. Izgūts (10.10.2017.) no: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gRiXM8RiCOc&t=50s>

vadmotīvu, raugoties šajā nākotnē; kā dalība eirozonā varētu palīdzēt sasniegt iespējami augstāku labklājības līmeni Latvijas iedzīvotājiem un ko ES varētu vairāk darīt drošības jomā? Šāda izvēle nepārsteidz, ņemot vērā to, ka par Eiropas integrācijas projekta sūrakmeņiem tiek uzskatītas tās pamatvērtības, politiskā stabilitāte un savstarpējā uzticēšanās un ekonomiskā labklājība un drošība.

Atbilstoši tika veidota arī diskusijas struktūra. Vispirms tika spriests par vērtībām kā kopējo, nemainīgo un Eiropas nācijas vienojošo faktoru, kā arī mēģināts atbildēt, vai šodien vispār ir aktuāli ES skatīt kā uz vērtībām balstītu savienību. Sekojošā paneļdiskusijā dalībnieki sprieda par ekonomiskās izaugsmes un labklājības jautājumiem, aktualizējot tādas tēmas kā Latvijas iedzīvotāju labklājības līmeņa pielīdzināšanas iespējas vidējam ES līmenim; sociālās dimensijas stiprināšana savienības ietvaros un tās nozīme; Latvijas intereses dziļākas ekonomiskas integrācijas procesos. Savukārt sarunu ciklu noslēdza drošībai veltīta paneļdiskusija, kuras ietvaros tika spriests par ES drošības stiprināšanas iespējamām formām un Latvijas interesēm atbilstošu stratēģiju izstrādi.

Raksta mērķis ir sniegt ieskatu galvenajos jautājumos, kas tika apskatīti tikšanās laikā un kas sniegs ieguldījumu tālākajā Latvijas ārpolitiskās pozīcijas izstrādē attiecībā uz ES nākotni. Tā kā seminārs tika veidots, ievērojot *Chatham House* noteikumus, dalībnieku personiskie viedokļi vai idejas netiks citētas. Lasītājam tiks piedāvātas kopējās idejas, kas radās un tika apspriestas diskusiju laikā.

Vērtības

ES šobrīd pārdzīvo trauksmainu laiku, kam raksturīgas daudzas dažādu veidu krīzes. Tās ir izraisījušas virkni eksistenciālu jautājumu ES iedzīvotāju vidū. To skaitā ir arī jautājumi, kas vērsti uz tādu nemainīgo faktoru meklējumiem, kas līdz šim ir kalpojuši par ES virzītāju un daudzveidības konsolidētāju. Viens no tiem, neapšaubāmi, ir vērtības.

ES tika dibināta, balstoties uz vērtībām un ideju par miera un demokrātijas ienešanu reģionā. Attiecīgi brīvība, demokrātija, cilvēktiesības, laba pārvaldība, drošība un taisnīgums kļuva par dalībvalstis vienojošiem ideoloģiskajiem pamatiem. Tieši vērtības ir bijušas tās, kas ļāva mazināt atšķirības dalībvalstu pozīcijās, piemērot tādus principus politiku veidošanā

kā solidaritāte, līdztiesība un subsidaritāte. Tomēr, neraugoties uz to iedarbīgumu, Eiropā arvien skaļākas kļūst balsis, kas apšaubā šī ētiski morālā pamata atbilstību pašreizējām aktualitātēm. Arvien biežāk tiek apšaubīts, vai ir iespējama tālākā līdzāspastāvēšana saskaņā ar principu “vienoti dažādībā”. Jāatzīst, ka šīs balsis atrod dzirdīgas ausis arī iedzīvotāju vidū, par ko liecina balsotāju izvēles nesenaļās Eiropas valstu nacionālajās vēlēšanās. Izvēle ir kritusi par labu tiem, kas runājuši emocionālā, vēlētajam tuvā un saprotamā valodā, vienlaikus piedāvājot atklāti antieuropeisku pozīciju. Situāciju vieglāku nepadara ES līdz šim praktizētais, bieži vien institucionalizētais skatījums uz iedzīvotājiem un komunikācijas forma, kas izvēlēta to uzrunāšanai. Tā ir bijusi visai tehnokrātiska un drīzāk veidota tā, it kā saruna būtu ar pakalpojuma saņēmējiem, nevis pilntiesīgiem lēmumu pieņemšanas līdzdalībniekiem.

Atsaucoties uz minētajiem izaicinājumiem, diskusijas laikā dalībnieki īpašu uzmanību veltīja jautājumam par ES politisko līderu kā sabiedriskās domas veidotāju atbildību un iespējām mainīt pastāvošās iedzīvotāju orientācijas, pirmām kārtām ieviešot korekcijas savā pieejā komunikācijai ar sabiedrību. Tika piedāvāts uzrunāt ES pilsoņus patiesu emociju piepildītā, bet vienlaikus uz faktiem balstītā valodā, kas spētu piesaistīt cilvēku prātus un sirdis.

Tika izcelts arī tāds nozīmīgs aspekts kā nepieciešamība veicināt iedzīvotāju piederības izjūtu Eiropai kā vienotām mājām. Runa ir par vīziju, ko ES varētu piedāvāt par vadmotīvu saviem iedzīvotājiem. Tas ietver arī kopējo vērtību pārformulēšanu, kas ilgtermiņā spētu vienot Eiropas nācijas. Šis nav viegls uzdevums.

Apzinoties situācijas sarežģītību, semināra laikā tika piedāvāts arī no jauna aktualizēt un īpaši izcelt tādas vērtības kā demokrātiskums, dažādība un tolerance dažādībā, kā arī racionālisms. Demokrātiskums šajā izpratnē iekļauj neatkarīgu, izglītotu pilsoņu līdzatbildību par pieņemtajiem lēmumiem. Tas ir arī tiesiskums, taisnīgums, solidaritāte, cilvēka cieņa un cieņpilna dzīve. Arī dažādība un tolerance dažādībā lielā mērā var tikt uzskatīta par neatņemamu demokrātijas sastāvdaļu. Savukārt racionālisms šajā izpratnē ir drīzāk skatāms kā instruments patiesības, taisnīguma un moralitātes stiprināšanai, zināšanu akumulēšanai un kā pretnostatījums primitīvai, uz pamatinstinktiem balstītu baudu iegūšanu vērstai uzvedībai.

Kā redzams, piedāvājums nav vērsts uz konceptuāla rakstura orientāciju maiņu⁶, bet gan drīzāk uz vēl Apgaismības laikmetā noformulēto morāli – tiesisko pamatu aktualizēšanu un piemērošanu atbilstoši mūsdienu apstākļiem. Tātad faktiski ir pamats apgalvot, ka drīzāk ir nepieciešams runāt par to, ka Eiropas idejas naratīvs jāpiemēro šodienai, jāpadara tas atraktīvs un tuvs pašreizējiem Eiropas iedzīvotājiem.

Ekonomika un sociālā labklājība

Viens no pamata virzieniem, kurā tiek iemiesotas ES kopējās vērtības, ir vienotā ekonomiskā telpa, kas savulaik tika dibināta, lai nodrošinātu valstu ekonomisko izaugsmi un iedzīvotāju labklājību. To apliecina arī pārdomas, ko izraisīja pēdējo gadu ES iekšējie finansiāla rakstura izaicinājumi, piemēram, saistībā ar Grieķijas finansiālo nespēju. Šo pārdomu ietvaros radās leģitīms jautājumu kopums par solidaritātes kā praktizētas vērtības lietderību, ja vienlaikus netiek praktizēts samērīgums un disciplinētība. Solidaritātei ir jānāk kopā ar pienākumu un taisnīgumu, pretējā gadījumā par ilgtspēju runāt būs grūti.

Cits, ne mazāk nozīmīgs ideju kopums, kas izceļams, domājot par ES ekonomisko ilgtspēju un Latvijas pozīciju formulēšanu šajā kontekstā, ir saistīts ar tālāko fiskālās savienības un banku savienības attīstību un stiprināšanu. Banku savienību var uzskatīt par piemēru veiksmīgiem integrācijas procesiem un efektīvai sadarbībai. Tā ir stabila un sasniegusi ievērojamu attīstību. Savukārt ar fiskālo savienību situācija nav tik vienkārša. Kā norāda eksperti, Latvijas nacionālajām interesēm atbilstoši būtu formulēt tādu valsts pozīciju, kas iestātos par fiskālās kapacitātes celšanu, jau minēto disciplīnas noteikšanu un pārskatāmību, kā arī likuma varas nozīmīguma aktualizēšanu. Savukārt banku savienības kontekstā semināra laikā tika izcelti tie pozitīvie efekti, ko Latvijai varētu nest pilnīgas banku savienības iedibināšana.

Līdzās minētajiem jautājumiem tika spriests arī par nepieciešamību formulēt valsts pozīciju attiecībā uz kohēzijas fondu izlietojumu. Līdz šim struktūrfondi ļoti bieži tikuši saliedēti ar demokrātisko vērtību praktizēšanas

⁶ Arī līdz šim par ES pamatvērtībām tika uzskatītas demokrātija, brīvība, vienlīdzība, likuma vara un cilvēktiesību ievērošana.

jautājumiem. Šāda pieeja ir nesusi arī zināmus rezultātus ceļā uz vienmērīgāku ES dalībvalstu reģionālo attīstību⁷, tomēr vienlaikus izraisījusi virkni jautājumu par tās efektivitāti un taisnīgumu attiecībā, piemēram, uz ES pārtikušajām dalībvalstīm. Līdz ar to, iezīmējot Latvijas pozīciju attiecībā uz kohēzijas politiku pēc 2020. gada, tika piedāvāts ņemt vērā iepriekš minētos apstākļus, kā arī atcerēties, cik nozīmīga ir šī politika sociālo tiesību dimensijas attīstībā.

Pašreiz ES sociālā dimensija ir daudz vājāk izteikta nekā ekonomiskā. Situācija gan var mainīties, pateicoties Eiropas Komisijas pasludinātajai iecerei par ES sociālo tiesību pilāra izveidi. Tā mērķis ir nodrošināt jaunu, efektīvāku pilsoņu sociālo tiesību nodrošināšanu trīs pamata kategorijās: vienlīdzīgās iespējās un pieejā darba tirgum; taisnīgos darba apstākļos; sociālajā aizsardzībā un iekļaušanā.⁸

Diskutējot par ieteikumiem Latvijas pozīcijas formulēšanai, eksperti nonāca pie secinājuma, ka nav iespējams runāt par vienotas pabalstu vai atalgojuma sistēmas radīšanu. Drīzāk ir nepieciešams uzsvērt vienotu principu ievērošanas nodrošināšanu. Tas nozīmē arī minimālo standartu paaugstināšanu visās ES dalībvalstīs. Līdzīgi ir ar nodokļiem – arī te galvenokārt ir jārunā nevis par nodokļu novienādošanu, bet gan to uzlikšanas principu pielīdzināšanu. Tiek pieļauts, ka šādas aktivitātes ilgtermiņā varētu novest pie sociālās konverģences, kas nozīmētu kā algu līmeņa pakāpenisku izlīdzināšanos, tā arī sociālās solidaritātes līmeņa celšanos.

Apkopojot minētās idejas, semināra dalībnieki vienojās, ka virzieni, kas atbilstu valsts nacionālajām interesēm, ir plašāka un dziļāka integrācija kā ekonomikas, tā arī labklājības jomā. Savukārt diskutējot par to, kam būtu jābūt šī procesa virzītājspēkam, tika secināts, ka tai ir jābūt Eiropas Komisijai, kas līdz šim pierādījusi spēju risināt līdzīgus jautājumus efektīvāk nekā dalībvalstis.

⁷ European Comitee of Regions. (10.10.2017.). Cohesion Alliance: MEPs join local leaders' fight for a strong cohesion policy post 2020. Press release. Izgūts (10.10.2017.) no: <http://cor.europa.eu/en/news/Pages/Cohesion-Alliance-MEPs-join-local-leaders-fight.aspx>

⁸ European Commision. (2017). *European Pillar of Social Rights*. Izgūts (10.10.2017.) no: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/deeper-and-fairer-economic-and-monetary-union/european-pillar-social-rights_en

Drošība

Drošības dimensija ir vēl viena ārkārtīgi aktuāla joma ne tikai Latvijai kā nacionālai valstij pastāvošo apdraudējumu kontekstā, bet arī domājot par citām dalībvalstīm un ES kopumā. Apdraudējums Eiropai ir daudz nopietnāks, nekā ES dalībvalstis to uztver un formulē. Krievijas radītie hibrīdraudi, kā arī karadarbība Sīrijā, kas izraisījusi milzīgu spiedienu uz Eiropas ārējo un iekšējo drošību, ir tikai redzamākā daļa. ES kā globālam spēlētājam ir jāiesaistās arī vairāku tādu problēmu bloku risināšanā kā, piemēram, reģionālie konflikti, varas izmaiņas starptautiskajos tirgos, dzeramā ūdens trūkums, bads, infekcijas slimības, klimata pārmaiņas un ekoloģija.

Līdz šim ES dalībvalstu realizētās aktivitātes ir demonstrējušas salīdzinoši aktīvu iesaisti aprakstīto izaicinājumu risināšanā. Kā piemēru te iespējams minēt ES Ārējās darbības dienestu, viens no kura darbības pamata virzieniem ir miera stiprināšana un konfliktu novēršana. Kā instrumenti minēto aktivitāšu realizācijai tiek izmantoti mediācija un konfliktu novēršana, krīžu menedžments, pēckonflikta stabilizācija un normatīvo tiklu ieviešana. ES ir pasaules lielākais humanitārās palīdzības donors un miera stiprināšanas atbalstītājs dažādos pasaules reģionos. Vienlaikus joprojām tiek runāts par nepieciešamību pilnveidot radīto sistēmu ar mērķi paaugstināt darbības efektivitāti.

Līdzīgi valstu ciešākās sadarbības centieni ir novērojami arī ES iekšējās drošības stiprināšanā. Tomēr joprojām nav panākta valstu vienprātība par, piemēram, prokuratūru savienību un citiem līdzīgiem dziļākas savstarpējās integrācijas projektiem, kas uzskatāmi par īpaši jutīgiem un ne tik viegli risināmiem. Vienlaikus nonākt pie risinājuma, kas vērsts uz sadarbību, spiež terorisma radītie draudi un nepieciešamība kontrolēt un koordinēt migrācijas rezultātā Eiropā ieplūdušo indivīdu plūsmu.

Iepriekš minētais, no vienas puses, liek domāt par steidzamiem risinājumiem pastāvošā vājuma novēršanai, bet no otras – ļauj šo situāciju uzlūkot kā iespēju logu ES drošības struktūras stiprināšanai. Formulējot ieteikumus Latvijas pozīcijas veidošanai šajā jautājumā, drošības eksperti tikšanās laikā nāca klajā ar vairākiem uzdevumiem valstij. Pirmkārt, runa ir par nepieciešamību diferencēt savas drošības stratēģijas, nepaļaujoties tikai un vienīgi uz NATO atbalstu. Īpaši aktuāli tas ir, ņemot vērā pastāvošo draudu hibrīdo formu, kas ierobežo iespējas, uz tiem reaģējot, iedarbināt NATO piekto

pantu par kolektīvo aizsardzību. Turklāt pašreizējā ES drošības diskursa tuvināšanās NATO diskursam un abu pušu sadarbības paplašināšanās⁹ liecina par dalībvalstu meklējumiem pēc drošības nodrošinājuma, kombinējot abu starptautisko institucionālo ietvaru piedāvātos instrumentus. Attiecīgi Latvijas nacionālajās interesēs būtu veicināt arī turpmāku šāda veida sadarbības padziļināšanos.

Otrkārt, diskusijas laikā tika uzsvērtā nepieciešamība stiprināt valsts kapacitāti drošības apdraudējumu novēršanai. Līdzās vēl darāmajam eksperti izcēla arī to, cik nozīmīgi ir apzināt jau izdarīto un veicināt tā popularizēšanu sabiedroto vidū, tādējādi demonstrējot Latvijas politisko gribu un spēju panākt vērā ņemamus rezultātus kā nacionālās drošības stiprināšanā, tā arī sniedzot atbalstu kopējās reģionālās drošības pilnveidei.

Treškārt, apspriežamo jautājumu lokā tika iekļauti iespējamie ES drošības savienības izveides scenāriji, kas atbilstu Latvijas interesēm. To starpā dalībnieki izcēla tādus iespējamus projektus kā, piemēram, vienota militārā štāba un kopēja aizsardzības plāna izveidi, kā arī kopējo militāro spēju stiprināšanu, tajā skaitā nodrošinot darboties spējīgas kaujas vienības.

Papildus iepriekš minētajam tika izcelts arī jautājums par iespējām, kas tādējādi varētu pavērties kā militārās industrijas, tā arī zinātnes attīstībai. Piemēram, atsevišķas Latvijas kompānijas IT jomā jau ir spējušas nodemonstrēt savas spējas starptautiskajā drošības sistēmu tirgū, tajā skaitā vairāku NATO programmu attīstīšanā. Tomēr ierobežojumi, kas saistīti ar nepietiekamo finansējumu pētniecības attīstībai, ir atstājuši iespaidu arī uz šo jomu, tādēļ pieejamais potenciāls līdz šim nav ticis pilnvērtīgi izmantots.

Kā redzams, semināra laikā skaidri iezīmējās tendence ne tikai nostāties par labu kolektīvās drošības un aizsardzības nodrošināšanas stiprināšanai, bet arī vienlaikus veidot uz sevi centrētu individuālās izturētspējas (angļu val. – *resilience*) vektoru, kas attiecīgi paredz visu apspriesto jomu attīstību savstarpējas mijiedarbības procesā. Tas nozīmē, ka tādējādi tiktu attīstīta spēja veiksmīgi izpildīt starptautisko institūtu uzdotos mājasdarbus, kā arī celtas prasmes attīstīt nacionālo drošību patstāvīgi. Seminārā tika runāts arī par to, cik nozīmīgi ir attīstīt skaidru valsts pozīciju ne tikai Latvijai aktuālo drošības jautājumu kontekstā, bet arī saistībā ar tiem izaicinājumiem, ar ko

⁹ ES un NATO sadarbība institucionālā līmenī tiek vērtēta kā efektīva, īpaši jomās, kas attiecas uz hibrīdraudiem. Šai sadarbībai ir *ad hoc* raksturs, un ne visas dalībvalstis tiek informētas par tās izpausmēm.

sastopas citas ES dalībvalstis vai ar ko sastopas ES kā globāls spēlētājs. Runa ir nevis par kādu ievērojamus resursus prasošu aktivitāšu realizāciju, bet gan drīzāk par skaidras pozīcijas un politiskās gribas paušanu, kas ir nozīmīga valsts pozīciju stiprināšanai ES ietvaros.

Semināra diskusiju noslēgumā dalībnieki secināja, ka Latvijas interesēs ir Eiropas ciešāka integrācija un tās atrašanās ES kodolā jeb pirmā ātruma blokā. Vienlaikus ir arī skaidrs, ka, ja valsts vēlas būt šajā kodolā, ir jāveic virkne mājas darbu, jo tas nav atkarīgs tikai no vēlmes. Ne mazāk nozīmīgas ir arī ekonomiskās un politiskās spējas, kā arī spējas definēt savu pozīciju. Ja šī pozīcija ir skaidra un tiek salāgota ar citu valstu pozīcijām, valstij ir visas iespējas būt ES kodolā.



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